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SPORTS.COMM: IT TAKES A VILLAGE TO
BUILD A SPORTS FACILITY
MARTIN J. GREENBERG∗
&
DENNIS HUGHES, JR. ∗∗ 1
In the past twenty years, over 100 new or renovated sports facilities have
In the 1990s,
been developed in cities across the United States. 2
approximately $15 billion was spent on major league facilities, with
approximately $11 billion of the funding contributed by state and local
governments. 3 Since 2003, the four major sports leagues—Major League
Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL)—have seen the
development of twenty-one new facilities, at a cost of over $16 billion,4 nearly
equal to the cost of the sixty-five facilities built the decade before. 5
As stadium costs, not to mention revenues, continue to rise, the American
taxpayer continues to be the largest underwriter of sports facilities for its home
teams. For example, in MLB during the 1990s, nine new stadiums were
completed 6 with over eighty percent of the cost of those MLB ballparks
∗
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1. Special thanks to the following for their research on this article: Laurie Frey, Daniel Friedman,
Doug Fuglsang, Elise Harris, Rachel Lindsay, and Robert Wagener
2. Nick Rieder, An Analysis of Sports Facility Costs and Developments from 1989–2009, 10
SPORTS FACILITY REPORTS 3 (2009) available at https://law.marquette.edu/images/sports/v10-sportsfacility-costs.pdf.
3. Christopher Gregory, The House that Joe Taxpayer Built: Preserving the Role of Baseball
Stadiums Without Providing Distorted Public Subsidies, 1 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 3 (2004),
available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/sportslaw/spring04/gregory_stadiums.pdf.
4. See Nick Rieder, supra note 2, at 4.
5. See id. at 3.
6. Tropicana Field (Tampa Bay Rays), U.S. Cellular Field (Chicago White Sox), Oriole Park at
Camden Yards (Baltimore Orioles), Rangers Ballpark in Arlington (Texas Rangers), Progressive
Field (Cleveland Indians), Coors Field (Colorado Rockies), Turner Field (Atlanta Braves), Chase
Field (Arizona Diamondbacks), and Safeco Field (Seattle Mariners).
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financed through public resources. 7 From 2000 through the planned
construction of the new Miami Marlins ballpark in 2012, fourteen MLB
stadiums have or will be completed. 8 Fifty-four percent of the cost of those
MLB ballparks was financed through public resources. 9 Twenty-three of the
thirty MLB teams received new or renovated stadiums during the period from
1990 to 2010. Therefore, most MLB teams were able to take advantage of a
booming American economy during the 1990s and early 2000s to convince
local taxpayers to help finance their stadiums.
The trend towards primarily public financing of sports facilities has finally
begun to shift as a result of today’s recessionary economy. The poor economy
has: (1) led to a lack of political support, (2) decreased public appetite for
funding state-of-the-art facilities, (3) limited state governmental capacity to
finance large-scale infrastructure projects, (4) forced state governments to
reprioritize spending, and (5) decreased the desirability of using municipal
bonds to finance a stadium construction project. Therefore, economic and
political realities necessarily require more private-side participation in order to
construct future sports facilities. More private-side participation may include
an increase in the owner’s cash contribution, league contributions, private
loans, further sharing of contractually obligated income, service provider
participation, business and charitable community contributions, more
utilization of personal seat licenses and seat mortgages, unique integrated
partnerships, the investment of gambling interests, and auxiliary real estate
development, to name a few.
Opponents of public financing for stadium construction argue that sports
venues financed largely with public dollars (“sports pork”) are nothing more
than a form of public subsidy to benefit leagues, private team owners, and
players. They claim that governmental units throughout the country are
mortgaging their future to the sports industry. Opponents also refuse to
acknowledge statistics that demonstrate how stadiums create a net positive
economic impact through the direct and indirect benefits sports venues can
7. BRIAN REICH, BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN CITY: AN EXAMINATION OF PUBLIC
FINANCING AND STADIUM CONSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, URBAN STUDIES
3546 (2001), available at http://www.stadiummouse.com/stadium/economic.html.
8. AT&T Park (San Francisco Giants), Minute Made Park (Houston Astros), Comerica Park
(Detroit Tigers), PNC Park (Pittsburgh Pirates), Miller Park (Milwaukee Brewers), Great American
Ball Park (Cincinnati Reds), PETCO Park (San Diego Padres), Citizens Bank Park (Philadelphia
Phillies), Busch Stadium (St. Louis Cardinals), Nationals Park (Washington Nationals), Yankee
Stadium (New York Yankees), Citi Field (New York Mets), Target Field (Minnesota Twins), and
New Marlins Ballpark (Florida Marlins).
9. Josh Goodman, Skybox Skeptics: It’s Getting Harder and Harder for Baseball Teams to
Wrangle Public Money for New Stadiums, GOVERNING (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.governing.com/
topics /economic-dev/Skybox-Skeptics.html.
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provide a city. They argue that the positive economic impact that a sports
facility creates simply represents a transfer of dollars from one entertainment
source to another within a city. Therefore, as the American economy has
slowed, the critics of “sports pork” have become much more aggressive in
their attempts to derail even reasonable public financing proposals.
It is not the purpose of this article to draw the reader into such debate.
The franchise owner pays dearly in the form of an acquisition or franchise fee
to bring a sports team to a community. 10 To obtain and maintain sports
franchises in a community, governmental units are likewise required to pay a
municipal entitlement or franchise fee. 11 The municipal entitlement or
franchise fee usually takes the form of the public’s creation or renovation of a
team sports facility; it is the cost of sitting at the table and being a major
league city. 12
In the modern context, a sports facility is more than a place to view a
sporting event. Sports venues have become a catalyst for urban transformation
or revitalization. A sports facility is a destination place, an entertainment
district, a bundling stimulus, a real estate development, and a place where
people can work, eat, watch, congregate, buy, and socialize. Sports facility
development is nothing more than real estate development. If constructed
thoughtfully, a sports facility could convert the image of a league or team
owner from a tax vulture into a long-term leader and visionary for a
community. Moreover, a newly constructed or renovated venue can bring
complete renewal and revitalization to blighted areas, environmentally
hazardous sites, aged communities, or near-downtown areas. Real estate
development has become a central component of sports facility development,
and the results thereof—urban revitalization and transformation—may be as
important as the building of the sports facility itself.
Sports facilities have long been a staple of the economic recovery tool kit
and are intended to jump-start the recovery of dilapidated or vacant urban
districts. 13 A major shift in the focus of economic development and rationale
used to justify these investments has occurred in the past decade. While
previous decades saw stadium proponents emphasize the indirect economic
benefits of a new facility using terms such as “spin-offs,” “multipliers,” and
10. Darren Rovell, NHL Franchise Fees: Is the Price Right?, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2007), http://a.
espncdn .com/nhl/s/expansion4a.html.
11. Martin J. Greenberg, Sports Facility Financing and Development Trends in the United States,
15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 93, 154 (2004).
12. Id.
13. DENNIS COATES & BRAD R. HUMPHREYS, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES, FRANCHISES,
AND URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UMBC ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT WORKING PAPER 03103, 2, available at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_03_103.pdf.
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“job creation,” the current economic development rationale for almost all of
these projects rests upon the idea of district redevelopment; that is: the facility
is a catalyst for physical redevelopment of a portion of the city’s core.
Special Activity Generator (SAG) is a strategy for downtown
redevelopment centered on the idea that large facilities that generate special
activity within a district can anchor redevelopment within that district by
drawing visitors and suburbanites to downtown for events. 14 This influx of
people can provide the critical mass necessary to support other commercial
activities in the district. In addition, these large projects can galvanize other
investments in the district by the public sector in the form of new
infrastructure or urban design improvements which help to establish and
sustain a revitalized district.
The SAG strategy has three central objectives: (1) to generate spillover
spending benefits for the surrounding district, (2) to produce new construction
within a district, and (3) to rejuvenate a blighted area. Based on these broad
objectives, three indicators of successful urban redevelopment can be derived,
including reuse of existing buildings or spaces, new construction within the
surrounding district, and emergence of a new entertainment or sports district.
As a result of the growing use of sports facilities as economic generators, team
owners and cities have begun to focus their stadium financing proposals on the
venue’s ability to catalyze redevelopment utilizing the objectives and
indicators mentioned above. This trend has led to the creation of a new type
of sports venue that combines the needs of a sports franchise with the needs of
a community to create a regional sports and entertainment destination, or
sports.comm.
This article will address the relationship between sports facilities, real
estate, and urban development. Part I will discuss the concept of a receptive
community and what subsidies governmental units have been willing to assist
in with respect to the real estate development component of a sports.comm.
Part II of the article will discuss the theory of concentric circles, which is the
happenstance or rippling economic development that results from placing a
sports venue in a community. Part III will discuss the concept of
sports.comm; that is, a planned community utilizing the sports facility as the
anchor for a larger planned development. Part IV of the article will next
discuss the recent phenomenon of the delayed sports.comm. Part V will
analyze delayed or failed sports.comm projects. Part VI will give an overview
of the future of sports.comm development. Finally, Part VII of this article will
14. Timothy S. Chapin, Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, 70 J. AM.
PLANNING ASS’N 193, 194 (2004), available at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ord/e9e4f2
ed094eee898825793600641064/$file/sportsfacilities1.pdf.
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highlight the best practices that should be utilized for the successful creation
of a sports.comm.
I.

RECEPTIVE COMMUNITIES

If the surrounds of a sports facility are going to experience real estate and
economic development, both the facility and the development must be part of
a “receptive community.” A receptive community has a number of
components.
First, a receptive community must have a need or desire for a new or
renovated sports facility and envision the sports facility as the centerpiece for
future real estate development. Preferably, the venue is located in the
downtown or near downtown area, wherein the current use of the land or
improvements are blighted, environmentally impacted, underdeveloped, aged,
or socially impacted.
Second, a receptive community must have a political or civic leader or
organization that takes center stage and advocates for either a new sports
facility or a renovated sports facility as the centerpiece for real estate
development and transformation of an area of that community.
Third, the area in which the new or renovated sports facility is to be
located must be surrounded by properties that accommodate auxiliary
development with land assemblage possibilities. In the alternative, there must
be the availability of publicly owned or acquired properties that have strong
site characteristics and strong potential for adjacent development and public
infrastructure such as transit, roads, and parking.
Fourth, if the community does not have sufficient area to accommodate
auxiliary real estate development, the community must have the financial
capability and desire to exercise statutory or quick-take condemnation power
in order to deliver land as part of the assemblage in an expeditious manner.
Fifth, a receptive community must have a governmental unit that has or is
willing to adopt flexible zoning laws for the proposed development, which
allows for multiple and mixed uses as well as increased density.
Sixth, a receptive community must also provide incentives to locate the
real estate development as part of a sports facility development by providing
roadway and infrastructure construction, beautification, enhancements,
utilities, parking, potential leasing of the property developed, tax abatement,
reduction of impact fees, expedited permitting and approval, waiver of various
development requirements, and willingness, as previously stated, to assemble
adjacent lands.
Finally, a receptive community involves governmental units that have the
availability and willingness to utilize financial incentive tools and subsidies to
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promote real estate and economic development.
Some of the tools that communities can use and have used as incentives
for real estate and economic development include the following:
A.

Tax Increment Financing (TIF) Districts

TIF districts were first utilized in California in 1952 and are now used in
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia to meet each area’s unique
economic development needs and challenges. 15 Most notably, TIF has been
utilized in the development of Nationwide Arena, which is discussed in detail
below. TIF helps local communities attract private development and new
businesses utilizing local resources that do not depend upon an increase in
taxes or the reduction of other services. 16 The theory behind TIF is simple.
TIF is a tool that utilizes projected future expansion of the overall tax base to
finance current improvements that theoretically will create the gains. 17 In
essence, a governmental unit makes expenditures to promote development that
would not otherwise be likely to occur. Thereafter, the resulting development
increases the tax base by attracting new business. Other taxing jurisdictions
within the TIF district (such as school districts, county, technical colleges and
the like) agree to forego the increase in property tax revenue so that the
governmental unit can use it exclusively to repay the cost of public
improvements. 18 If the development results in an increased tax base, the
governmental unit recoups the cost of their investment, and thereafter, all
taxing jurisdictions that are part of the TIF district share in the new tax base.
For example, assume that a governmental unit wants to redevelop a
designated area that includes parcels that contain substandard, obsolete, and
vacant or merely vacant commercial buildings. Assume that these parcels are
currently paying $90,000 per year in real estate taxes. The local government
unit determines that by making an investment of $2.5 million to rehabilitate
those buildings and provide necessary infrastructure, private developers will
commit an additional $8 million, making the commercial buildings available
for rental and utilization. These additional investments cause the real estate to
increase in assessed valuation, and the real estate taxes paid on these parcels to
increase from $90,000 per year to $210,000 per year. The project would then
result in $120,000 of new tax increment each year, which the governmental
unit could use to offset its original investment in the property.
15. CRAIG L. JOHNSON, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS 1
(Nov. 2002), http://www.realtor.org/smart_growth.nsf/docfiles/TIFreport.pdf/$FILE/TIFreport.pdf.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 6.
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State-enabling legislation gives local governmental units the authority to
designate TIF districts. The districts usually have legislatively mandated time
periods including a maximum expiration and maximum life periods. 19 Most
governments that utilize TIF districts must utilize a “but for” test, which
mandates that the governmental unit demonstrate that the area would not have
been developed or redeveloped but for the public investment provided through
the TIF.
TIF designated properties must be blighted, declining,
underperforming, vacant, contaminated, or in need of basic development. 20
Following approval, the tax base in the blighted district is frozen at the
predevelopment level. Real estate taxes continue to be paid, but the real estate
taxes derived from increases in the assessed value resulting from new
development (the tax increment) either go into a special fund created to retire
bonds issued to originate the development or leverage future growth in the TIF
district. The tax freeze lasts for a defined period of time as set forth either in
the redevelopment plan or by statute. 21 At the end of the defined period,
taxing jurisdictions enjoy the benefit of increased property values, and
therefore, increased real estate taxes. In some instances, revenue streams other
than real estate taxes are used as increments. Increases in sales and use taxes
and even project-related income taxes are the most readily available revenue
recapture targets.
A TIF program may also be developer-financed. With a developerfinanced TIF, the governmental unit “borrows the funds for project costs not
by issuing general obligation debt to be held by the public but by issuing
limited obligation debt to the developer.” 22 The developer lends money to the
governmental unit; the governmental unit uses the money to pay for the
project costs to help the developer’s project; and the loan is evidenced by a
debt instrument issued by the governmental unit to the developer or developer
bond. 23 Under the developer bond, the governmental unit repays the
developer out of tax increment that is generated by the district. 24 A
governmental unit’s obligation is limited to the amount of tax increment
actually generated. 25
A developer-financed TIF is desirable for a
governmental unit because it uses none of its constitutional debt capacity and
19. Id. at 12–13.
20. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 66.1105(2)(ae) (2011).
21. JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 7–8.
22. Jesse S. Ishikawa, Developer-Funded Tax Incremental Financing: Promoting Development
Without Breaking the Bank, 79 WIS. LAWYER 5 (May 2006), available at http://www.wisbar.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=57609.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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because it shifts the financial risks of the project not generating sufficient
increment from the governmental unit to the developer. 26
TIF may be utilized by numerous projects related to sports venue
development and may be used to cover a variety of construction costs.
Typical TIF projects include the creation and financing of public infrastructure
improvements such as sewers, waterways, and streets; redevelopment of
blighted, substandard, obsolete, or vacated buildings; demolition; land
acquisition and assemblage; professional studies; and remediation of
contaminated or polluted areas. Depending upon the state’s enabling
legislation, some or all of the following costs may utilize TIF financing: the
administration of a TIF redevelopment project; property acquisition and
assemblage; rehabilitation; construction of public works and improvements;
relocation; job training; financing costs; studies, surveys and plans; marketing;
and professional services.
B.

New Market Tax Credits

New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) were established under the Community
Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000. 27 The NMTC program allows taxpayers to
claim a credit against federal income taxes for qualified equity investments
made to acquire stock or a capital interest in designated Community
Development Entities (CDE). 28 The most notable use of NMTC financing in
the development of a sports.comm was the Benson Family’s redevelopment of
the Superdome, discussed below.
A CDE is the vehicle through which NMTC investments are made. A
qualified CDE’s primary mission is to serve the needs of or provide
investment capital to low-income communities or individuals. Once a CDE is
certified by the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI
Fund), it can apply to the CDFI Fund for an allocation of NMTCs.
Allocations are subject to an aggregate annual dollar limit, currently $3.5
billion, and are made once a year. 29
CDEs sell tax credits in exchange for investors’ equity investment in the
CDE referred to as a qualified equity investment. 30 CDEs have five years to

26. Id.
27. New Markets Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (May 2010), http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/article/0,,id=223578,00.html#2.
28. Id.
29. Treasury Announces 3.5 Billion in Awards for Economic Development and Community
Revitalization, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 24, 2011.
30. New Markets Tax Credit, supra note 27.
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use or sell all of their tax credits. 31 The investor receives a tax credit equal to
five percent of the total amount paid for the capital investment or stock
purchase over the first three years. 32 For the final four years, the value of the
tax credit is six percent annually. 33 In essence, then, investors receive tax
credits over a seven-year period, and the tax credits amount to 39% of the
equity investment in the CDE. 34 For example, if an investor invests $1
million in a CDE, the investor receives tax credits totaling $390,000 over
seven years.
Businesses eligible to receive NMTC financing must be active and located
in low-income communities as defined by NMTC regulations. Generally, a
low-income community is defined as a census tract with a poverty rate of at
least 20% or with a medium income of up to 80% of the area or statewide
medium, whichever is greater. 35 A qualified, active, low-income community
business must derive at least half of its gross income from business in the
eligible area and must have a substantial portion (40%) of its tangible property
located in the low-income community. 36 Finally, the business must perform a
substantial portion (40%) of its services in any low-income community. 37
C.

EB-5 Visa for Immigrant Investors Program

Created by the Immigration Act of 1990, the EB-5 Visa for Immigrant
Investors program provides a method for obtaining a green card to foreign
nationals who invest money in the United States that is strategically aimed at
stimulating economic activity and job growth in America. 38 The foreign
national is required to invest $1 million, although the amount is reduced to
$500,000 if the investment is made in a rural or high unemployment area. 39
Ten or more new jobs must be created by the investment. 40 Under the EB-5
program, a two-year visa can be converted into a green card that provides
permanent U.S. residency privileges to the investor, his spouse, and

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The EB-5 Investment Visa, THE EB-5 GREEN CARD INVESTMENT VISA, http://www.eb5green
card.com/eb5visa/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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children. 41 After holding the green card for five years, the investor and his
family are eligible for citizenship. 42 EB-5 financing has most recently been
utilized in the development of the Barclays Center in Brooklyn, New York.
Of the 10,000 EB-5 green cards available each year, 3000 are reserved for
foreign nationals who invest through a Regional Center. 43 The EB-5 program
does not require the foreign national to directly employ ten U.S. workers. 44 In
fact, the individual receiving the visa is not required to actively manage the
business in which he invested. Instead, it is enough if ten or more jobs will be
created directly or indirectly as a result of the foreign national’s investment. 45
The EB-5 Visa program has been renewed several times and is currently due
to expire September 30, 2012. 46
Senators John Kerry (D-ME) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) introduced the
Start Up Visa Act of 2010 in an effort to modify the existing EB-5 Visa
Program. 47 The new Act would allow immigrant entrepreneurs who are
creating new companies in the United States to secure a two-year EB-6 visa to
come to the United States if investment capital is secured from a sponsoring
U.S. venture capital or angel investor of at least $250,000. 48 The person
would become a permanent U.S. resident after two years if his or her start-up
business has met one of three criteria: (1) created five full-time jobs in the
United States, (2) raised an additional $1 million from investors, or (3)
achieved $1 million in revenues. 49 The purpose, once again, of the EB-6 is to
increase America’s global competitiveness by creating a new magnet for
innovations and innovators to come to the United States and create jobs.
D.

Other Real Estate Incentives

Governmental units may provide other incentives, subsidies, and programs

41. About EB-5, EB-5 GREEN CARD VISA PROGRAM, http://eb5central.com/about-eb5/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
42. Id.
43. Frequently Asked Questions, EB-5 GREEN CARD VISA PROGRAM, http://eb5central.com/eb5faq/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
44. EB-5 Regional Center, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (May 18, 2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2
785a5f224a2e210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=2785a5f224a2e210VgnVCM10
0000082ca60aRCRD.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Pei Kuo, Interpreting the Startup Visa Act, RIMON LAW GROUP (June 22, 2011), http://www.
rimonlaw.com/blog/2011/06/22/interpreting-the-startup-visa-act.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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such as debt financing, debt guarantees, credit enhancements, loan insurance,
seed capital tax credits, freezing property taxes at predevelopment level for a
predetermined period, grants, and tax abatement to add to the toolbox to
incentivize the development of real estate. Moreover, the federal government
can provide extra incentives through legislation such as the recently expired
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which provided low-cost bond
financing in the form of Build America Bonds, Recovery Zone Bonds, and
Recovery Zone Facility Bonds.
II.

CONCENTRIC CIRCLES

In the 1990s, we witnessed the redevelopment of downtown or neardowntown blighted areas with the construction of new state-of-the-art
ballparks. The new stadiums that have been built in downtown or neardowntown areas have not only increased team revenue but have contributed to
the economic growth of the surrounding neighborhoods. Sports facilities
provide a greater economic impact when located in an urban area, which is
more likely to be in need of infrastructure improvement and attract crowds due
to the concentration of people in a central business district. 50 These
impressions have led to the use of new sports and entertainment facilities as
the main centerpieces for urban redevelopment. In many communities, the
construction or renovation of a sports venue has created happenstance real
estate and economic development surrounding the venue. The sports facility
stimulates concentric circles of development surrounding the sports venue. 51
Team owners and real estate developers realize the potential benefits of
constructing a new facility and from developing the surrounding land.
Because of developed and redeveloped sports facilities, blighted and inner city
areas have turned into attractive gathering places for tourists and local citizens
alike. A sports facility is created, and over time, the area around the facility
develops into a popular destination place and entertainment district. These
sports facilities become a staple of economic recovery, as the new facilities
represent progress in dilapidated inner cities. 52 The stadiums draw attention
to the cities as areas of commerce and culture. 53 Therefore, sports facilities

50. Welch Suggs, Suburban Fling is Ending as Arenas Return Downtown, SPORTS BUS. DAILY
(Apr. 27, 1998), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/1998/04/19980427/No-TopicName/Suburban-Fling-Is-Ending-As-Arenas-Return-Downtown.aspx.
51. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 155.
52. Tim Chapin, Investigating District and Sports Facility Synergy, 6 (2000) (report prepared for
CMC Heartland Partners for the Shops Area Project in Milwaukee, WI).
53. Id.
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have become the most popular tool for urban revitalization. 54 The concept of
concentric circles starts when the only real estate that is planned is the sports
facility itself. Because of the number of people that come into the area, both
on a permanent and nonpermanent basis, it only makes sense to develop
support-type real estate, which may include housing, service-type
establishments to support the housing, offices, other types of entertainment
activities such as restaurants, movies and, of course, shopping.
The concept of concentric circles works because new sports facilities
attract businesses to the neighborhoods surrounding the sports facility, which
creates additional jobs and consumer spending. Additionally, sports facilities
bring new crowds to a district and require upgraded physical investments such
as widened roads and interchanges, pedestrian pathways, and parking
garages. 55 These factors create an incentive for new hotels, restaurants, and
businesses to move to a city, which serves to revitalize a city by creating more
economic activity, even out of season. 56 The downtown areas then generate
higher hotel occupancy, restaurant patronage, retail jobs, and city revenues as
the fans can walk from the stadium to restaurants and bars to celebrate. 57 The
districts themselves have become as much of an attraction as the events and
facilities in the cities. 58
A downtown or near-downtown stadium, where the surrounding area is
developed, benefits both the owner and the taxpayer. The use of a new sports
facility specifically designed as the centerpiece for economic development
makes the public funding of these facilities easier to swallow. When asked to
help fund a new stadium, the taxpayers and public officials want something for
their financial assistance. A stadium specifically designed to take advantage
of the concentric circle effect can satisfy investors and taxpayers alike by
attracting new businesses that will create additional jobs and consumer
spending for the benefit of the community.
Some of America’s deteriorating inner cities have provided the perfect
testing ground. This has been especially true in cities with baseball stadiums.
Three baseball stadiums in particular, opened in the 1990s, are properly
considered to have spurred the trend of neighborhood economic development
and revitalization through the development of a sports venue, namely: Camden
Yards, home of the Baltimore Orioles (now known as Oriole Park at Camden

54. Id.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id.
57. Lawrence O. Houstoun, Jr., Sitting Stadiums for Fun and Profit, available at http://
lhoustoun.wordpress.com/public-spaces/stadiums/.
58. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 201.
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Yards), opened in 1992; Jacobs Field, Home of the Cleveland Indians (now
known as Progressive Field), opened in 1994; and Coors Field, home of the
Colorado Rockies, opened in 1995. The concept was extended beyond
baseball stadiums in 1999 with the development of the Staples Center, home
of the Los Angeles Lakers and Los Angeles Clippers NBA franchises.
A.

Camden Yards

In the 1980s, Baltimore’s downtown, located on a historic seaport,
experienced a dramatic renaissance and revitalization. A new convention
center, the National Aquarium, and the Maryland Science Center attracted
tourists and Baltimore residents to the downtown Inner Harbor neighborhood,
which resulted in property values increasing and further new development
occurring. 59 The downtown Inner Harbor neighborhood has become an iconic
Baltimore Landmark and today is the destination of not only the aforereferenced centerpieces of development, but also the American Visionary Art
Museum, Baltimore Museum of Industry, Geppi’s Entertainment Museum,
Port Discovery Children’s Museum, and First Mariner Arena, to name a
More recently, the Inner Harbor neighborhood has seen the
few. 60
development of the Legg Mason Tower, Ritz Carlton residences, and Harbor
View Pier homes. 61
As a result, perhaps no city has garnered more attention and acclamation
for its downtown revitalization and rehabilitation efforts than Baltimore,
Maryland. “Baltimore ‘is the town cities unabashedly seek to copy to revive
their own decaying downtowns.’” 62 The culmination and accumulation of
these projects have helped to create a “tourist bubble” in which a well-defined
perimeter separates the tourist space from the rest of the city. 63
59. Community Development: Compatibility of Waste-to-Energy Projects, WHEELABRATOR
TECHS. INC., http://wheelabratortechnologies.com/?LinkServID=F38DDE7B-5056-905C-36BC49EE
0820D9F7&showMeta=0 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
60. Baltimore’s
Inner
Harbor:
Shore
Things,
ICW
FACILITIES
GUIDE,
http://www.icwfacilitiesguide.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=C872B1F7A9AD47719F6661AFF137D958
&nm=ICW+Side+Trips&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=B6194D77191
9466D93892A36D69B131F&tier=4&id=9C16E4322E56456E99D944CF6B3072CC (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
61. Edward Grunts, Redrawing Downtown: Shift Adds Vibrancy Along Harbor, Vacancy in City
Core, BALT. SUN, July 7, 2009, at 1A.
62. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 197 (quoting Neal
Peirce, Is Baltimore Unique?, BALT. MAG. 69 (Oct. 2000)).
63. Nick Bailey, The Challenge and Response to Global Tourism in the Post-Modern Era: The
Commodification, Reconfiguration and Mutual Transformation of Habana Vieja, Cuba, 45 URB.
STUDIES J. 1079, 1080 (2008), available at http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/developpement/sha
red/developpement/mdev/soutienauxcours0809/milbert_villes/Bailey%20Nick_08.pdf.
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However, not all of downtown benefited from the Inner Harbor
neighborhood revitalization. Much of the west side of downtown remained
destitute, empty, and unsafe. Just fifteen years ago, Camden Yards was home
to a warehouse district filled with a dilapidated rail yard, vacant buildings, and
a few businesses. 64 The twin stadiums within the sports district, Camden
Yards, home of the Baltimore Orioles, and M&T Bank Stadium, home of the
Baltimore Ravens (formerly known as PSINet Stadium and then as Ravens
Stadium), were conceived to address three primary goals: (1) to keep the
Baltimore Orioles in Baltimore, Maryland; (2) to attract an NFL franchise to
the city; and (3) to bring the Inner Harbor success further west to the Camden
Yards area, which was considered the edge of town. 65
Construction began for the baseball stadium in 1989 and finished in 1992.
Construction began for the football stadium in 1996 and was completed in
1998. 66 The stadiums encompass approximately 115 acres and were 95%
publicly funded through a sports-themed state lottery game. 67 Initially, the
neighborhood surrounding Camden Yards saw little economic development
resulting from Camden Yards construction. In an interview, Laurie Feinberg,
the Division Chief of the City of Baltimore Planning Department, indicated
that with the exception of the renovation of the B&O Warehouse and the
Camden Train Station, which now house offices, gift shops and restaurants,
the area surrounding Camden Yards “saw no changes.” 68
However, by 2005, approximately thirteen years after the Baltimore
Orioles Stadium opened its doors, some local development had occurred. 69
The Bromo Seltzer Arts Tower, a 100-year-old building, was transformed to
house visual and literary artists. 70 The historic structure, completed in 1911,
was at that time the tallest building in Baltimore and was modeled after
Palazzo Vecchio in Florence, Italy. 71 It is now listed on the National Register
of Historic Places. 72 The Sports Legends Museum at Camden Yards opened

64. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 197.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 196.
67. Id.
68. Interview by Robert Wagener with Laurie Feinberg, Division Chief of the City of Baltimore
Planning Department (Feb. 14, 2011).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Bromo Seltzer Tower Marks Centennial, CBS BALT. (June 2, 2011),
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2011/06/02/bromo-seltzer-tower/.
72. Emerson Bromo-Seltzer Tower, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/baltimore
/b17.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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in 2005 and is housed in the former Camden Station. 73 The 22,000-squarefoot museum is adjacent to the main gate of Oriole Park at Camden Yards and
features exhibits profiling Maryland sports history. 74
The area has also seen a surge in residential and hotel development.
Ground was broken in October of 2005 for the Zenith Apartments, a 21-story
building including 191 apartments and 6000 square feet of retail space at the
corner of West Pratt and South Paca Streets. 75 Rombro Lofts, located at 22
Howard Street, contains seventeen loft condo units in a historic six-story
warehouse building. 76 During this period, the Camden Yards area also
witnessed the development of Camden Court Apartments. 77 The 757-room
Hilton Baltimore, opened in 2008, was built on two vacant blocks that are
north of Oriole Park at Camden Yards and west of the Baltimore Convention
Center. 78 In addition, hotels in close proximity to the Ballpark at Camden
Yards have been recently renovated, including the Baltimore Marriott Inn
Harbor at Camden Yards renovated in 2007, Sheraton Inner Harbor Hotel
renovated in 2007, Radisson Plaza Lord Baltimore renovated in 2008, and the
Hyatt Regency Baltimore renovated in 2009, to name a few. 79
In assessing Camden Yards in the context of concentric circles, it has
“experienced some success as an urban redevelopment catalyst.” 80 Baltimore
already had an entertainment district, the Inner Harbor, which flourished as a
catalyst for redevelopment long before the two stadiums were built. “Camden
Yards did not create the success that is Inner Harbor; it simply incorporated
roughly 20 formerly industrial blocks into the postmodern tourist economy.” 81
While the public investment created two stadiums, maintained the team in
town, and gave new life to the warehouse at Camden Station, the Camden
yards sports complex did not in and of itself spark a drastic transformation of

73. History of the Sports Legends Museum and Camden Station, BABE RUTH BIRTHPLACE AND
SPORTS LEGENDS MUSEUMS, http://www.baberuthmuseum.com/history/slmacy/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
74. Id.
75. Heather Harlan, The Shovels Finally Show Up for $46M Zenith, BALT. BUS. J. (Oct. 6, 2005),
http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2005/10/03/daily34.html.
76. Edward Gunts, Rombro Building to be Converted Into Condos, BALT. SUN, Aug. 8, 2005, at
1C.
77. Westside Initiative, BALT. DEV. CORP., http://www.baltimoredevelopment.com/westsideinitiative (last updated July 6, 2010).
78. J.J. McCoy, Baltimore’s Best, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1998, at T4.
79. MARY K. TILGHMAN & ELIZABETH A. EVITTS, INSIDERS’ GUIDE TO BALTIMORE 82–88
(2008).
80. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 201.
81. Id.
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the western edge of downtown. 82 It was successful at expanding the tourist
bubble to the west, but little development carried over into the neighboring
areas that were in desperate need of economic stimulus. 83 Therefore, the
economic impact of Camden Yards may be only an extension of the Inner
Harbor, and Baltimore may have only enough entertainment demand to sustain
one entertainment district. 84
There are also demographic features about the location of the two Camden
Yards stadiums that could have prevented a surge in real estate and economic
development. The stadiums are located in two historic neighborhoods in west
downtown that did not need or desire new development. 85 To the south of the
stadiums is the elevated freeway, I-95, which offers easy access to the
stadiums, but further separates the stadiums from the remainder of the city.
Finally, the immediate vicinity of Camden Yards is filled mostly by surface
parking to fill the need to sustain the entertainment nature of the two
stadiums. 86 It should be noted that a 1997 Request for Proposal from the
Maryland Stadium Authority and the City of Baltimore for an entertainmentoriented project to be sited on the parking lots between the two entertainment
venues was opposed by the Baltimore Orioles. 87
The Inner Harbor and West Downtown neighborhoods continue to excite
the imagination. The Baltimore Grand Prix, part of the Izod Indy Car Series,
debuted along a 2-mile downtown track in September 2011, drew more than
75,000 people during its inaugural weekend, and is expected to generate $11
million in direct city tax revenue. 88 Baltimore Racing Development, the
promoter of the Baltimore Grand Prix, signed a five-year lease at the B&O
Warehouse. 89 In addition there are preliminary plans to expand the Baltimore
Convention Center and build a new arena next to it. The cost would range
between $750 million and $930 million and would take 6.5 to 7 years to build,
i.e. one of the most expensive construction projects ever undertaken in the city
of Baltimore. 90 The cost estimate includes a 4-level, 400,000-square-foot
convention center expansion, an 18,500-seat arena with a 2-level, 500-space
82. Id. at 199.
83. Id. at 201.
84. Id. at 199.
85. Id. at 201.
86. Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 201.
88. Mike Tanier, Amid a Large City, a Noisy Racing Village, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at 4.
89. Ryan Sharrow, Baltimore Racing Development Inks Lease in B&O Warehouse, BALT. BUS. J.
(Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2010/08/02/daily19.html.
90. Edward Gunts, Details of Arena Project Emerge, Combined Sports Facility and Convention
Center Could Cost Nearly $1 Billion, BALT. SUN, Dec. 17, 2010, at 1A.
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garage beneath it, and a 500-room Sheraton Hotel rising 23 to 25 stories. 91
B.

Jacobs Field

The second example of concentric circles occurred in Cleveland, Ohio,
with the creation of Jacobs Field (now Progressive Field), home of the
Cleveland Indians, and Gund Arena (now Quicken Loans Arena), home of the
Cleveland Cavaliers. The ballpark and arena were the first sport facilities in
the United States to be constructed simultaneously at the same general
location, i.e. the Gateway District. 92
The Gateway District was originally a produce and meat market known as
the Central Market area from 1857 until the 1970s. 93 The area was dubbed the
Gateway District because it was constructed just north of a confluence of
interstates that provides major entrances (or gateways) into downtown
Cleveland. 94 The Gateway area had begun to decline after World War II, and
by the 1980s, many buildings were either dilapidated or torn down to make
way for surface parking lots. 95 The Gateway District was meant to fill the gap
between the city’s successful theater district, Playhouse Square, and the Tower
City shopping and office complex. 96 Jacobs Field was part of a $467 million
initiative that also included a basketball arena, office buildings, and improved
district connections to a nearby train station and other activity centers. 97 The
two sport complexes are connected to the Tower City Center and the RTA
Rapid Transit System via an underground walkway. 98
Construction began in 1991, finished in 1994, and involved approximately
twenty-eight acres. 99 Seventy-five percent of the total cost was borne through
public funding, which was a tax on cigarettes and liquor. 100 The push for
redevelopment of Gateway came from Cleveland Tomorrow, a downtown

91. Id.
92. Quicken Loans Arena, NBA BASKETBALL ARENAS, http://www.nbabasketballarenas.com/
Quicken-Loans-Arena.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
93. BAY AREA ECONOMICS, NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSED SAN JOSE
STADIUM, SAN JOSE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY 8, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.sjredevelopment.org/ballpark/SJStadiumReportfinal.pdf.
94. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 202.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. BAY AREA ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 8.
98. Quicken Loans Arena, BALLPARKS BY MUNSEY AND SUPPES, http://basketball.ballparks.
com/NBA/ClevelandCavaliers/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
99. Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts, supra note 14, at 196.
100. Id.
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development group. 101 Additionally a development corporation was formed,
the Historic Gateway Neighborhood (originally the Gateway Economic
Development Corporation), with the goal of promoting redevelopment in the
Gateway District. 102
The change caused by the development of the Gateway complex was
drastic:
Formerly vacant buildings have been renovated as market-rate
housing, bringing upper-middle-class residents to this portion
of the city for the first time in decades. A total of seven
residential projects, with a combined total of over 800 units,
have been opened in the district since 1994, with almost an
equal number of units currently in the planning stages.
Included in these renovations are a number of historic and
architecturally significant structures (including the old Statler
Hotel and the Osborn Building). Buildings have been reused
for retail spaces as well. New restaurants have been carved
out of other formerly vacant properties. 103
Additionally, several large new hotels have found homes in the Gateway
district in historic, underutilized buildings. 104 New upscale hotels built in
Cleveland’s historic shopping arcades have helped catalyze redevelopment. 105
A hotel has been utilized to renovate an old warehouse adjacent to the
Gateway District and the historic National City Bank Building. 106 Moreover,
the Colonial Marketplace project includes not only a hotel but also a retail and
office space across seven buildings. 107
Though the Gateway District is aging, new businesses continue to be
developed. Recent developments include a casino proposed by Dan Gilbert,
owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers. 108 Another is a new arcade located
underneath the Hyatt Hotel downtown. 109 Additionally, the Med Mart
Convention Center is being constructed nearby on the corner of St. Clair
101. Id. at 202.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 203–04.
104. Id. at 204.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Interview by Robert Wagener with Thomas Starinsky, Associate Director of the Historic
Gateway Neighborhood Corporation (Feb. 11, 2011).
109. Id.
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Avenue and Ontario Street. 110 Most of the other recent developments are
restaurants and bars, including a House of Blues, Lola’s, LaStrada, Wonder
Bar, and Greenhouse Tavern. 111
In 1997, the assessed value of the total downtown property of Cleveland
dropped 1.7% from 1996. 112 However, the assessed value of properties within
the three-block radius surrounding Progressive Field actually increased. 113
For example, twelve of the hotels in the area increased in value, one remained
stagnant, and only one lost value. 114 Additionally, of the eight entertainment
properties that existed in 1997, none of the properties lost value from the
previous year, and in fact, increased an average of 68%. 115 Finally, the
residential properties showed an increase as well. Although smaller—at
3.5%—the increase further showed the viability of the area. 116
After 1997, there was a rise in assessed property value throughout
downtown Cleveland. 117 The assessed values rose 2.3%, 3.2%, and 38.8%
respectively. However, there was an even greater increase in the three-block
radius surrounding Progressive Field. 118 In fact, the hotel properties increased
an average of 206% between 1998 and 2000, and only one of the hotels
decreased in assessed value, and even then it lost only 7%. 119 On the other
hand, the entertainment properties increased an average of 413% and the
residential properties averaged a 45% increase during such period. 120
Conversely, the city of Cleveland faced dramatic decreases in assessed
value in 2000 through 2003. 121 The downtown properties showed a 19.7%
drop in assessed value in 2001; however, the properties around Progressive
Field continued to increase. 122 For example, commercial business properties
increased 20%, residential properties increased 55%, and hotel properties
increased 91%. 123 The entertainment properties were the only properties to
110.
111.
112.
2010).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Interview by Doug Fuglsang with Jim Hopkins, Cleveland Assessor’s Office (June 10,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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see a decrease, but this was slight at two percent. 124 However, from 2003
through 2007, the assessed value for the commercial businesses, residential
properties, entertainment properties, and hotel properties all increased. 125
Even during the recession, Progressive Field positively impacted the area. 126
Although the hotel and residential properties decreased slightly, in the threeblock radius surrounding the stadium, the commercial business properties
increased 8.5% and the entertainment properties increased 2%. 127 Robert
Brown, Director of the City Planning Commission of Cleveland praised the
development:
A key factor in the success of Cleveland’s sports facilities in
helping to revive downtown is the fact that both the stadium
and arena are located in heart of downtown and are not
segregated in some sports island on the periphery of
downtown. This location in the core of downtown, right on
the downtown street grid, has helped to maximize the spin-off
traffic to nearby businesses. 128
Therefore, by strategically planning the development of the Gateway
District, the City of Cleveland has transformed a formerly dilapidated district
into a lucrative regional tourist destination and economic engine for the city.
C.

Coors Field

Coors Field, home of the Colorado Rockies, completes the trilogy of
baseball stadiums that have been characteristic of the concept of concentric
circles. Ground for the baseball stadium was broken in 1992 and opened on
April 26, 1995. 129 The 50,445-seat, $215 million stadium was located at the
northern edge of the Denver central business district, commonly referred to as
Denver’s Lower Downtown (LoDo), a 25-square block section of downtown
Denver that was designated a historic district in 1988. 130 However, prior to
the construction of Coors Field, LoDo was described as a “double-ugly” strip

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Interview by Robert Wagener with Robert Brown, Director of the City Planning
Commission of Cleveland (Feb. 8, 2011).
129. Coors Field, BALLPARKSOFBASEBALL.COM, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/nl/Coors
Field.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
130. Id.
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of dilapidated 1930 warehouses and industrial buildings. 131 LoDo was
considered one of the most blighted areas in the Denver downtown area. 132 At
the time of planning the sports facility, many politicians and planners were
worried that suburbanites would not venture into this part of downtown
Denver. 133 Not only have the Rockies set attendance records, but the
Cincinnati Post described the area as a “sparkling symbol of urban
hipness.” 134
The Coors Field project was funded by a $162 million six-county Denver
Metropolitan Area ballot initiative. 135 In addition, money was spent to insure
access and pedestrian connections to the area. “The announcement in 1991
that Coors Field would be located in LoDo gave the neighborhood another
boost. Sales tax revenue in LoDo increased by 22 percent a year from 1990 to
1995, and the number of restaurants increased 140 percent between 1993 and
1996.” 136
“However, the pace of change increased dramatically after the stadium
opened” in 1995 as evidenced by the increase in LoDo residential units from
270 in 1994 to 1374 by 2000. 137 Similarly, “[h]otel occupancy rates rose from
66 percent in 1994 to 70 percent each subsequent year” despite the fact that
room rates rose continuously. 138 Moreover, “the total number of rooms in
downtown grew 25 percent from 1995 to 2000.” 139 Sales tax revenue also
increased; “[i]n 1995, sales tax collections rose by 86 percent to $4.7
million. . . . Even in the off season, few stores have closed, with new
development continuing year round. While Coors Field cannot take all the
credit for these recent neighborhood improvements, it does appear that the
stadium has been an integral part of LoDo’s turnaround.” 140
D.

Staples Center

Concentric circles works with any sports facility, not just a baseball
stadium. In fact, the Staples Center has revitalized a downtown area in Los
131. Parke M. Chapman, Arena-Led Urban Revivals, NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
(Nov. 1, 2006), http://nreionline.com/property/mixed_use/real_estate_arenaled_urban_revivals/.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. BAY AREA ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 10–11.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Angeles. In the early 1990s, the area surrounding the Staples Center was filled
with gangs, drugs and dilapidated buildings. 141 The Staples Center was
opened on October 17, 1999 by the L.A. Arena Company and Anschutz
Entertainment Group. 142 The ten-acre facility cost approximately $375
million and was largely privately financed. 143 The facility is a multi-purpose
sports arena that is located adjacent to the Los Angeles Convention Center.
Beyond hosting two NBA teams, an NHL team, and a WNBA franchise, the
Staples Center is host to approximately 250 events and nearly four million
visitors a year. 144
[The] Staples Center continues to distinguish itself as the host
of major, high-profile events of national and international
distinction, including the 2004 and 2011 NBA All-Star Game,
the 2002 NHL All-Star Game, the 2000 Democratic National
Convention, eleven Grammy Award shows as well as the
annual X-Game competitions and PAC-10 basketball
championship tournaments. 145
While the Staples Center provides a shining example on how a sports
facility can create momentum for urban development, L.A. Live has helped
make this area of Los Angeles one of the foremost destination places for sports
and entertainment. Adjacent to the Staples Center, L.A. Live is the premier
entertainment complex in downtown Los Angeles. At a cost of approximately
$2.5 billion, L.A. Live was developed by Anschutz Entertainment Group,
Wachovia Group, and McFarland Partners. 146 Its 27-acre site features 5.6
million square feet of apartments, ballrooms, bars, concerts, theaters,
restaurants, movie theaters, and a 54-story hotel and condominium tower. 147
Construction of L.A. Live was conducted in three phases. The first phase
141. Don Muret, Staples Becomes a Beacon for Urban Renewal, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Aug. 3,
2009), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2009/08/20090803/SBJ-In-Depth/StaplesBecomes-A-Beacon-For-Urban-Renewal.aspx.
142. Staples Center, BALLPARKS BY MUNSEY AND SUPPES, http://basketball.ballparks.com/
NBA/LosAngelesLakers/newindex.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
143. Id.
144. Staples Center, AEG, http://aegworldwide.com/facilities/arenas/staplescenter (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011).
145. About Staples Center, STAPLES CENTER, http://www.staplescenter.com/doublecol.php
?section =about&page=aboutstaplescenter (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
146. Roger Vincent, Downtown Project to Get Really ‘Live,’ L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at C1.
147. Recreation, L.A. LIVE, http://www.lalivemarriott.com/LA-Live-Entertainment/Recreation5.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); Frequently Asked Questions, L.A. LIVE, http://lalive.com/faq (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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opened on October 18, 2007, and included a 7,100-seat Nokia Theater, a
concert and awards show venue, and Nokia Plaza, a 40,000-square-foot open
space featuring six, seventy-five-foot towers with LED signage. 148 The
second phase of L.A. Live began in 2008 and included ESPN studios, the
Grammy Museum, Club Nokia (a 2,300 person club and live music venue),
Lucky Strike bowling alley, the Conga Room, and thirteen eateries. 149 Phase
three of L.A. Live included a fifty-four-story hybrid tower constructed above
the parking lot directly north of Staples Center that houses the JW Marriott,
Ritz-Carlton Hotel, and Ritz-Carlton Residences at L.A. Live. 150 Phase three
also included the fourteen-screen, $100 million Regal Entertainment Group
movie complex.
Ten years after the grand opening of the Staples Center there has been $5
billion worth of development in the four block radius of the arena, half of
which was generated by L.A. Live. 151 Much of the economic growth can be
attributed to a dramatic growth of the area’s residential market. When
construction of the Staples Center began, the district was home to 5,000
residents, but today the same area is home to almost 50,000 residents. Tim
Leiweke, president and CEO of Anshutz Entertainment Group (AEG)
explained the transformation:
Staples Center has not only been the catalyst for development,
it’s been the catalyst for making this a true, livable downtown
community. . . . Ironically, in our industry, we always hear
from the politicians and professors about how sports facilities
ultimately don’t create any economic rejuvenation. . . . The
fact [that] there is $5 billion worth of bricks and steel and
glass proves that is not accurate. 152
In October 2010, the L.A. Live complex was honored as one of five
worldwide winners of the Urban Land Institute’s Global Awards for
Excellence competition honoring the world’s finest achievements in land-use
practices. 153
Development of L.A. Live was also important for highlighting the

148. L.A. Live, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 147.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Muret, supra note 141.
152. Id.
153. Anschutz’s L.A. Live Complex Wins Global Urban Land Institute Honors, BUS. JOURNALS
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2010/10/19/la-live.html.
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necessity of ensuring that a multi-use stadium district development provide
local benefits. Development of L.A. Live incorporated a Community Benefits
Agreement (CBA), which were first utilized in California beginning in
1997. 154 A CBA is a contract usually entered into by community-based
organizations, a private real estate developer, a public official, and local
government agencies that defines specific benefits, amenities and mitigations,
or only mitigations to the local community or neighborhood guaranteed by the
developer as a result of the planned development. 155 In exchange for the
promised benefits, the community groups who normally would oppose
development subsidization agree to publicly support the project or at least not
openly oppose it. 156 Normally, a development project involves the creation of
a development agreement, which is basically an agreement between the
government unit and the developer that provides for a completed development
for some form of taxpayer subsidy. CBAs permit community groups to
become active partners in the process at the forefront and to receive benefits
and protect the community as a result of the agreed-upon development.
The most well-known and probably one of the most successful CBAs is
that created in 2001 for the L.A. Sports and Entertainment District adjacent to
Staples Center in Los Angeles, California, wherein the public subsidies were
to approximate $150 million. Some of the provisions contained in the Staples
Center CBA include: $1,000,000 for the creation or improvement of parks and
recreational facilities; $25,000 per year for a term of five years for the creation
of a residential parking permit program; agreement to comply with the city’s
living wage ordinance and to make all reasonable efforts to reach the goal of
ensuring that 70% of the jobs created by the project pay a living wage; priority
hiring to persons displaced by the project and to low income individuals
residing within three miles of the project; job training programs; a requirement
that 20% of the residential units in the project be affordable; and an agreement
to cooperate with the coalition to establish an advisory committee to assist
with the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. 157 CBAs have
recently been used in other sports developments including Yankee Stadium,
Pittsburgh Penguin Arena, Atlantic Yards, the 2010 Vancouver Winter
Olympics, and Ballpark Village in San Diego.

154. Naved Sheikh, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private Contracts Replace Public
Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 228 (2008).
155. Id. at 224.
156. Id.
157. LOS ANGELES SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT DISTRICT PROJECT COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENT, available at http://www.saje.net/atf/cf/%7B493B2790-DD4E-4ED0-8F4E-C78E8F3A7
561%7D/communitybenefits.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
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III. SPORTS.COMM
Given the rippling effect of real estate development as a result of the
creation of a sports venue, it was only a matter of time before professional
sports owners, governmental units, and real estate developers began
cooperating to form sports and entertainment destinations near or adjacent to
the sports venue on a pre-planned basis. Using the examples of stadiums that
have transformed their city into a sports and entertainment destination such as
Camden Yards, Cleveland Gateway, and LoDo, developers have sought to
consolidate the business and entertainment needs of a community at
professional sports venues. The result has been the creation of a new type of
collaborative relationship between privately-owned sports teams and local
governments with both parties working towards the common goal of
constructing a master-planned sports and entertainment community, or
sports.comm.
For a sports.comm to be successful, the venue, team owners, and the
community must work together beginning at the planning stages of
development. Local governments are necessary to identify the type of land
uses that would be appropriate for a district, to provide the infrastructure
needed to support the sports.comm, and to obtain the permits required to begin
construction. A sports.comm can support an almost limitless array of retail,
residential, recreational, and business facilities; therefore, each venue can be
tailored to meet the specific needs of its community. Common structures
include shopping centers, restaurants, sports bars, condominiums, offices,
apartments, hotels, movie theaters, museums, “green space” public areas, and
parking structures.
A sports.comm is essentially a joint venture between a government unit or
units and a sports team in conjunction with a real estate developer or solely a
real estate developer. The success of the sports.comm will be dependent upon
a number of factors including, but not limited to: the location of the
development, an agreed-upon master plan acceptable to the community,
market timing, financial staying power of the developer, ability to control
construction costs and schedules, an absence of legal challenges, a properly
marketed and targeted development, a well-conceived and sustainable
financial package, effective management control, a healthy economy where
expansion is occurring, an ability for all parties to compromise, and good oldfashioned luck.
A sports.comm, like any other real estate development, involves a
multitude of targeted tasks to achieve the ultimate goal, which may include,
but are not limited to: determining development concept; site selection; zoning
approvals; meetings with local officials; neighborhood groups and planning
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boards; land acquisition and site assemblage; title searches; comprehensive
project studies such as soil, geotechnical, and environmental and wetland
testing; construction cost analysis; market study; site schematics; pro formas;
the lender package; marketing and leasing strategy; compliance with land use
policies; traffic issues; green issues; scheduling; and market feasibility
analysis.
The basic goal of a sports.comm is to transform a sports venue that attracts
millions of people, but is only used on a limited basis, into a year-round
entertainment destination for an entire region. The sports.comm has been
especially popular in the professional sports context because league revenuesharing rules have made sports venues the most useful generator of nonshared
revenues for team owners. Every professional sports league requires its
members to share some portion of its ticket sales and media revenues with
rival teams. 158 Therefore, modern team owners have placed a greater
emphasis on generating revenues from personal seat licenses, stadium naming
rights, local media contracts, luxury suites, in-stadium advertising, and
sponsorships. 159 The stadium itself was generally considered to be a limited
source of nonshared revenues based on its maximum occupancy of up to
100,000 spectators. However, the sports.comm concept has served to expand
the definition of the sports venue to include an entertainment district, which
has allowed team owners to capture and convert its fans’ auxiliary
entertainment dollars into a new source of nonshared revenues.
Examples of successfully completed sports.comms include Patriot Place,
home of the New England Patriots; Nationwide Arena, home of the Columbus
Blue Jackets; and Ballpark Village, home of the San Diego Padres. The
sports.comm is most often associated with professional sports venues;
however, the beneficial economic impact of a sports.comm can be realized on
both a smaller and larger scale. Minor league venues such as Victory Field in
Indianapolis attract smaller crowds but are more family-friendly and
affordable, which allows fans to spend more at surrounding retailers. The
concept has most recently led to the creation of college sports villages with
schools such as Florida Atlantic University, the University of Nevada-Las
Vegas, the Ohio State University, and the University of Notre Dame, with
each school applying the elements of a sports.comm to their venues. In
contrast, the sports.comm has also been applied on an international scale in an
attempt to form a sports and entertainment destination capable of attracting a
global market, which is most recently exemplified by developments in Dubai
and Qatar. Together, these successful developments demonstrate the potential
158. JAMES HUMPHREY, ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS 74 (2007).
159. Id.
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of a sports.comm to serve as an economic catalyst for a community regardless
of its market size or location.
A. Patriot Place
The modern sports.comm can be traced to Robert Kraft’s (Kraft) decision
to keep the New England Patriots in Massachusetts in 1999. Kraft’s attempt at
creating a sports.comm began in 1993 when he proposed moving the Patriots
from Foxborough, Massachusetts, into a new $1 billion stadium attached to a
convention center in South Boston. 160 In his initial proposal, Kraft pledged a
$215 million private contribution with the rest of the costs provided by the
state. 161 The mayor of Boston refused Kraft’s initial plan because it required
the city to contribute a portion of its hotel tax revenues, even though those
revenues stood to increase greatly with the presence of a new stadium and
convention center. 162 The state government also refused to offer bond
financing based on criticism that such an extensive bond offering would
overburden the government, which would require the reprioritizing of other
public works projects like prisons, bridges, and public housing. 163
A University of Massachusetts professor summarized the city’s problem
succinctly, “There’s a tension between the role a facility like this plays in
strengthening a city’s identity and all these new pressures. . . . Like a lot of
cities, Boston was going through an identity crisis. The difficulty in building a
consensus for these kind[s] of showcase facilities mirrors that crisis.” 164 The
City of Boston simply did not understand the potential benefits a sports.comm
could provide in the early 1990s, so Kraft was forced to look elsewhere to
build a new facility.
Next, Kraft attempted to secure public assistance to build a new stadium in
Foxborough, the site of the Patriots original stadium that was built in 1971 for
a total cost of $6.7 million. 165 The proposal required the State of
Massachusetts to contribute $57 million in infrastructure improvements, to
buy the land upon which the stadium would be built, and to lease the land back
to the Patriots. 166 The government rejected even this minimal allocation of
160. Meg Vaillancourt & Peter Canellos, Clashing Agendas Undid the Megaplex; A Revival
Depends on Compromises, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1995, at 1.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Brian Adams, Note, Stadium Funding in Massachusetts: Has the Commonwealth Found the
Balance in Private vs. Public Spending, 51 CATH. U.L. REV. 655, 657 (2002).
166. Id. at 659.
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public financing, and the Patriots were forced to expand their search beyond
Massachusetts.
In 1998, Kraft accepted a proposal from Hartford, Connecticut in which
the state agreed to completely fund the $374 million cost of a new stadium and
to build additional facilities as part of an urban renewal project. 167 Despite
finding a city that was willing to cooperate in building his sports.comm, Kraft
abruptly exercised an opt-out clause in his contract with Hartford and decided
Based on his decision, the
to keep the team in Massachusetts. 168
Massachusetts Legislature agreed to extend public financing for infrastructure
improvements to the Foxborough site, but held firm on its refusal to purchase
the land for a new stadium. 169 Therefore, as one of the few visionaries that
understood the potential of the sports.comm, Kraft decided to privately finance
the $325 million cost of Gillette Stadium in 2000 and the $350 million cost of
Patriot Place in 2006. 170
The purpose of Patriot Place was to construct “a self-sustaining, superregional destination” on the 1.3 million-square-foot area surrounding Gillette
Stadium. 171 As evidence of the necessity for a private-public partnership to
construct a sports.comm, the first hurdle was to obtain the necessary state land
use permits. In order to allow for the construction of a mixed-use sports and
entertainment facility, Foxborough’s zoning rules had to be revised. 172 The
Patriots also needed to obtain approval from the city to manage traffic and to
receive liquor licenses for the various restaurants to be built on the site. 173 In
total, Kraft spent over six months working to obtain the necessary approvals in
order to begin construction. 174
Following approvals, Kraft’s implementation of the design for Patriot
Place set the standard for the modern sports.comm by incorporating retail and
recreational options that had been traditionally underserved in the New
England region. Patriot Place was an immediate success based on Kraft’s
decision to anchor his entertainment venue with New England’s first Bass Pro
167. Id.
168. William D. Cohan, Football’s True Patriot, CNNMONEY (Nov. 3, 2010), http://features.
blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2010/11/03/footballs-true-patriot/.
169. Adams, supra note 165, at 659–60.
170. Jenn Abelson, Krafts Hope to Build a $350m Patriot Place Complex, and a Legacy, BOS.
GLOBE, May 20, 2007, at A1.
171. Greg Gatlin, Patriot Place to Open as Construction Drive Continues, BOS. HERALD, Nov. 1,
2007, at 25.
172. Robert Preer, Patriots Owner Aims to Develop a ‘Destination’; Kraft Envisions Turning
Parking Lots into a Massive Retail Entertainment Complex, BOS. GLOBE, July 29, 2006, at E28.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Shops. Bass Pro Shops is a unique destination retailer that acts as both a store
and an entertainment venue; complete with indoor waterfalls, fish ponds, live
animals, and indoor shooting ranges. 175 The largest Bass Pro Shops in
Springfield, Missouri attracts four million visitors a year and is the state’s
number one tourist attraction. 176 Similarly, the store at Patriot Place was an
immediate success, drawing over 60,000 shoppers in its first five days. Due to
the scarcity of Bass Pro Shops in the Northeast, the store expected to attract
customers from up to 500 miles away. 177 Despite the popularity of Bass Pro
Shops, Kraft purposely tried to avoid the “man mall” moniker that has been
used to describe Patriot Place since its early stages of development by
selecting other retail and entertainment options meant to attract women and
families.
Kraft was able to broaden the appeal of Patriot Place by incorporating
traditional retailers, a wide variety of restaurants, and a multitude of
entertainment options. Like a traditional mall, Patriot Place includes retailers
such as Hollister, Old Navy, Bath and Body Works, and Victoria’s Secret. 178
Most recently, Tech Superpowers announced the opening of its flagship retail
store at Patriot Place, which is a new retail concept that combines over a dozen
technology brands under the same roof, including Apple. 179 Moreover, it
includes dining options for every price point to ensure that all visitors are
satisfied. 180 Most notably, Patriot Place includes a CBS-themed restaurant
called “CBS Scene” and Toby Keith’s famous “I Love This Bar and Grill.” 181
Beyond shopping and affordable dining, Patriot Place offers a multitude of
family-friendly entertainment options. The Showcase Cinema de Lux
provides visitors much more than the traditional movie theater experience. It
offers standard tickets, but also, for a $10 upgrade, leather seating, a server,
and access to the “Lux Level” bar and lounge. 182 Understanding that movie
theaters are slowly becoming extinct, the purpose of the Cinema de Lux is to
175. Steve Bailey, New Role for Krafts: Developers, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2006, at F1.
176. America’s Largest Private Companies: #96 Bass Pro Shops, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/21/private-companies-10_Bass-Pro-Shops_ISAK.html.
177. Robert Preer, Patriots Officials Have Game Plan to Handle Football Fans, BOS. GLOBE,
Nov. 25, 2007, at 5.
178. Shopping, PATRIOT PLACE, http://www.patriot-place.com/shopping.aspx (last visited Oct.
20, 2011).
179. Tech Superpowers Opening Flagship Retail Store at Patriot Place, PATRIOT PLACE (June
20, 2011), http://www.patriotplacefoxboro.net/article.aspx?id=4079.
180. Gatlin, supra note 171.
181. Dining, PATRIOT PLACE, http://www.patriot-place.com/dining.aspx (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
182. Angel Jennings, Top Movie Ticket Puts You Far Beyond the Cheap Seats, BOS. GLOBE,
Aug. 6, 2008, at C1.
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attract people to the theater by offering something for everyone, even if they
do not intend to see a movie. Patriot Place also includes Showcase Live, an
intimate two-story, 500-seat concert venue. Patriot Place has also opened two
new interactive games called “Espionage” and “20,000 Leagues Under the
Sea,” which are designed to make visitors feel like they are inside a real video
game. 183 The games are aimed at drawing families, but are also utilized for
corporate team-building excursions. 184
To further cater to families and to provide accommodations for visitors
from far and wide, Patriot Place includes a museum, hotel and spa, and health
care center. The Hall at Patriot Place is the focal point of the development and
includes a state-of-the-art museum that utilizes video and audio technology to
help fans experience the history of New England football. 185 To provide
accommodations to visitors, the facility features a four-star Renaissance Hotel
& Spa. 186 Hotels, condominiums, and apartment complexes are essential to
the success of a sports.comm because they naturally instill a sense of
community that benefits the entire venue. Surprisingly, Patriot Place also
includes Brigham and Women’s/Mass General Health Care Center located
next to the stadium, which provides outpatient care and some surgical services
to the Foxborough area. 187 The inclusion of the Health Care Center reflects
the true purpose of a sports.comm, to benefit the local community.
Patriot Place was truly ahead of its time, but reflects the important aspects
of the sports.comm concept. Kraft was successful in making Foxborough,
Massachusetts a retail destination for all of New England, which benefited him
personally, and in turn, the entire business community of Foxborough.
Therefore, Patriot Place is proof of the potential for a sports.comm to
transform a city from an afterthought into a tourist destination.
B Nationwide Arena
Like Patriot Place, Columbus’s Nationwide Arena was built without the
help of significant public assistance. In 1997, after four failed ballot initiatives
to bring a professional sports team to Columbus over the prior two decades,

183. Robert Preer, Matching Wits with Wonder; Tomb Developer Taking His Walk-Through
Puzzles from Fenway to Foxborough, BOS. GLOBE, June 28, 2010, at 5.
184. Id.
185. About the Hall, HALL AT PATRIOT PLACE, http://www.thehallatpatriotplace.com/about-thehall/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
186. Renaissance Hotel & Spa at Patriot Place, PATRIOT PLACE, http://www.patriot-place.com/
hotel.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
187. Brigham and Women’s/Mass General Health Care Center, PATRIOT PLACE, http://www.
patriot-place.com/healthcare.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).

GREENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/21/2011 2:12 PM

SPORTS.COMM

121

the NHL offered Columbus a thirty-day window to obtain financing to build a
stadium for a new expansion franchise. 188 The government proposed a threeyear, one-half percent sales tax to fund both an NHL arena and Major League
Soccer (MLS) stadium in downtown Columbus. 189 Voters also rejected that
proposal, and with no “Plan B,” the city accepted an offer from Nationwide
Insurance to privately finance a downtown arena for $150 million. 190 To
secure its interest, Nationwide retained their right to the revenues generated
from the arena’s naming rights, parking structures, and luxury boxes. 191
Beyond the arena cost, Nationwide promised to invest another $350 million in
an entertainment district surrounding the venue that served a dual purpose:
enriching downtown Columbus by transforming a formerly blighted area into
a regional attraction and protecting Nationwide’s investment in the arena. 192
In return for Nationwide’s investment, the city was required to lease, and
eventually sell, the site of an old federal penitentiary and to contribute $16.6
million towards roads, sewers, and other capital improvements. 193 Columbus
taxpayers ultimately contributed $44 million to finance the arena district,
which was financed through municipal bonds that were repaid through
property taxes generated from a thirty-year tax TIF district. 194 However, the
TIF district has been an overwhelming success that has allowed Columbus to
profit greatly from its initial investment. The district was initially projected to
generate $47 million in tax revenue over a thirty-year period, but has instead
generated over $31 million per year. 195
The success of the TIF district is also proof of Nationwide Arena’s success
in transforming Columbus, Ohio into a regional destination. The Nationwide
Arena district includes restaurants, bars, office space, a movie theater, a
concert pavilion, a baseball stadium, hotels, and apartment and condominium
structures. 196 Unlike Patriot Place, which is most attractive due to its retail
188. Brian Williams & Mark Ferenchik, Despite Chaotic Beginning, Arena Planners Praised for
Vision, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Sept. 3, 2000, at 6D.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Jeff Little, The Arena Chronicles: Part IV- Arena Requires Public Participation, HOCKEY
WRITERS (Feb. 19, 2010), http://thehockeywriters.com/the-arena-chronicles-part-iv-columbus-unique
-in-arena-structure/.
192. Id.
193. Jim Woods, City Oks Sale of Pen Land for Arena District, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio),
July 28, 1998, at 5B.
194. Jim Woods, New City District to Fuel Revenues, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Sept. 13,
1998, at 1D.
195. Little, supra note 191.
196. What to Do, ARENA DISTRICT, http://www.arenadistrict.com/what-to-do/ (last visited Oct.
29, 2011).
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options, Nationwide Arena is a sports.comm focused on providing familyfriendly entertainment and downtown residential options for young
professionals.
The arena district has successfully attracted families to downtown
Columbus by offering a safe, affordable environment featuring many unique
attractions. The Arena Grand Movie Theater, for example, was the first movie
theater built in downtown Columbus in seven decades. 197 The Lifestyle
Communities Pavilion is another distinctive attraction, which features the first
ever “reversion stage” that can serve up to 2,200 visitors indoors or 4,500
outdoors. 198 Huntington Park, home of the Columbus Clippers Minor League
Baseball team, is another exciting destination for families in the arena district.
Built in 2009 for the price of $55 million, Huntington Park was voted the 2009
Best New Ballpark in America, beating out its parent-club New York
Yankees’ $1.5 billion new stadium. 199 From a practical standpoint, the arena
district’s success in attracting families can be attributed to the reasonable
prices charged for parking. Rather than charge the premium price of up to $15
for Blue Jacket’s home games, the district only charges $3-$5 for Minor
League Baseball parking and charges $1 everyday for movie theater
parking. 200 By ensuring families that they will not be gouged unnecessarily
for a trip to the arena district, Nationwide Arena provides an affordable
entertainment option for families throughout Ohio.
Nationwide Arena has also been extremely successful in attracting young
professionals to live within the arena district. The district currently offers six
residential options. Arena Crossing, a 252-unit apartment complex, was the
first to be built and is 100% leased, despite being priced nearly $0.20 more per
square foot in comparison to other downtown residential options. 201 Due to
its success, Burnham Square was constructed, offering 98 upscale
condominiums for as much as $500,000 per unit. 202 The Condominiums at
North Bank were built in 2007, providing 109 more high-class

197. See Arena Grand Movie Theatre, ARENA DISTRICT, http://www.arenadistrict.com/what-todo/arena-grand-movie-theatre/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
198. Lifestyle Communities Pavilion, ARENA DISTRICT, http://www.arenadistrict.com/what-to-do
/lifestyle-communities-pavilion/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
199. Hugh J. Dorrian, Too Much is Invested in Arena District to Put it at Risk, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Ohio), Nov. 22, 2009, at 5G.
200. Robert Vitale, Arena District; Clippers Parking May Stay Modest; Nationwide, County Aim
for a Range of $3 to $5, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), May 14, 2006, at 1C.
201. Michael Pramik, Urban Hot Spot Alters Columbus, NATIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTOR,
Jan. 1, 2007, at 46.
202. Id.
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condominiums. 203 The three remaining apartments and condominiums are
smaller in scale and price and are located in refurbished buildings throughout
the district. Nationwide is also in the process of developing a residential
neighborhood featuring condominiums and retail space near Huntington Park,
which would add the final piece to the western reaches of the arena district. 204
Overall, the 800 residents of the arena district represent over $30 million in
annual consumer expenditures. 205 However, a negative effect of the arena
district’s residential development is that because the district is privately
owned, Nationwide has had little incentive to provide affordable housing
given that the upscale residential market has been so lucrative.
Beyond Nationwide’s initial $350 million investment in the arena district,
over $1 billion has been committed to the final project. 206 Since the beginning
of the arena district project in 1999, the average property value in the district
has increased by 267%, and property values in all of Columbus have increased
a total of 22%. 207 The arena district was extremely profitable and also wellplanned, considering that the one million square feet of available office space
has a 95% occupancy rate. 208
The immense success realized by private investors in Patriot Place and
Nationwide Arena has led to an increased willingness by local governments to
participate in the construction of sports.comms.
Greater government
involvement is important to provide a diverse range of financing alternatives
for the development of a sports.comm and to encourage development that is
focused on benefiting the community as a whole rather than a private
investor’s bottom line.
C. Ballpark Village—Petco Park
Development of the Ballpark Village sports.comm began around the same
time as Patriot Place and Nationwide Arena, but had the added benefit of
significant public support. Petco Park, home of the San Diego Padres, was
constructed as the last phase in the revitalization process of downtown San
Diego, California and was to be the centerpiece of the downtown

203. Id.
204. Mike Pramik, Construction Zone; New Neighborhood on Deck West of Arena, Huntington
Park, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), May 26, 2008, at 8C.
205. David Wirick, Assessment of the Gross Economic Impact of the Arena District on Greater
Columbus, JOHN GLENN SCHOOL OF PUB. AFFAIRS, July 2008, at 2.
206. Id. at 1–2.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Id. at 14.
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revitalization. 209 In 1998, 60% of voters approved Proposition C, which
allocated $411 million toward building a ballpark and redeveloping a twentysix block area of downtown San Diego now known as Ballpark Village. 210 In
return, the Padres pledged to spend $115 million on the new ballpark, to invest
at least $300 million in the surrounding developments, and to be responsible
for all construction cost overruns. 211 Ultimately, the Padres contributed over
$200 million to Petco Park and nearly $600 million to the surrounding
redevelopment.
The revitalization of the blighted East Village section of San Diego
exemplifies the effective utilization of the sports.comm public-private
partnership model. Redevelopment areas like the East Village are more
attractive to private investors that hope to develop a sports.comm because
these areas offer greater access to public funding like New Market Tax Credits
and Build America Bonds. The city used the leverage created by its public
investment to require that the developer sign a CBA in order to build Ballpark
Village. 212 The CBA requires developers to meet LEED green building
standards, provide employees and the employees of its service contractors with
a living wage, and to institute a local hiring program. 213 The agreement also
commits the developer to offer affordable housing, to provide a grocery store
that offers a living wage and benefits, to fund community arts programs, and
to study the effects of the CBA and the Petco development on the local
community. 214
The redevelopment of a blighted area also gave San Diego increased
flexibility to repay its bonds. Traditionally, 17% of citywide property tax
revenues would accrue to the city and 83% to the state; however, in a
redevelopment area most property tax revenue stays in the city. 215 Therefore,
San Diego was able to use its extra projected tax revenue to accumulate the
necessary funds to pay off the bonds issued for construction of Petco Park and
Ballpark Village. Moreover, through the use of redevelopment district tax

209. About JMIR: Ballpark District, JMI REALTY, http://www.jmirealty.com/about/ballpark/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
210. Caitlin Rother, Promises of Padres are a Mixed Bag; Some Kept, Some Broken in Long
Building Process, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 5, 2004, at A-1.
211. Id.
212. See Ballpark Village Project: Community Benefits Agreement, SAN DIEGO HOUSING
COMMISSION, available at http://onlinecpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2005/07/BPV-CBA-text.pdf (last
visited Oct. 10, 2011).
213. Id. at 5–9.
214. Id. at 10–11.
215. Peter Davis, From Idea to Ideal, Ballpark was a Struggle, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar.
28, 2004, at G-1.
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incentives, San Diego was able to entice its professional baseball franchise to
move from the affluent Qualcomm Stadium district to the inner city. 216 Thus,
the formation of a sports.comm enabled the city to successfully redistribute
one of its most valuable resources to an area in need of economic
development. Currently, the Chargers are discussing a similar move from
Qualcomm to the Ballpark District, and hope to have a public vote on $800
million worth of subsidies for the project by 2012. 217
Like Nationwide Arena, the Petco Park sports.comm has been more
successful as a residential rather than commercial development. The focal
point of the redevelopment is the 511-room Omni Hotel and Metropolitan
Condominiums, which features a pedestrian walkway that connects directly to
the ballpark. 218 Many other upscale condominiums and apartments populate
the district, but unlike Nationwide Arena, Petco also includes Lillian Place, a
much needed low-income housing development. 219 The presence of lowincome housing in the middle of an entertainment district reveals the unique
opportunities that sports.comms present for community improvement. The
district’s development has also included San Diego City College, the New
School of Architecture, two high schools, and the Thomas Jefferson School of
Law; 220 none of which would have been possible without the development of
Petco Park. 221 By the end of 2009, the sports.comm had expanded to include
more than 3500 residential units, 957 hotel rooms, and over 600,000 square
feet of commercial space. 222 Therefore, Petco Park has been extremely
successful in attracting residents and consumers to take advantage of
downtown San Diego businesses.
Petco Park has exceeded expectations as a tax revenue generator, as a
catalyst to lure businesses into a previously underutilized downtown, and as a
stimulus to San Diego’s overall economy. 223 In fact, from 2000 to 2009 the
Petco Park district has generated more than $207 million in new tax

216. Lou Hirsh, Study: Petco Park a Home Run for County Economy, SAN DIEGO BUS. J. (July
19, 2010), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-regionallocal/14934711-1.html.
217. Matthew T. Hall, Public Money for Sports Teams at an End, AEG Says; Company’s
President Says Private Enterprise Must pay; Chargers’ Counsel Disagrees, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., at A-1.
218. About JMIR: Ballpark District, supra note 209.
219. See Lillian Place, STUDIO E ARCHITECTS, http://www.studioearchitects.com/lilian-place#!
__lilian-place (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
220. Hirsh, supra note 216.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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revenues. 224 Prior to Petco Park, the same area was 70 percent vacant and
created only $2 million per year in property tax revenue. 225 The immense
increase in tax revenue is a result of $1.2 billion in new spending by
consumers within the twenty-six block district. Petco Park is also responsible
for creating 19,220 jobs since 2000. 226 The success of Ballpark Village at
Petco Park offers encouragement to other cities debating whether to offer
public investment for the creation of a sports and entertainment district, by
demonstrating that a city’s investment can guarantee tangible returns for its
community.
D. Minor League Sports.comm
Professional sports teams are clearly more successful at drawing large
crowds than their minor league counterparts; however, minor league stadiums
are equally attractive as a sports anchor facility to a sports.comm. In contrast
to attendance at professional sports stadiums, which is often dependent upon
team success, minor league stadiums are attractive due to their affordable
family-friendly environment and consistent attendance levels. Consistent fans
and affordable prices offer great potential for a sports.comm because fans have
more money left in their pockets following a game to spend at local nearby
businesses.
The most complete vision of a minor league sports.comm and the use of
sports for economic revitalization is the development of downtown
Indianapolis and its use of a Minor League Baseball stadium as the catalyst for
economic development. The construction of Victory Field, home of the
Indianapolis Indians, the Triple-A affiliate of the Pittsburgh Pirates, was
strategically designed to synergize the developing professional and amateur
sports districts within the city. Beginning in the 1980s, Indianapolis became a
model for the utilization of sports for economic revitalization with the
institution of their Regional Center General Plan: Indianapolis 1980–2000,
which was designed to foster the development of Indianapolis as the capital of
the Midwest for both professional and amateur sports. 227 The plan arose in
response to two decades of economic decline throughout Indianapolis and the
Midwest, in general. 228
To combat the declining economy, a Policy Group (Group) comprised of
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
64 (1995).
228. Id. at 62–63.
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more than twenty local business and civic leaders began meeting to discuss a
redevelopment plan for the city and to decide on an identity for the future of
Indianapolis. The Group settled on three sectors to focus on during the city’s
redevelopment efforts: amateur sports, convention and tourism, and arts and
culture. 229 Implementation of the plan included the allocation of over $125
million over ten years for the creation of numerous amateur, professional, and
business facilities. 230 The $77.5 million Hoosier Dome was the most
significant investment, but the $30 million spent on amateur sports
infrastructure transformed Indianapolis into the amateur sports center of the
By 1992, the headquarters of nineteen amateur sports
country. 231
organizations had relocated to Indianapolis, including the Amateur Athletic
Union, U.S. Diving Association, and the U.S. Gymnastics Federation. 232 The
city solidified itself as the nation’s premier destination for amateur sports in
1999 when the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) moved its
headquarters to its current downtown Indianapolis location. 233
In 1980, Indianapolis’ initial public investment in sports was met with
unprecedented local and national philanthropic support. As part of its
revitalization plan, the city constructed a downtown public meeting place to
solicit community input on its future development projects. 234 These
meetings were attended by 25,000 people in the first year. 235 They were
especially popular due to Indianapolis’ unique local political structure. The
city had a unified city and county government, which offered greater power to
the mayor and ultimately made the local government more flexible to the will
of the people. 236 The Indianapolis revitalization also utilized unprecedented
philanthropic support from the Lilly Endowment Foundation, which provided
a $25 million donation for the revitalization project. 237 However, by the end
of the 1980s, the public had grown tired of its tax contribution to sports
development in the city and voted against a $40 million bond offering to build
dormitories for the Pan-American Games, which were to be converted to lowincome housing. 238 Following the failed bond offering, the attempt to secure

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Steve Herman, NCAA to Move into New Headquarters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 23, 1999.
JOHNSON, supra note 227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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public funding for a new minor league stadium for the Indianapolis Indians
became a major challenge.
In 1977, the City of Indianapolis bought the Indians’ home, Bush Stadium,
from their deceased owner for a total of $300,000. 239 The city leased the
stadium to the Indians, who were responsible for operational and maintenance
costs, while the city provided major structural repairs, including a $1.8 million
renovation in 1979. 240 During the 1980s, the public debate over moving the
team from its location outside of downtown into the city centered on whether
the city should invest in a minor league or professional baseball stadium, not
whether a stadium should be constructed at all. As public sentiment turned,
the Indians’ private ownership group was unable to get their stadium
completely funded by the city. Instead, the team’s private investors and the
Indianapolis Capital Improvement Board split the initial $18 million
construction costs, which were privately funded through ticket sales and
fundraising. 241
Victory Field opened in 1996 and was immediately named the “Best
Minor League Ballpark in America” by both Baseball America and Sports
Illustrated. 242 The stadium shares many characteristics with its Major League
counterparts’ architecture, which exemplifies the city’s desire to create a
minor league sports.comm. The stadium includes open concourses, lawn
seating for 2000 fans, and 12,500 permanent seats. 243 It also includes twentyeight luxury suites, five party suites, and two large picnic areas. 244 The city
recently committed another $700,000 to upgrade Victory Field by installing an
open-air restaurant and bar in the stadium’s left field stands. 245
The $20 million facility was strategically placed to act as an economic
catalyst with the purpose of consolidating the amateur and professional sports
sections of downtown Indianapolis. 246 The stadium is located at the southwest
border of White River State Park in downtown, which is now home to
numerous cultural, commercial, recreational, and educational facilities.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Victory Field Profile, MILB.COM, http://www.minorleaguebaseball.com/ballpark/page.jsp
?ymd=20050630&content_id=13591&vkey=ballpark_t484&fext=.jsp&sid=t484 (last visited Oct. 10,
2011).
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. Indians Adding Dining Option; $700k Project Brings Restaurant, Bar to Victory Field,
INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Feb. 7, 2011.
246. Victory Field, SCRIBD, at 43, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/50538485/Local-InfoCamp-Atterbury-Muscatatuck-Urban-Training-Complex (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
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Nearby attractions include the NCAA Hall of Champions, the Indiana State
Museum, an IMAX theater, and the Congressional Medal of Honor Memorial.
In the ten years following the stadium’s opening in 1996, the area received
over $3 billion in private and public capital investments, which includes the
development of the Circle Centre Mall, 300 new retail stores, and 200 bars and
restaurants downtown. 247
The city has used the minor league stadium as a catalyst for urban
revitalization by taking a synergistic approach to implementing its various
recreational and entertainment attractions. 248 Professional and amateur sports
attractions generally draw different markets; therefore, the utilization of
baseball, America’s pastime, has been the perfect element to combine the
distinct districts. Victory Field’s strategic location in downtown Indianapolis
and the city’s decision to forego an attempt to lure a professional baseball
franchise has made it an attractive place for budget-conscious families, which
has produced a consistent revenue base. The city of Indianapolis began its
economic revitalization plan over twenty years ago, and has successfully
created the model minor league sports.comm through smart investment and by
highlighting its Midwestern identity by focusing on quality and affordability in
order to create a vibrant, family-friendly entertainment district.
Following the success of Victory Field as an economic catalyst, minor
league sports.comms have been utilized by cities that are unable to support a
professional sports franchise.
Examples of successful minor league
sports.comms include Louisville Slugger Field in Louisville, Kentucky;
Autozone Park in Memphis, Tennessee; Canal Park in Akron, Ohio; Fifth
Third Field in Dayton, Ohio; and Campbell’s Field in Camden, New Jersey.
E. College Sports.comm
Most recently, the sports.comm concept has been utilized in the college
setting to satisfy both the practical and revenue-producing needs of the modern
university. A college sports.comm increases use days and revenue streams for
universities. If the university can partner with a private developer to create
commercial and residential revenue-producing real estate, the university can
share in the cash flow, equity, and appreciated value of the real estate. Such
cash flows may help the university pay for the cost of construction, ongoing
maintenance of its facilities, and other athletic program costs. Furthermore, a
college sports.comm creates a lifestyle and retail experience for students,
247. Victory Field Profile, supra note 242.
248. Craig Penquite, Thesis, Urban Ballpark Design: A Holistic Strategy Toward Vitalization, U.
CIN. ARCH. 68, 2004, available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi/Hall%20Bridget.pdf?ucin124253
1725.
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alumni, and guests, as part of, adjacent to, or connected to a sports facility. A
college sports.comm could include retail, residential living spaces including
condominiums, a convocation center, and a university hotel connected to or
near a sports facility. The college sports.comm concept has generally taken
two forms: multi-use districts built for the purpose of acting as an economic
catalyst for a school and its athletic programs, or multi-use districts built to
capture revenues generated by fans of successful athletic programs. Examples
of catalytic college sports.comms include Florida Atlantic University (FAU),
and the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV). Examples of the staged
college sports.comm, which seeks to capitalize on a school’s existing sports
facilities, includes the Ohio State University (OSU) and the University of
Notre Dame (Notre Dame).
1.

Florida Atlantic University.

Innovation Village has become a reality as a result of a joint venture
between FAU and two private developers, Capstone On-Campus Management
(Capstone) and Balfour Beatty Campus Solutions (Balfour Beatty). 249 Under
their agreement, Balfour Beatty contributed $3.4 million in bonds to finance
the project. 250 After completion, FAU is responsible for leasing, marketing,
student programming, and residential life. 251 Capstone and Balfour Beatty
will co-manage the new and existing student housing facilities on campus, and
be responsible for budgeting and physical operations. 252
Financing for the project required significant public investment beyond
the developer and university’s contribution. Of the $70 million stadium cost,
$44.5 million will be funded by Build America Bonds, which will be financed
by a thirty-year, fixed rate loan. 253 The interest rate is set at 5.78%, but a
Build America Bond federal interest rate subsidy will make FAU’s effective
rate 3.76%. 254 The balance will be contributed through university funding. 255
Construction of Innovation Village was conducted in phases. Phase I of
the development was completed in the fall of 2009 with the construction of a

249. Innovative Campus Life: FAU Breaks Ground on Innovation Village Apartments, FAU,
http://www.fau.edu/explore/homepage-stories/2010_04IV.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2011).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Innovation Village Stadium Project: Final Terms of Stadium Loan, FAU (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.fau.edu/bot/files/12_15_2010_committee_meeting/audit_finance/innovation_stadium_pro
ject.pdf.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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32,000-foot Wellness Center, an alumni center, and 480 new parking
spaces. 256 Phase II began in March of 2010 and includes Innovation Village
Residential Hall, which features 1200 beds and was set to open in August of
2011. 257 The stadium project also began construction in 2010, and opened in
October 2011. 258 The stadium includes 30,000 seats, 5,000 club seats, 26 loge
boxes, and 20 suites. The construction is subject to a Community
Development Agreement with the City of Boca Raton, Florida, which limits
the number of events at the new stadium to fifteen per year. 259 However, the
agreement allows that number to be modified at any time.
Because FAU previously played its football games nearly fifteen miles
away, the on-campus stadium is expected to generate immediate revenues for
the University. Beginning with the 2011–2012 season, FAU expects the
stadium to produce $6,244,733 in annual revenue, at a cost of $3,784,588 in
yearly expenses. 260 More notably, the stadium is expected to add $1.7 million
into the local economy during each FAU home game. 261
2.

University of Nevada–Las Vegas.

UNLV has recently begun the process of developing its own sports.comm.
In February 2011, the University agreed to grant a 150-day negotiating
window to Ed Roski, Jr. to propose a construction and financing plan for a
40,000-seat, domed, multi-use facility on its Las Vegas campus, which would
include approximately 600,000 square feet of retail space and restaurants,
student housing, parking, and a refurbished events center. 262 Roski is working
with the same architect that he used in the development of L.A. Live at the
Staples Center, and most recently, the proposed 80,000-seat NFL stadium in
the City of Grand Crossing. 263
The preliminary proposal places the 40,000-seat stadium as the
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.; Student Government Game Day Program: FAU v. UAB, FAU, http://www.fau.edu/sg/
gameday.php (last visited Dec. 14, 2011).
259. Innovation Village Stadium Project, supra note 253.
260. Rebekah Monson, FAU Gives Early Peek at Stadium, SUN-SENTINEL (Florida), Mar. 31,
2011, at 1B.
261. Id.
262. Press Release, Craig Cavileer, Majestic Realty Co. Proposes Mixed-Use Development
Including Multi-Purpose Events Center at UNLV, MAJESTIC REALTY CO. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.unlvnow.com/downloads/2011-02-01.pdf.
263. Sam Farmer, Roski Not Fazed by Naming-Rights Deal;
He Says His Plan for an NFL Stadium in City of Industry is Better Than AEG’s, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2011), at SPORTS 1.
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centerpiece of a 150-acre mixed-use village, which will include 3000 housing
units and 600,000 square feet of retail space. 264 The 150-acre master-planned
development would include retail space and university housing. 265 The
unique aspect of the project is the flexibility of the proposed mixed-use arena.
The event center is being designed to host UNLV basketball and football
events, NCAA bowl games, Arena Football, NBA, NHL, MLS, and even
Professional Bull Riding. 266 One of the main focuses of the development is
continuing Las Vegas’ relationship with the National Finals Rodeo, which is
held annually in December. Other facilities like Dallas Cowboys Stadium
have been trying desperately to poach the event. 267
The Nevada Board of Regents recently approved a 150-day extension for
the University and Majestic Realty to propose a suitable financing package. 268
The proposal cannot include academic dollars, but the proceeds from ticket
sales and rent could be used. 269 University President Neal Smatresk is
confident a project will get done, saying, “We do believe in this project.
When you try to do something very big and very bold that can change your
campus and the trajectory of growth and build-out of UNLV, it takes time.” 270
3.

The Ohio State University.

OSU’s application of the sports.comm concept is more similar to its
professional sport counterparts. A 2005 economic impact study concluded
that OSU’s sports programs were responsible for generating $100 million a
year for the local economy, one-third of which came from fan spending on
hotels, food, parking, and shopping. 271 Therefore, OSU’s goals were to
capture a portion of those revenues while revitalizing the University,
enhancing the housing and retail options in the area, and creating a greater
sense of a collegiate atmosphere. 272
264. Jason R. Latham, UNLV Project Goes Beyond Stadium, FOX5 VEGAS (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.fox5vegas.com/news/26692310/detail.html.
265. UNLV to Continue Talks on New Stadium, REVENUES FROM SPORTS VENUES NEWSLETTER,
June 23, 2011.
266. The Cause, UNLVNOW.COM, http://www.unlvnow.com/index-1.html (last visited Oct. 23,
2011).
267. Id.
268. UNLV to Continue Talks on New Stadium, supra note 265.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Jon Weinbach, Inside College Sports’ Biggest Money Machine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2007,
at Bus. News.
272. Retail Development Draft Market Study-FIU, BRAILSFORD & DUNLAVEY, Mar. 2008,
available at http://facilities.fiu.edu/documents/sacs/FIU-Retail-Market-Study-March-08.pdf.
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The creation of the OSU sports.comm began in 1995 with the creation of
an urban redevelopment plan to improve the quality of life within the
University. 273 The specific goals were to create a college-town atmosphere
around the campus, improve the retail and rental housing markets in the area,
and to improve the quality of life in the neighborhood. 274 By 1999,
development began on a $153 million mixed-use project featuring restaurants,
a movie theater, retailers, apartments, and a parking garage. 275 Overall, the
development included 184 apartments, 88,000 square feet of office space, and
249,000 square feet of retail space. 276 The project was funded through
contributions from the University, New Market Tax Credits, and TIF districts
funded by city and state taxes. 277 Since its opening in 2005, the sports.comm
has been successful in creating a gateway to the campus and in promoting
additional development adjacent to the district. 278
4.

The University of Notre Dame.

Arguably the most unique college sports.comm can be found at Notre
Dame, which has used the popularity of its sports programs not only to
upgrade the retail and dining options around its sports facilities, but also to
promote innovation and advancements in technology. Opened in September
2009, the $215 million sports.comm was created based on a partnership
between Notre Dame and the City of South Bend. 279 The City provided $35
million worth of infrastructure improvements and acquired land for the project
in return for the University’s promise to focus development on attracting
innovative businesses. 280
The Notre Dame sports.comm includes Innovation Park, a state-certified
technology park, and Eddy Street Commons, a retail and dining complex—
both across the street from Notre Dame Stadium—the Joyce Center, baseball
and softball fields, and new hockey arena. Innovation Park was developed for
the specific purpose of serving early-stage businesses that could benefit from
access to the university’s resources and expertise. Some current businesses at
Innovation Park include Maranon Capital, L.P., NETech Corporation, and
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
at A6.
280.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
The Northeast Neighborhood Gets a Gold Star, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Indiana), Dec. 3, 2010,
Id.
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Elevate Ventures. 281 Eddy Street Commons includes apartments, condos,
gymnasium, multiple restaurants, a bank, and multiple retailers. Shops include
an AT&T store, an outdoor sports store, a bookstore, and a salon and spa.
The Notre Dame project has been considered a complete success and
personifies an ideal college sports.comm by aligning the economic goals of a
university with its goals as an institution of education and innovation. The
project has been so successful that it won the Gold Award for Municipal
Excellence by the National League of Cities. As these relatively new college
sports.comms begin to prove their economic value, there is no doubt that the
trend will spread to universities across the country.
F. International Sports.comm
Just as the sports.comm concept can be applied on a smaller scale to minor
league ballparks that provide an affordable, family-friendly sports
entertainment attraction, the sports.comm can also be successful on an
international scale. By consolidating multiple different professional sports
venues within a single location, an international sports.comm could potentially
provide year-round professional sports entertainment. A well-planned
international sports.comm that has no offseason would provide the ideal sports
anchor to a sports.comm and would attract the best brands in entertainment,
retail, and residential development from across the globe to compete for yearround exposure within the entertainment district. As a result, a well-planned
international sports.comm could attract consumers worldwide.
The international sports.comm concept has been utilized for years, at least
temporarily, to maximize revenues at the site of each Olympic Games, but
Dubai Sports City is the first true stand-alone international sports.comm.
Short-term events with massive appeal such as the Olympics require enormous
infrastructure investments that are generally underutilized by a city following
the event. 282 While a city might be well-positioned to host a single “megaevent,” it is unlikely to be able to utilize the resulting infrastructure efficiently
after the event has concluded. 283
1. Dubai Sports City.
Rather than attempt to reinvent a city to compete in the global marketplace

281. Clients and Services, INNOVATION PARK AT NOTRE DAME, http://innovationparknd.com/
about-ipnd/tenants/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
282. Solomon J. Greene, Staged Cities: Mega-Events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital, 6
YALE HUM.RTS. & DEV. L.J. 161, 164 (2003).
283. Id.
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after a mega-event has concluded, Dubai Sports City has taken the
revolutionary step of preplanning an entire sports city to attract mega-events
throughout the year. Dubai Sports City’s official vision statement is “[t]o
create one of the world’s premier sporting destinations in line with the overall
vision of Dubai to create world class sporting infrastructure and become a
destination for the sporting world.” 284 To achieve its goal as an international
entertainment destination, Dubai is constructing a $4 billion, 50 million
square-foot mixed-use sports.comm development.
The sports venues in Dubai Sports City are still under development, but
will include four professional sports stadiums and the Els Club golf course. 285
The largest facility will be a 60,000-seat, multi-use outdoor stadium designed
to host world-class football, rugby, and track and field. 286 The City will
feature a 10,000-seat indoor stadium for basketball, volleyball, tennis, ice
hockey, and other indoor events. 287 It will also include an advanced 25,000seat cricket stadium and 5,000-seat field hockey stadium. 288 The golf course
was completed in 2008 and was named “Best New International Course.” 289
Residential, commercial, and retail facilities are also under construction
and will provide luxurious complements to Dubai Sports City’s state of the art
venues. Residential options include the Canal Residence West Apartments,
Victory Heights Villas, and the completed Gallery Villas, near the Els Club
Golf Course. 290 Dubai Sports City will also include three commercial real
estate structures, including The Gateway, a forty-four story office tower.
Retail options will be available throughout the area, but the 1.9 million-squarefoot Arena Mall will be the main retail destination. 291 The mall will include
over 300 retail stores, a 120,000 square-foot family entertainment center,
Cinema Multiplex, and multiple eateries and food courts. 292 It will also
connect directly to the cricket stadium and multi-purpose indoor stadium to
284. Vision and Mission, DUBAI SPORTS CITY, http://www.dubaisportscity.ae/articledisplay.
asp?id=60 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
285. Stadiums, DUBAI SPORTS CITY, http://www.dubaisportscity.ae/articledisplay.asp?id=74 (last
visited Oct. 23, 2011).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Best New Golf Courses of 2008, LINKS GOLF MAGAZINE, http://www.linksmagazine.com/
golf_courses/best-new-golf-courses-of-2008/els-club-golf-course-dubai/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
290. Residential, DUBAI SPORTS CITY, http://www.dubaisportscity.ae/articledisplay.asp?id=15
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
291. A Well-Designed, Shopper-Friendly Environment, ARENA MALL, http://www.arenamall.ae/
great_shopping.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
292. A Diverse Retail Mix, ARENA MALL, http://www.arenamall.ae/retailmix.asp (last visited
Oct. 23, 2011).
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maximize consumer traffic. 293
Once completed, Dubai Sports City will be the ultimate example of the
potential for a sports.comm development.
However, like all other
developments that have been financed during the last few years, the global
recession has caused rents to fall dramatically in Dubai Sports City, which has
delayed construction. 294 Most significantly, financing within Dubai Sports
City must comply with Shariah Law, which prohibits lenders from earning
interests; therefore, developers must find investors that are willing to act as
partners on the project rather than simply as lenders. 295 The resulting lack of
financing has led the Dubai government to allocate forty-three percent of its
budget to local economic and infrastructure development, which has boosted
Dubai’s property market and revitalized the development of the world’s
preeminent international sports.comm. 296
2. Qatar.
Like the Summer and Winter Olympics, the FIFA World Cup occurs every
four years and draws a global audience; therefore, the host city is obligated to
develop infrastructure in order to satisfy the massive crowds drawn to the
event. In December 2010, the small Middle Eastern country of Qatar beat out
Australia and the United States to host the 2022 World Cup. 297 With no
stadiums capable of supporting the event, the country plans to spend $57
billion to build twelve state-of-the-art stadiums.
The most notable stadium is the Sports City Stadium, which is planned to
be a “full entertainment destination in one building.” 298 The 47,560-seat
stadium is projected to cost $1.6 billion, but could rise to $2 billion, making it
the most expensive stadium in history. 299 Features include a retractable roof

293. Id.
294. Kevin Brass, Half of Buyers Default on Dubai Sports City Project, NATIONAL, July 19,
2011, available at http://www.thenational.ae/business/property/half-of-buyers-default-on-dubaisports-city-project.
295. Heather Timmons, Dubai Crisis Tests Laws of Islamic Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2009, at B4.
296. Richar Ellis, CBRE-Dubai MarketView, ZAWYA (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.zawya.com/
story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110424065548/Dubai-Rents-Continue-Slide.
297. Simon Rice, Qatar’s Incredible Stadium Plans for 2022 World Cup, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 2,
2010),
http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-and-comment/qatars-incredible-stadiumplans-for-2022-world-cup-2149447.html.
298. Dan Muret, Capacity Increase Could Make Qatar Stadium Costliest Ever, SPORTS BUS.
DAILY
(July
18,
2011),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2011/07/18/Facilities/Breaking-Ground.aspx.
299. Id.
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that will also provide seating above the playing field, adjustable seating
capacity, and a cooling system that will provide cool air for spectators and
players in the desert heat. 300
Sports City Stadium was specifically designed for the venue to have a
lasting effect in the region. Dan Meis, an architect working on the project
with the Kansas City firm Populous, explained that “[o]ften countries will
build stadiums for events, and they have difficulty utilizing the building
afterwards.” 301 Populous sought to avoid that problem by meshing the
stadium design with Arabian culture using inspiration drawn from a Bedouin
tent. 302 Like a Bedouin tent, the stadium will be easily convertible, which will
allow it to satisfy a multitude of events. 303 With the economic trouble of
Dubai Sports City, the successful completion of the Qatar stadium project
could make it the preeminent international sports.comm.
IV. STAGED SPORTS.COMM
Though sports.comms are most successful as a revenue generator when
they are part of a fully-conceived development plan, team owners and local
governments have begun to apply the sports.comm concept on a staged basis
by upgrading a city’s existing sports infrastructure. Team owners that own
additional land surrounding their stadium, or are part of a receptive
community that enables them to acquire that land, have begun creating multiuse entertainment districts adjacent to their sports venues in order to further
enlarge their sports venues.
Most notably, league revenue-sharing rules have made the development of
a sports.comm a practical necessity for owners in order to keep their teams
economically viable. All professional leagues have some form of revenue
sharing that generally requires teams to share their national media, licensing,
and gate receipt revenues; however, other stadium revenues are generally not
shared. 304 Therefore, team owners have sought to maximize their stadium
revenues by constructing additional revenue-generating facilities around an
existing professional sports anchor venue. These structures are not necessarily
sports-related; rather, they are traditional retail, entertainment, and recreational
elements capable of attracting large crowds to a sports venue.
300. Kyle Stack, Qatar World Cup Stadiums Promise Eco-Friendly Soccer Utopia, WIRED.COM
(Dec. 6, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/playbook/2010/12/gallery-qatar-stadiums/?pid
=75&viewall=true.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. SCOTT ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 48 (2004).
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The staged sports.comm concept, in addition to being utilized by team
owners, has also been utilized by local governments that have attempted to
transform their city into a destination place in order to better compete in the
emerging global marketplace. Cities have accomplished this by both
expanding their existing stadium infrastructure and by creating new sports
venues in the hope of attracting a professional sports tenant to anchor its multiuse entertainment district. The effects of the recession have generally required
local governments to play a larger role in the development of the modern
sports.comm, which has given cities more power to control the planning of
these developments, ensuring that the sports.comm will benefit the local
community as well as the local sports franchise.
Examples of the staged sports.comm concept include the expansion of the
New Orleans Superdome, home of the New Orleans Saints, and the creation of
the Titletown District surrounding Lambeau Field, home of the Green Bay
Packers. The city-driven staged sports.comm is best illustrated by the
Bricktown District in Oklahoma City, home of the Oklahoma City Thunder;
and the Platinum Triangle in Anaheim, home of the Los Angeles Angels of
Anaheim and the Anaheim Mighty Ducks.
A.

New Orleans Superdome

The New Orleans Superdome has long been one of the nation’s
preeminent indoor sports venues, but was decimated when Hurricane Katrina
tragically struck Louisiana in 2005. Prior to the disaster, the Saints had been
putting pressure on the State of Louisiana to finance a new stadium or to
contribute to necessary large-scale Superdome improvements. Without the
requisite local support to publicly finance a new stadium, the State agreed to
contribute yearly state subsidies to cover the Saints’ annual revenue losses. 305
At the time, only Indianapolis had offered to subsidize its NFL franchise’s
revenue losses, but the Louisiana state government realized it could not retain
its NFL franchise without offering public subsidies. 306 The state concluded
that its participation was necessary based on the fact that New Orleans ranked
as the fourth smallest NFL franchise, had the third fewest television
households among NFL markets, and its population had one of the lowest per
capita incomes among NFL cities. 307 Therefore, in 2001, the Saints and the
305. Victor A. Matheson & Robert A. Baade, NFL Governance and the Fate of the New Orleans
Saints: Some Observations, INT’L ASSOC. OF SPORTS ECONOMISTS 3 (Apr. 2007), available at
http://college.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/BaadeMatheson_NFLSaints.pdf.
306. John Fritze & Kevin Corcoran, Subsidies for Colts Unforeseen, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov.
21, 2004, at 1B.
307. Stephen Stuart, Funds & Games: Paying for the Saints, BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RES.
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State of Louisiana entered into a ten-year, $180.5 million agreement that
would initially pay the Saints $12.5 million, with payments scheduled to
gradually increase to $23.5 million per year. 308
Following Hurricane Katrina, the state’s desperate bargaining position in
negotiations with the Saints became much worse due to the destruction in and
around the Superdome. Due to the devastation throughout the city, the
Superdome became an important anchor for retail, commercial, and cultural
redevelopment in New Orleans. 309 Therefore, out of necessity, the state and
Saints owner Tom Benson (Benson) entered into a public-private partnership
to create a staged sports.comm around a refurbished Superdome.
The first phase of the Superdome sports.comm was to reinvigorate the
deteriorating Superdome with $85 million in publicly-financed
improvements. 310 A portion of these improvements utilized New Market Tax
Credits, which were available because the construction would take place in a
blighted area. 311 The funds were primarily directed towards stadium
improvements including the addition of 3100 plaza-level seats, sixteen new
luxury boxes, premium club lounges, and forty-three additional food and
beverage stands throughout the Superdome. 312 With the exception of the
increased plaza seating, all increased revenues generated from these
improvements would fund nonshared NFL revenue streams. 313 In return for
such an advantageous deal, Benson agreed to decrease the amount of annual
government subsidies owed by the state to between $6 and $7 million per
year. 314
The second phase of the Superdome redevelopment has also been
developed with a focus on maximizing the Saints nonshared revenues. The
next step was to replace the New Orleans Centre mall and Dominion Tower
government building with a lucrative alternative. The Benson family’s
company, Zelia, LLC (Zelia), privately purchased the 26-story Dominion
Tower for a price of $12.5 million, on the condition that the state would
promise to lease at least two-thirds of the vacant office space for the first

8 (Jan. 2005), http://www.bgr.org/files/reports/FundsandGames.pdf.
308. Id. at 10.
309. Robert Travis Scott, New Orleans Saints, Superdome Game Plan is Multlayered Effort for
State, NOLA.COM (Feb. 21, 2010), www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/02/new_orleans_saints
_complicated.html.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE , supra note 304.
314. Scott, supra note 309.
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fifteen years. 315 Zelia also purchased the New Orleans Centre properties,
including a 2000-space parking garage, for a total of $42.1 million. 316 The
agreement required the Louisiana Sports Entertainment District to pay the
Bensons $2.3 million annually in rent for the New Orleans Centre. 317 The
$10.5 million cost of demolishing the property surrounding the stadium was
also paid for by the state as a credit for the remaining subsidy payments
forgiven by the Saints. 318 The demolition made room for the creation of a
92,000-foot open-air gathering place, now known as Champions Square.
Currently, the area serves as a grand entrance to the Superdome, a
performance stage, and a game-day party zone for pregame events. 319
Another private developer is in the process of completing the renovation of the
New Orleans Hyatt hotel that was destroyed during Hurricane Katrina, but had
previously been a focal point of the Superdome district. 320 The hotel
renovation project will cost a total of $275 million to complete and will be a
key addition to the district. 321 The coordination of those two distinct
developments will be critical to the overall functionality and success of the
Superdome staged sports.comm.
The final phase of development will concern the implementation of new
entrances to the Superdome and the creation of restaurants, night clubs, and
entertainment venues within the entertainment district. As those developments
are completed, the City of New Orleans plans to join the ranks of Patriots Park
and L.A. Live as one of the nation’s model sports.comm developments. 322 At
a minimum, the sports.comm will be nationally recognized as the Superdome
is scheduled to host the 2012 and 2013 Sugar Bowl; the 2012 Bowl
Championship Series National Championship Game, the 2012 Men’s
Basketball Final Four, and Super Bowl XLVII in 2013. 323

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Nakia Hogan, Champions Square Will Open for New Orleans Saints’ First Exhibition Game
at Superdome, NOLA.COM (Aug. 15, 2010), http://www.nola.com/saints/index.ssf/2010/08/
champions_square_set_to_open_f.html.
320. Officials Break Ground on Hyatt Regency New Orleans Redevelopment Project,
NOLA.COM (Aug. 18, 2010, 11:04 a.m.), http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2010/08/
officials_break_ground_on_hyat.html.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Kathy Finn, New Anchor in Town, MYNEW ORLEANS.COM (Nov. 2010), http://www.mynew
orleans .com/New-Orleans-Magazine/November-2010/New-anchor-in-town/.
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B. Titletown District
Similar to New Orleans, development of the Titletown District
surrounding Lambeau Field in Green Bay, Wisconsin has adopted the staged
sports.comm formula for creating a regional sports and entertainment
destination. However, unlike the Superdome and arguably all of the
sports.comm developments previously discussed, Lambeau Field has the
unique distinction of being located in a cold, rural area of the country.
Therefore, the success or failure of the Titletown District will be the ultimate
test of whether the staged sports.comm is a viable tool for economic
development regardless of market size, climate, or location. The Titletown
District could also finally conclude the seemingly endless debate over whether
a sports venue creates new wealth or simply transfers wealth from other forms
of entertainment within a city.
The Green Bay Packers are also in a unique position as a result of NFL
revenue-sharing rules. Unlike the owners of large-market teams that seek to
develop a sports.comm in order to avoid losing revenues to league revenue
sharing rules, the Packers have been forced to implement a sports.comm
surrounding Lambeau Field to supplement its proceeds from revenue sharing
in order to remain economically viable in the NFL. The current NFL salary
cap formula includes both shared and nonshared revenues; therefore, as
nonshared revenues have increased, due in large part to the modern
sports.comm, the salary cap has also increased. 324 Thus, while player costs
have consistently risen as a result of increased nonshared revenues, the amount
of shared revenues available to the Packers has remained the same.
Meanwhile, the Packers local revenues have remained the same since 2007. 325
Though the exact numbers are unavailable, Packers President Mark Murphy
has observed that player costs are outpacing revenue by a two-to-one rate. 326
As a result, the Packers and the City of Green Bay are working together to
upgrade its existing infrastructure to create a staged sports.comm in order to
mitigate Green Bay’s size disadvantage compared to competing NFL markets.
Similar to the New Orleans Superdome, the first phase of the Titletown
District required a renovation of the existing football venue. In 2002,
Lambeau Field underwent a massive $295 million renovation that caused the

324. Christopher Stefani, State of the Shield: The NFL’s Economic Model and Its Impact on
Competitive Balance, STATE OF THE SHIELD (Sept. 2009), http://stateoftheshield.com/files/State_of_
the_Shield_by_Chris_Stefani_09_09.pdf.
325. Gregg Rosenthal, NFLPA Responds to Packers’ Financial Report, PROFOOTBALLTALK
(July 14, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/07/14/nflpa-responds-to-packersfinancial-report/.
326. Id.
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stadium to more than double in size to nearly 1.7 million square feet. 327 The
crown jewel of the development was the five-story Lambeau Field Atrium.
The facility is home to the Green Bay Packers Hall of Fame, the Packers’ team
shop, interactive fan zones, event facilities, seven new restaurants, and
multiple new outlets for concessions. 328 The developer of the project,
Hammes Co., strategically positioned the atrium to “open up the building to
the potential of bringing people to the stadium year-round.” 329
The one-time impact of the Lambeau renovation on Brown County
included $203 million in spending, $79 million in wages, and $5.8 million in
tax revenues created during construction. 330 At the peak of construction, the
As a result of the
development created approximately 880 jobs. 331
development, use of the renovated stadium has increased the local impact of
the Packers by an estimated $107 million in new spending, 940 jobs, and $5.6
million in tax revenue. 332 Based on the success of the Lambeau Field
renovation, Hammes Co. has also been hired for the more challenging task of
creating a proposal to make the Titletown District into a year-round regional
destination.
To date, the Packers have acquired twenty-eight acres of land surrounding
Lambeau Field for a price of $27 million, which was $10 million greater than
the fair market value for the land. 333 Little is currently known about the
Packers’ plans for developing the area, but Packers’ President Mark Murphy
hopes the finished development will triple the total number of people that visit
Lambeau Field each year, and will pay back the community’s contribution
towards the $295 million Lambeau Field renovation. 334 However, before that
investment can be repaid, the Packers must seek to extend the one-half cent
Brown County sales tax used for the initial renovation, which is scheduled to
end by 2015; although the last of the $174 million in bonds issued for the

327. 10 Things You Gotta Know About Lambeau, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2003,
at 10T.
328. Karen Rauen, Atrium is Crown Jewel of New Lambeau, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, Aug.
24, 2003, at 14T.
329. Id.
330. Economic Impact Study of the Green Bay Packers and the Redeveloped Lambeau Field,
AECOM TECHNICAL SERVS., INC. 1, 7 (Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.packers.com/assets/
docs/2010economic_impact_report.pdf.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Tony Walter, Green Bay Packers Have Big Plans for Real Estate Surrounding Lambeau
Field, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, July 26, 2010, at GPG.
334. Everyone Has Interest in Lambeau Field Area, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, Aug. 1, 2010,
at A13.
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renovation will be paid off by August 1, 2011. 335
The next step of the Titletown development will be another renovation of
Lambeau Field, this time adding up to 6600 additional seats, which will
enclose the south end of the stadium to create a “wall of sound.” 336 The
additional seating, along with ticket prices that were increased by $8 to $11
dollars apiece last year, will allow the Packers to make a greater financial
contribution to future development surrounding the stadium. 337 According to
Jason Wied, Packers’ Vice President of Administration/General Counsel, the
new seats will be in vertical stacks to allow maximum visibility, and will
likely include standing-room-only, loge, and premium seating options. 338 The
new seating will have an estimated economic impact of $2 million per game,
and the Packers’ plan to fund the project without a public contribution. 339
Moreover, the Packers are planning to add new scoreboards and to expand the
Packers Hall of Fame by moving the Packers Pro Shop and Curly’s Pub to the
adjacent east parking lot. Unfortunately, the Packers have also faced some
unexpected adversity in their future development plans.
To date, construction of the retail and entertainment district has been
slowed. Titletown’s first proposed retail anchor store, Bass Pro Shops,
abruptly ended negotiations to come to Green Bay following the Wisconsin
legislature’s decision to reclassify an area of wetlands in order to facilitate the
development. 340 A spokesman for Bass Pro Shops stated, “We were unaware
of any wetland issue and have not and will not be in favor of doing anything to
harm wetlands, wherever they might be.” 341 The loss of Bass Pro Shops is a
definite blow to the projected success of Titletown, but competing outdoor
retailer, Cabela’s, has already been rumored as a replacement. Other projected

335. Richard Ryman, Lambeau Field Renovation Debt to be Paid Off Aug. 1, GREEN BAY
PRESS-GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 2011, at A6.
336. Rich Rovito, Lambeau Field Expansion May Create ‘Wall of Sound’, BUS. J. (MILWAUKEE)
(July 4, 2010, 11:28 a.m.), http://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/stories/2010/07/05/story6.html;
Lambeau Field Expansion, JSONLINE (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/multimedia/photos
/128414938.html#id_55302458.
337. Packers Asking Fans for Input on Potential Lambeau Field Changes, NFL.COM (2010),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?confirm=true&id=09000d5d81840a9a&template=with-video-withcomments.
338. Tony Walter, Seatbacks, Armrests Among Options on Survey Green Bay Packers Fans Get
About Lambeau Field Expansion Plans, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE, May 6, 2011, at GPG.
339. Richard Ryman, Green Bay Packers Hall of Fame May Be Expanded, GREEN BAY PRESSGAZETTE, May 20, 2011, at PKR.
340. Wes Johnson, Bass Pro Shops Rejects Wetlands Site Near Lambeau Field, GREEN BAY
PRESS-GAZETTE (Jan. 28, 2011, 5:25 a.m.), http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/article/20110128
/GPG0101/101280534/Bass-Pro-Shops-rejects-wetlands-site-near-Lambeau-Field.
341. Id.
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uses of the Titletown District include a multi-use baseball stadium, a new
indoor training facility, and a new hotel adjacent to the stadium. 342
Regardless of the options the Packers choose to implement, the Titletown
District will be the clearest example of the success of the sports.comm concept
because the Packers disclose their local revenues yearly; therefore, the drastic
change in revenue production should be evident.
C. Bricktown District
The most successful utilization of the city-driven staged sports.comm
model has been Oklahoma City’s development of the Bricktown District,
which has transformed a blighted area into a vibrant regional attraction. Once
the city’s warehouse district, the sports.comm has become its entertainment
center through strategic public investment that has attracted private business
from across the country. Today, Oklahoma City is known as the best place in
America to launch a small business. 343
Oklahoma City’s warehouse district faced a crash in 1982 as a result of
falling oil prices that led many companies to evacuate the oil-fueled downtown
area. 344 After ten years of decay, the City instituted its now-historic MAPS
program, which primarily includes a one-cent sales tax. 345 Beginning in 2003,
its most visible success has been the creation of the Bricktown canal and river
walk, but the MAPS program is responsible for most of the economic growth
in downtown Oklahoma City throughout the last twenty years. 346
Oklahoma City began to incorporate the sports.comm concept into its city
revitalization plans on a staged basis by strategically acquiring and developing
land to provide the most efficient uses for the city. The development of the
sports.comm was made possible by the city’s complete funding of the project,
and was necessary due to the city government’s need to allocate resources
economically, efficiently, and fairly. The initial MAPS public investments
were focused on four categories of the economy: the Traditional Economy,
which focused on invigorating the depressed warehouse district economy; the
Health Economy, by starting health initiatives in the area; the Culture and
342. Tony Walter, Green Bay Packers Look to Expand Stadium District, GREEN BAY PRESSGAZETTE, Apr. 17, 2011, at A-1.
343. Best Places to Launch: 2009, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/smallbusiness/best_
places_launch/2009/snapshot/241.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
344. The History of Bricktown, NEWS9.COM, http://www.news9.com/global/story.asp?s=76
90410 (Last visited Dec. 8, 2011).
345. Executive Summary, Larkin Warner, Impact Analysis of MAPS and Other Significant
Central City Investments, prepared for GREATER OKLAHOMA CITY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Sept.
2003, at 2.
346. Id. at 20.
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Recreation Economy, which focused on making the city more livable and
walkable; and the Low-Socioeconomic Status Economy, which focused on
providing for the displaced and impoverished community in the downtown
area. 347 By staging the development process in this way, Oklahoma City was
able to limit the risk inherent in such a large-scale real estate development, to
increase public support for the project, and to successfully maximize the
economic potential of the sports entertainment district within the city.
Therefore, the goals of the development were unique because the stadium
district plan had a dual focus on economic impact and community benefits.
In 2004, the Oklahoma City Council codified its intentions for the district
by instituting a Downtown Strategic Action Plan, which set goals for
marketing, private investment, and area business development. 348 The plan
called for a goal of $350 million in private investment in Bricktown, which
would match the total amount contributed by MAPS since 1993. Despite the
city’s unprecedented investment, the plan for the Bricktown District was also a
unique public-private partnership. The government’s role was to set a
foundation for continued economic viability in the area by constructing the
district’s sports and entertainment anchor-facilities by synergizing the city’s
existing infrastructure. Thereafter, the city encouraged private commercial
and retail investors to complete the entertainment district. By staging the
development process, Oklahoma City was able to limit the risk inherent in
such a large-scale real estate development, which made private investors more
anxious to invest, and maximized the economic benefits of the sports.comm to
the city.
The first major anchor in the Bricktown District was AT&T Bricktown
Ballpark constructed in 1998. The stadium cost a total of $34 million, but the
cost was offset by a ten-year naming rights deal with AT&T that began in
2006 and has since been recouped by the stadium’s overall economic impact
on the district. 349 Development of the district’s first key sports anchor
occurred concurrently with the construction of the Bricktown Canal. 350 The
canal has been an indispensable piece to the district’s success by providing
beauty, transportation, and a sense of cohesion to the community. 351 These
two developments led to the district’s first two commercial and retail coups
347. Id. at 7.
348. Brian Brus, OKC’s Downtown Makes Progress Toward Multi-Year Goals, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Oct. 24, 2007, at NEWS.
349. Brian Brus, Home of Oklahoma RedHawks Renamed AT&T Bricktown Ballpark, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Mar. 3, 2006, at NEWS.
350. See generally Executive Summary, supra note 345.
351. About Bricktown Water Taxi, BRICKTOWN WATER TAXI, http://www.bricktownwatertaxi.
com/about_us (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
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when Sonic Corporation built a large corporate office and Bass Pro Shops
constructed an 110,000 square-foot outdoor recreation superstore in the
area. 352
The second phase of the sports.comm began when voters approved an
extension of the sales tax for the construction of a 500,000-square-foot Ford
Center to host concerts and sporting events. The building cost taxpayers a
total of $89 million, but that price also included a new library and
infrastructure projects surrounding the arena. 353 The Ford Center opened in
2002 with the hope of attracting a professional sports franchise, but settled for
hosting concerts, minor league sports, and city-wide events during its first
three years. However, in 2005, the New Orleans Hornets were forced to
relocate from New Orleans to the Ford Center as a result of Hurricane Katrina,
which gave the city a chance to prove itself as a regional destination.
The New Orleans Hornets were an immediate success at the Ford Center.
In their first season, the Hornets ranked eleventh in the league in attendance
and proved that Oklahoma City had potential as an NBA city and that the
Bricktown District was capable of becoming a regional destination. After one
year, the Hornets had an overall economic impact of $66.4 million on the state
and generated a total of $4.6 million in tax revenues. 354 The excitement over
the Hornets continued entering their second season at the Ford Center, despite
the fact that an Oklahoma-based investment group had recently purchased the
Seattle Supersonics in 2006 with the intention of relocating the team to
Oklahoma City. 355 In the face of the excitement about the Hornets, the city’s
desire for a permanent team was at an all-time high. As the president of
Downtown OKC, Inc. explained, “I view a pro team as an investment in the
city that provides an economic impact and job growth for the entire city.” 356
Clay Bennett’s investment group purchased the Seattle Supersonics after
their previous ownership group was unable to secure a new arena for the
franchise. Following a public outcry in Seattle against moving the team to
Oklahoma City, the city council allowed voters to decide whether or not to
extend the one-cent MAPS sales tax to create $120 million worth of financing

352. Executive Summary, supra note 345, at 16–17.
353. Kelley Chambers, These Walls: The Ford Center in Downtown OKC, JOURNAL RECORD
(Okla.), June 2, 2008, at NEWS.
354. Jerry Shottenkirk, A Future in the Game: NBA has Multiple Avenues for OKC, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), July 20, 2006, at NEWS.
355. Jerry Shottenkirk, Local Interest in New Orleans/OKC Hornets Hasn’t Faded as Team
Enters Second Season in OKC, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Oct. 4, 2006, at NEWS.
356. Darren Currin, The Three “Ls” of Downtown OKC: Leasing, Living, and Leisure, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Feb. 14, 2008, at COMMENTARY.
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in order to upgrade the Ford Center for an NBA team. 357 With little
opposition, the City passed the measure, and Oklahoma City was named the
new home of the Oklahoma City Thunder. 358
With an NBA tenant in the newly-named Oklahoma City Center, a
successful AAA Minor League Baseball franchise at AT&T Bricktown
Ballpark, and the completion of a $63 million convention center, Oklahoma
City has provided the infrastructure necessary for private residential,
commercial, and retail businesses to flourish.
Most importantly, to
accommodate overnight guests, the Bricktown District has created a total of
1600 downtown hotel rooms and plans to include a total of 2250 units upon
completion of the development. 359 Beyond hotels, the city council has set a
goal of creating 2000 new permanent housing units in the district, of which
1400 units have been completed. 360 Housing units include market-priced
condominiums, high-end townhomes, and low-income housing. Construction
of a $36 million, twelve-story mixed-use condominium, retail, and office
space is also underway. 361 Most recently, the city council has approved
funding for a TIF district to support the creation of the Center City Residential
project, a 230 single-family unit structure set to open in 2012. 362
While the housing phase was being constructed, the City focused its
auxiliary developments on creating dining and nightlife options for the
Bricktown District. Bricktown features many popular national bars like
Coyote Ugly and Toby Keith’s I Love This Bar and Grill, and high-end clubs
for the districts’ affluent guests. 363 The creation of a walkable downtown
environment was also a key for connecting the district’s sports venues, hotels,
bars, and restaurants. To create a connected environment, the city council
instituted the Downtown Streetscape Master Plan in 2006 to plan and maintain
a cohesive streetscape as development expanded and changed hands from
public to private investors. 364 The plan provides for uniform light polls, trash
357. Brian Brus, OKC Council to Ask Citizens for Money to Accommodate NBA Team, JOURNAL
RECORD LEGIS. REP. (Okla.), Dec. 21, 2007.
358. Brian Brus, OKC-Based Ford Center Upgrade: The Ball is in the Voters’ Court, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Jan. 3, 2008, at NEWS.
359. Brian Brus, OKC Visitors Fill Rooms, Look for More Downtown Retail Options, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), June 4, 2009, at NEWS.
360. Id.
361. Kelley Chambers, Bricktown Mixed-Use Project on Track, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Jan.
18, 2008, at NEWS.
362. Darren Currin, TIF Projects Fuel Growth Throughout Oklahoma, JOURNAL RECORD
(Okla.), Nov. 11, 2010, at COMMENTARY.
363. Kelley Chambers, Three New Nightclubs to Open in Oklahoma City’s Bricktown, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Feb. 27, 2009, at NEWS.
364. Kelley Chambers, Come Take a Walk Downtown; OKC Looks to Become Pedestrian-
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cans, and informational signage, while allowing each distinct downtown
district to maintain its unique character. 365
As the Bricktown District’s infrastructure started to take shape, the
balance between public and private investment began to equalize. Following
the sports venue anchor, residential, and dining phases of development,
Bricktown was in desperate need of retail and amusement options to satisfy
daytime tourists. 366 Until 2009, Bass Pro Shops was the only retail store
available to shoppers. 367 The retail development phase of the Bricktown
District is included in the City’s plans to attract over 200,000 square feet of
overall downtown retail development. 368 Many of the confirmed outlets are
eclectic, which affirms the City’s desire to create a unique entertainment
destination. Retailers include Red Dirt Marketplace, a 6000-square-foot
clothing store and International Riders, a motorcycle rental store. 369 The City
has also attempted to brand itself as the musical mecca of the region. As
evidence, Oklahoma City is home to the Academy of Contemporary Music,
the $52 million Civic Center Music Hall, and a Banjo Museum. 370
The Bricktown District’s unique offerings extend to other entertainment
options throughout the area. Bricktown’s entertainment options begin with the
Harkings Bricktown 16 cinema and numerous live music venues. The movie
theater has remained a steady source of crowds since its opening night. 371 The
district has also earned a reputation as a regional destination for gourmet
foods. 372 In contrast to its focus on the arts, Bricktown also seeks to attract
additional sports fans to cheer its recently-acquired Indoor Football League
franchise. 373 The district also seeks to attract more adventurous visitors to one
of the premier indoor climbing centers in the country, OKC Rocks Climbing
Silo. Created from a refurbished grain silo, the indoor climbing walls are

friendly, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Mar. 13, 2009, at NEWS.
365. Id.
366. Kelley Chambers, OKC’s Bricktown Development on Agenda, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.),
Apr. 16, 2009, at NEWS.
367. OKC Visitors Fill Rooms, supra note 359.
368. April Wilkerson, Retail Refill: Planned Restaurants, Stores to Counter Downtown
Oklahoma City Vacancies, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Sept. 24, 2010, at NEWS.
369. Id.
370. Executive Summary, supra note 345, at 4, 14.
371. Darren Currin, Lot Lines: Stable Year for Cinemas, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), May 1,
2009, at COMMENTARY.
372. Kelley Chambers, Retailers Follow Oklahoma City Downtown Housing Growth; Gourmet
Market to Open in Deep Deuce Area, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Mar. 31, 2009, at NEWS.
373. Brian Brus, OKC Council Approves License for Indoor Football League Team, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), Dec. 7, 2010, at NEWS.
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some of the tallest in the country. 374 Other attractions include an interactive
3-D amusement ride, one-of-a-kind McDonald’s restaurant, 375 and a comedy
club. 376 As unique retail and entertainment options began drawing larger
crowds to the district, the city council initiated plans to invest in upgraded
infrastructure, such as expanded sidewalks, footbridges, and potentially, street
cars. 377
As a staged sports.comm, a true judgment of the Bricktown District’s
economic impact cannot be concluded until the development is complete.
However, even as an incomplete entertainment district, Bricktown has
revolutionized Oklahoma City. 378 By contributing a steady one-cent sales tax
to the city’s public infrastructure investment fund since 1993, taxpayers have
successfully transformed a previously blighted area into the city’s most
popular tourist attraction. Recently, Oklahoma City was named Forbes sixth
most livable city in 2009 and the most recession-proof city in America in
2008. 379 Future construction is likely to only enhance the city’s reputation
further as the Bricktown District will transform the Oklahoma City skyline
with the future addition of the 40-story, $400 million Devon Tower, which
will be the largest building in the city. 380 With smart investment, strong
political will, and private sector support, Oklahoma City has used the staged
development of sports and entertainment venues to reinvent its national
identity.
D. The Platinum Triangle
In contrast to Oklahoma City, which constructed its staged sports.comm
by utilizing new sports venues as anchor facilities around existing
entertainment and recreational infrastructure, the City of Anaheim developed
its sports.comm by renovating and connecting its existing sports and

374. Brian Brus, Former Grain Silo in Downtown Oklahoma City Makes Wonderful Rock
Climbing Gym, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Apr. 27, 2007, at NEWS.
375. Kelley Chambers, Bricktown Tailor-Made McDonald’s in OKC Moves Ahead in Approval
Process, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Oct. 11, 2007, at NEWS.
376. Kelley Chambers, Oklahoma City’s Bricktown Works to Lure Uniqueness, JOURNAL
RECORD (Okla.), June 8, 2009, at NEWS.
377. Marie Price, Central OK Transportation Officials Examine Possibility of Streetcars,
JOURNAL RECORD LEG. REP., Apr. 18, 2006.
378. Brian Brus, Basketball Boom: Oklahoma City Thunder Bringing Business to Bricktown,
JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), Apr. 27, 2010, at NEWS.
379. Ben Johnson, Better Than OK, NAT’L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (July 1, 2009, 12:00 PM),
http://nreionline.com/news/areas/oklahoma-city-public-private-partnerships-0729/.
380. Kelley Chambers, OKC Roundtable: Devon’s Plans for New Tower and Its Effect on
Downtown Oklahoma City, JOURNAL RECORD (Okla.), May 23, 2008, at NEWS.
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entertainment facilities. The existing anchor facilities to be utilized in the
Platinum Triangle staged development include: Angels Stadium, the Honda
Center, and City National Grove of Anaheim, a live music and theatre
venue. 381 This area was ideal for the development of a sports.comm because
there was a strong residential demand in the area, large availability of land for
new housing, a need for revitalization, and a location that was at the
confluence of three freeways, which made it an ideal tourist destination. 382
Though still under development, the 820-acre project will be funded by
approximately $260 million in bonds that will be financed through the
establishment of a TIF district within the Platinum Triangle. 383
The location of the Platinum Triangle is advantageous for the City of
Anaheim because its proximity to existing and future railway transportation is
likely to increase property values. 384 The city’s current train station is to the
north of Angel Stadium, but part of the Platinum Triangle development
includes a new $184 million Anaheim Regional Transportation Intermodal
Center (ARTIC). 385 To accommodate future high-speed rail traffic, the city
has also approved an additional $100 million in financing from Measure M, a
half-cent county sales tax used to pay for transportation projects. 386 Though
no high-speed rail is currently scheduled to be built through Anaheim, the city
hopes a bullet train will eventually connect San Francisco, Anaheim, and Las
Vegas. 387
The City of Anaheim sought to achieve both an economic and cultural
revitalization through the development of the Platinum Triangle sports.comm.
The city’s goal was to balance and integrate land uses by connecting
residential, retail, and industrial facilities with walkable streets, open spaces,
and a consistent landscape. 388 It also sought to link employment and housing
so that each supports and facilitates the other. This was accomplished by
attaching first-floor retail shops to each condominium or apartment

381. The Platinum Triangle in Anaheim, CA, SOUTHERN CAL. ASSOC. OF GOV’TS 1, 2 (Mar.
2008), available at http://www.compassblueprint.org/files/htai_platinum.pdf.
382. Id at 7.
383. Id.
384. The Platinum Triangle – Where Corporate and Residential Opportunities Meet, CITY OF
ANAHEIM, www.anaheim.net/article.asp?id=1161 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
385. Dan Weikel, Transit Committee Backs Mega Station in Anaheim Amid Funding Questions,
L A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2011, 6:09 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/01/transitcommittee-backs-mega-station-in-anaheim-amid-questions-about-funding-and-high-speed-rail.html.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Introduction, PLATINUM TRIANGLE MASTER LAND USE PLAN 11, available at
http://www.anaheim.net/departmentfolders/planning/PT/Chapter1.pdf
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structure. 389 Such a design also promoted the goal of creating a neighborhood
feel in an urban setting. Moreover, by integrating the district’s residential and
retail developments, the city was able to stimulate future office development
because few regional urban locations offer both. 390
By creating a livable and walkable attraction in downtown Anaheim, the
city has been successful at increasing land values. By simply rezoning the
land to allow for high-density housing, the city has increased land values
within the district by up to $5 million per acre. 391 The city has also adopted
various “traffic calming” measures to reduce noise, decrease air pollution, and
enhance pedestrian activity in the area. 392 Anaheim has transformed
“superblocks” created by abandoned parking lots and warehouses into smaller,
more useful city blocks. 393 It has also narrowed streets, expanded sidewalks,
and beautified the district landscape with trees, urban parks, and thematic
street lights to encourage pedestrian traffic. The focal point of this
revitalization has been Market Street, which the city has specifically designed
to mimic bustling local streets like Larchmont Boulevard in Los Angeles,
Union Street in San Francisco, and Gaylord Street in Denver’s Lower
Downtown. 394
Future development of the Platinum Triangle will focus on upgrading the
Honda Center to become the future home of an NBA franchise. 395 To attract a
team, most likely the Sacramento Kings, the Anaheim City Council voted
unanimously to extend $75 million worth of bond financing to upgrade its
existing facilities and infrastructure. 396 However, the bonds will be funded
entirely by private investment firms, to be paid back within a ten-year period;
therefore, the city and taxpayers face no liability. 397 A total of $25 million has
currently been allocated for upgrades to the Honda Center and $50 million has

389. See The Platinum Triangle Vision, PLATINUM TRIANGLE MASTER LAND USE PLAN 12
(Aug. 21, 2007), available at http://www.anaheim.net/citydepartments/planning/projects/
Platinumtriangle/docs/TPTMLUP/Section%202%20%20The%20Platinum%20Triangle%20Vision.pdf.
390. Id.
391. Bobbi Murray, A Tale of Two Anaheims, BOBBI MURRAY (June 23, 2008),
http://bobbimurray.com/anaheim.html.
392. JEFF KENWORTHY & PETER NEWMAN, SUSTAINABLE CITIES READER 123 (2009).
393. The Platinum Triangle Vision, supra note 389.
394. Id.
395. Suzanne Hurt, Anaheim Approves $75 Million in Bonds for Kings, Honda Center,
SACRAMENTO PRESS (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.sacramentopress.com/headline/48249/Anaheim_
approves_75_million_in_bonds_for_Kings_Honda_Center.
396. Id.
397. Id.
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been set aside for working capital. 398 Despite a tentative deal with the Kings
that recently fell through, the Honda Center’s upgrades are likely to move
forward in the hopes of luring the Kings or another NBA franchise to Anaheim
in the near future. 399
Criticism of Anaheim’s Platinum Triangle project has been targeted at the
lack of affordable housing proposed under the city’s plan to create over 18,000
residential units within the district. 400 Through 2010, only 1600 units have
been completed, and construction has slowed due to the decrease in demand
caused by the recession. 401 Completed projects include Park Viridian
Apartments, 1818 Apartments, Anavia Condominiums, and Avalon Angel
Stadium, a mixed-use apartment and retail facility. 402
The Platinum
Triangle’s largest residential projects like Lennar’s A-Town Metro, The
Experience at Gene Autry Way, and Platinum Gateway are currently on hold
while developers wait for a revival of the upscale apartment and condominium
market. 403 However, there is a current demand for affordable housing to
accommodate low-income workers in the district, which has put pressure on
the city to approve residential projects that satisfy a broader range of income
levels.
Though still under development, the Platinum Triangle is a great example
of how a city can utilize the staged sports.comm concept to revitalize a city by
connecting and improving its existing tourist attractions. While most
sports.comms attempt to “trap” consumers in vast retail developments,
Anaheim highlights the more conservative and less expensive approach to
encouraging pedestrian activity by improving transportation infrastructure,
promoting residential development, and beautifying a city. The Platinum
Triangle also demonstrates how a staged sports.comm can be an ideal solution
to satisfying the existing housing, employment, or entertainment needs of a
city.

398. Id.
399. Arash Markazi, Honda Center Renovation Plan Set, ESPN LOS ANGELES (June 16, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/nhl/news/story?id=6670740.
400. Murray, supra note 391.
401. Eric Carpenter, Massive Expansion Plans Renewed Near Angel Stadium, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER (Aug. 16, 2010), http://articles.ocregister.com/2010-08-16/cities/24645893_1_platinumtriangle-sheri-vander-dussen-massive-expansion-plans.
402. Development Update, PLATINUM TRIANGLE MASTER LAND USE PLAN (Sept. 2011),
available at http://www.anaheim.net/departmentfolders/planning/DevelopmentUpdate/PT.pdf.
403. Id.
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DELAYED OR FAILED SPORTS.COMM

The recessionary economy that has drastically impacted real estate
development throughout the country has uniquely affected the investments of
both the public and private parties involved in the creation of a sports.comm.
Real estate is not only whacking Wall Street and Main Street, but also the
sports industry, which has made it difficult to create successful mixed-use real
estate development. From the public side, government deficits, lower bond
ratings, a lack of public appetite for use of public funds to create any type of
sports facilities, reluctance to create TIF districts, and priorities in spending
have affected the public’s ability to bring to fruition mixed-use real estate
developments. From the private side, difficulty in obtaining financing,
difficulty in refinancing existing projects, real estate assets that are under
water as a result of the decrease in fair market value, a risk-free lending
environment, and tenant contraction and liquidation have also affected the
ability to bring to fruition mixed-use real estate developments. The psyche of
growth, expansion, and development has also been met with resistance
because of an absence or lessening of discretionary spending, frozen credit
markets, availability of ready cash and depletion of reserves, loss of net worth
of companies and individual guarantors, loan delinquencies, foreclosures,
vacancies, bankruptcies and chapter proceedings, unemployment or
underemployment, bank failures, and distressed assets.
The recession has negatively affected every sports.comm throughout the
country to some degree, but a few prominent sports.comm developments have
failed or have been significantly delayed. The best examples of failed or
delayed sports.comms include the Westgate City Center, home of the Phoenix
Coyotes; Ballpark Village in St. Louis, home of the St. Louis Cardinals;
Glorypark, home of the Dallas Cowboys and Texas Rangers; Victory Park,
home of the Dallas Mavericks and Dallas Stars; New Meadowlands, home of
the New York Giants and New York Jets; and Atlantic Yards, the future home
of the New Jersey Nets.
A.

Westgate City Center

After their move from Winnipeg in 1996, the Phoenix Coyotes were
forced to accept an unfavorable lease to share the America West Arena
(AmWest, currently US Airways Arena) with the Phoenix Suns. 404 AmWest
was not built for hockey, which meant that 4000 of the 16,000 hockey seats
404. Kurt Badenhausen & Michael Ozanian, How a Small-Time Developer Leveraged a Poor
Hockey Team Into a Rich Real Estate Deal, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2002), http://www.forbes.
com/free_forbes/2002/1223/098.html.
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had obstructed views and had to be sold at a discount for every game. 405
Under the terms of the lease with AmWest, Suns owner Jerry Colangelo
retained nearly all revenues from concessions, sponsorships, and nonhockey
events. 406 This was especially detrimental to the Coyotes in the NHL context
because the thirty teams shared only twelve percent of their revenues, which
was by far the lowest percentage of all professional sports. 407 In 1997,
without the necessary revenue streams available at AmWest to stay
economically competitive in the NHL, Coyotes owner Richard Burke (Burke)
began working with Steve Ellman (Ellman) to construct a new NHL arena and
entertainment district in Glendale, Arizona.
In 2001, after Burke and Ellman were unable to obtain the necessary
zoning permits and public financing to support a new facility, Burke decided
to sell the team. In February 2001, Ellman partnered with Wayne Gretzky
(Gretzky) to buy the team for $127 million. 408 With a legendary new partner,
Ellman was able to garner the political support necessary to rezone a 223-acre
parcel in Glendale, Arizona for commercial use in order to create what is now
known as the Westgate City Center. With the land and zoning permits in
place, Ellman, Gretzky, and new partner Jerry Moyes (Moyes) began working
with the City of Glendale to develop a new hockey arena and the Westgate
City Center sports.comm, which was projected to cost $850 million. 409
Unlike every other state in America, Arizona does not allow TIF
financing; therefore, the ownership group and the city were forced to strike a
deal without utilizing the projected revenue increases that the Jobing.com
Arena and Westgate City Center would provide. Despite a limited financial
toolbox, the City of Glendale unanimously approved a $180 million arena deal
with the ownership group in April of 2001. 410 Pursuant to the agreement,
Ellman agreed to buy roughly 220 acres of vacant land, obtain loans to build a
17,500-seat hockey arena, be responsible for all arena cost overruns, and be
liable for some of the arena debt in the event that he was unable to complete
the sports.comm surrounding the arena. 411 In return, the City of Glendale
promised to buy the arena for a price of $180 million. 412

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Craig Harris, Coyotes Go to Glendale: City Quickly OKs $180 Million Arena Deal, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Apr. 12, 2001, at 1A.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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After years of struggling in AmWest, the Phoenix Coyotes deal with
Glendale was too good to be true. In December 2003, the Coyotes moved into
the new Jobing.com Arena. 413 The City of Glendale provided a total of $183
million for the cost of the arena, $155 million from municipal bonding, which
was paid for through increased sales taxes and parking revenues. 414 The
unique public-private partnership meant that Ellman owned the land, but the
City of Glendale owned the arena itself. 415 This partnership was beneficial for
Ellman because the team received all arena revenue streams, was not
responsible for the arena ownership costs, and paid no rent for the first ten
years in the arena. 416 However, in return for such economically-advantageous
lease terms, the team was also required to agree to a thirty-year nonrelocation
clause that required the Coyotes to stay in Glendale or to pay a $750 million
relocation fee. 417
Though the Jobing.com Arena was built quickly, the bonds used to back
the construction were based on projected increases in tax revenue generated by
Ellman’s proposed commercial developments surrounding the arena.
Development was drastically delayed, which caused financing problems for
the project as a whole and subjected Ellman to fines up to $1 million for the
delays. 418 Phase I of the Westgate City Center was scheduled to open in June
of 2004, but due to an overly aggressive startup plan and the project’s
complexity, did not open until November of 2006. As a result of the two-year
delay, Ellman was forced to pay two separate fines of $1 million. 419
Meanwhile, the Coyotes alone were not sufficiently enticing to draw fans from
Phoenix to the suburb of Glendale, and after three seasons in the arena the
team had accumulated nearly $65 million in debt. 420 In order to save the
development, Moyes and Ellman reached a separation agreement that gave
Moyes and Gretzky full control of the Coyotes and allowed Ellman to buy out
Moyes’ remaining interest in the Westgate City Center development. 421

413. JoBing.com Arena, BALLPARKS BY MUNSEY AND SUPPES, http://hockey.ballparks.com/
NHL/PhoenixCoyotes/newindex.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
414. Harris, supra note 410.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Rebekah L. Sanders, Coyotes Avoid Rent Fines, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 2009, at 5.
418. Pat Flannery, Ellman Pushed to Begin Development of Westgate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 25,
2004, at 1B.
419. Steve Wong, Developer Owes Glendale a Second $1 Million Fine, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July
26, 2006, at 5.
420. Craig Harris & David Vest, Coyotes Owners Break Up, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 2006, at
1D.
421. Ryan Gauthier, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, 1 HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 185 (2010).
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The anchor of Phase I of the Westgate development was the AMC
Westgate 20 movie theater, which features contemporary screens, seating,
concessions, and ticketing. 422 Beyond the theater, Phase I focused on the
entertainment center’s infrastructure and restaurant options to satisfy the
current fans drawn by the Coyotes. The infrastructure improvements included
more than thirty Times Square-style media boards throughout the site, a
60,000-gallon water fountain modeled after the Bellagio in Las Vegas, and
Miami-inspired green and orange color schemes throughout the facility. 423
The initial construction also included nearly twenty restaurants such as the
popular Margaritaville Café, Gordon Biersch Brewery Restaurant, and Saddle
Ranch Chop House. 424 Phase I also included a twelve-story Renaissance
Hotel and Convention Center that was not completed until 2007. 425
In retrospect, the split between Moyes and Ellman doomed the Westgate
City Center development. Ellman was able to escape the economic burden of
the Phoenix Coyotes franchise, which eventually led Moyes to file for Chapter
11 bankruptcy protection in 2009. 426 Moyes’ bankruptcy court had the power
to force the sale of the Coyotes and to allow the buyer to break Glendale’s
nonrelocation agreement, but given the city’s investment in the sports.comm,
the court insisted that the Coyote’s buyer must honor the lease or pay the $750
million relocation fee because the city had invested a total of $511 million into
the project. 427 Despite escaping the Coyotes’ bankruptcy, the inability to find
a buyer for the Coyotes stalled the development of Westgate and ultimately
led to the demise of Ellman. 428
The United States recession also contributed to the failure of Westgate.
Since Phases II and III of Westgate were delayed, the Phase I bars and
restaurants struggled because they depended on the increased foot traffic of the
retail and residential phases. 429 This struggle left Ellman unable to stay
current on the loans used to finance the Westgate development. Ellman
utilized a $97.5 million loan from iStar Financial and multiple loans from

422. AMC Westgate, WESTGATE CITY CENTER, http://www.westgatecitycenter.com/amc-west
gate-20/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
423. Scott Wong, A New City Center; Complex Turns Empty Space Into Urban Hub, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1.
424. Id.
425. Hotels at Westgate City Center, WESTGATE CITY CENTER, http://www.westgatecitycenter
.com/hotels.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
426. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).
427. Id.
428. Rebekah L. Sanders, Westgate Changed Face of Glendale, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 28, 2011,
at B1.
429. Carrie Watters, Westgate Weathering Downturn, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 2008, at 3.
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Credit Suisse totaling $376 million to develop the entertainment district. 430 In
November 2008, Ellman failed to make balloon payments on many of the
loans and ultimately defaulted. 431 An auction was scheduled for September
19, 2011, to sell the Westgate buildings that secured the iStar loan. 432 The
land around Westgate will go to auction in the future to satisfy the Credit
Suisse loan. 433
Though Westgate has failed to reach its full potential, the concentric circle
effect has caused the areas surrounding the sports.comm to achieve enormous
growth, which has provided Glendale with the necessary tax revenues that
Westgate has been unable to provide. Across the street from Westgate is the
new Zanjero District, which includes a Cabela’s outdoor superstore, other
retail outlets, condominiums, and office buildings. 434 The Westgate City
Center is also responsible for the 2009 completion of Camelback Ranch, the
Los Angeles Dodgers and White Sox spring training facility. 435 In its first
season, Camelback Ranch broke the Cactus League attendance record four
times. 436
As the Westgate City Center goes to auction, the NHL and the City of
Glendale have been unable to find a buyer for the Coyotes, which is the key to
a revitalized Westgate sports.comm. Since Moyes’ bankruptcy, the city has
paid the NHL $25 million per year to cover arena operating costs, but has yet
to find an owner. 437 Recently, the city had worked out an agreement with
Matthew Hulsizer to purchase the arena, who also was negotiating with the
NHL to buy the team. 438 The deal would have required the city to pay $100
million in bonds to cover arena operating costs in return for the rights to
parking fees. 439 The deal was nearly completed until the Goldwater Institute
threatened to sue the city for offering public subsidies to a private business in
violation of Arizona law. 440 The Institute also convinced bond traders to stay

430. Sanders, supra note 428.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Districts at Zanjero Set to Break Ground, W. VALLEY VIEW, http://westvalleyview.com/
main.asp?SectionID=13&SubSectionID=8&ArticleID=22119&TM=84251.22 (last visited Dec. 14,
2011).
435. Amy Wang, Jobing.com Arena Created ‘Synergy’, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, 2010, at 3.
436. Id.
437. Coyotes to Remain in Glendale Next Year, ESPN (May 11, 2011, 8:59 PM), http://sports.
espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=6524858.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.

GREENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

158

12/21/2011 2:12 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1

away from the city’s bond auction, which ultimately caused the deal to fall
through. 441 There was hope that other potential buyers would emerge when
the Glendale City Council reconvened in August 2011. 442
The Westgate City Center development highlights the potential and risks
associated with the construction of a sports.comm. By accepting Ellman’s
proposal after Scottsdale had refused, the City of Glendale transformed itself
into the mecca for professional sports in Arizona. By building an NHL arena,
the city cemented itself as a receptive community and was able to convince the
Arizona Cardinals to build their new revenue-generating facility, University of
Phoenix Stadium in Glendale, which gave the city the national recognition it
lacked prior to the development of the Westgate sports.comm. Regardless of
whether Westgate is able to retain the Phoenix Coyotes, the sports.comm will
likely remain viable based on the proximity of the Arizona Cardinals’
University of Phoenix Stadium and the retail development’s potential for
future economic growth, which should easily attract a new tenant to be its
sports anchor. 443
B. Ballpark Village – Busch Stadium
The St. Louis Cardinals attempted to create a sports.comm with Ballpark
Village, a proposed mixed-use entertainment district that was to be built on the
six blocks surrounding new Busch Stadium, which opened in 2006. 444
Unfortunately, there is no better example of a real estate whacking than
Ballpark Village. Ballpark Village was designed to be a grandiose
redevelopment project of retail shops, restaurants, residential units, office
space and parking. The 2009 MLB All-Star Game was supposed to be a
showcase for not only the new ballpark, but also the development that was
supposed to follow. 445 Instead, the Ballpark Village area was an open pit,
which the St. Louis Cardinals were forced to temporarily dress up for the 2009
All-Star festivities. 446
The stadium cost a total of $365 million, which was almost entirely

441. Id.
442. Glendale Closer to Finding Coyotes Buyer, REVENUES FROM SPORTS VENUES
NEWSLETTER, June 30, 2011.
443. Cecilia Chan, ‘Tea Party’ Group Dissatisfied with Answers on Coyotes Deal, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Mar. 12, 2011, at 8.
444. About, BALLPARK VILL., http://www.stlballparkvillage.com/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
445. Ray Hartmann, Why We Aren’t (Ballpark) Village People, STLMAG.COM (July 2009),
available at http://www.stlmag.com/St-Louis-Magazine/July-2009/Why-We-Aren-039t-BallparkVillage-People/#.
446. Id.
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privately funded except for a $45 million loan from St. Louis County. 447
Ballpark Village was projected to cost another $300 million more, but required
a larger public contribution. 448 The initial proposal for Ballpark Village
included a 1900-space parking garage; a 400-unit, 21-story residential building
overlooking the stadium; 470,000 square feet worth of office space; 110,000
square feet of commercial and retail space; a 16,000-square-foot Cardinals
baseball museum; and a 94,000-square-foot entertainment attraction (such as
an aquarium). 449 The plan was approved by the City of St. Louis in 2007,
which pledged $115 million in bond financing for the project to be funded
through a TIF district. 450
The initial plan for the project was divided into two development phases.
Phase I included the development of the southern portion of Ballpark Village,
which was to commence by April 2006 and to be completed within five
years. 451 Similarly, Phase II involved construction of the Northern Village,
which was expected to begin by April 2009, and was also to be completed
within five years. 452 In return for the city’s public contribution, the Cardinals
agreed to guarantee completion of Ballpark Village. 453 Failure to develop the
first phase would have resulted in the payment of liquidated damages of up to
$100 million. 454 If the Cardinals failed to meet the deadlines on the second
phase, a portion of the land was to be reconveyed to the city. 455 The Cardinals
also agreed to a profit-sharing clause which forced the team to provide the city
with a portion of any profits made if a significant portion of the team was
sold. 456
By 2008, the Cardinals had nearly $200 million in outstanding private
bond debt and another $17 million in annual debt service from its privately
funded stadium, which was to be paid utilizing the expected increase in real

447. Busch Stadium, BALLPARKS BY MUNSEY AND SUPPES, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/
national/stlbpk.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
448. Joel K. Goldstein, From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball Stadium
Financing Projects, 34 URBAN L. 397, 402–03 (2002).
449. Id. at 402.
450. Lisa Brown, City Greenlights Ballpark Village Project, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2007/02/05/daily57.html.
451. Goldstein, supra note 448, at 402.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 402–03.
454. Id.; see Section 12.3 Certain Equitable or Liquidated Damages in Journal of the Senate,
MO. SENATE (May 3, 2002) available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/02info/pdf-jrnl/Day65.pdf.
455. Goldstein, supra note 448, at 402–03.
456. Id. at 402.
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estate tax revenues from Ballpark Village. 457 Moreover, the Cardinals were
also unable to find any creditors willing to extend the necessary money to
complete the Ballpark Village project. Unlike other failed sports.comm
developments that never began construction, the failure of Ballpark Village is
symbolized by a vacant hole in the ground at the home of the demolished Old
Busch Stadium. Despite the failure to develop Ballpark Village to date, the
city has not exercised its option to obtain liquidated damages or to recover a
portion of the Ballpark Village land.
The recession has also increased the aggressiveness of public watchdog
groups opposed to public subsidies for sports facilities. Pursuant to the profitsharing clause in the agreement between the team and the city, the Coalition
against Public Funding for Stadiums alleged that the sale of thirteen percent of
the Cardinals team, after multiple owners sold their shares in 2010, triggered
the clause requiring the team to share its profit with the city. However, the
Cardinals argued that the profit-sharing clause was only triggered if the sale
was valued at over $180 million; therefore, the profits from the sale were not
shared by the team. 458 The city has not attempted to collect their portion of
the sale proceeds.
The difficulty getting the Ballpark Village project moving forward cannot
be attributed to a lack of fan support in St. Louis. In March 2011, the St.
Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association released a report that the
2011 Cardinals season would deliver a $313.6 million economic boost to the
Moreover, out-of-town visitors have historically
St. Louis region. 459
constituted forty percent of Cardinals attendance. 460 St. Louis continues to be
one of the best baseball towns in MLB. While St. Louis is the eighteenthlargest metro area, its 2010 season attendance of 3,301,218 put it at number
four for attendance for all MLB teams. 461
After two years of delay, the Cardinals revised their proposal and the city
approved a revised financing structure on January 19, 2011. 462 The first
457. Tom Van Riper, Where Real Estate is Whacking Sports, FORBES (July 7, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/real-estate-pro-sports-business-sports-real-estate.html.
458. City Releases Names of MLB Cardinals Owners Who Sold Shares, SPORTS BUS. DAILY
(Dec.
8,
2010),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2010/12/Dec-8/Franchises/
cards.aspx.
459. 2011 Baseball Season Forecast to be $313.6 Million Boost for Regional Economy, RGCA
Economic Impact Analysis Concludes, ST. LOUIS REG. CHAMBER & GROWTH ASSOC. (Mar. 30,
2011), http://www.stlrcga.org/x4516.xml?ss=print.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Tim Logan, Ballpark Village Plan Advances, STLTODAY.COM (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.stltoday.com/business/columns/building-blocks/article_6dd80628-23ef-11e0-9e5d0017a4a78c22.html.
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phase, originally estimated to cost over $300 million, was downsized to
$146.1 million by eliminating the residential aspect of Phase I. 463 However,
the fully realized development is still scheduled to include a residential
component and is estimated to cost up to $555 million. 464 The revised Phase I
plan is set to include a new fourteen-story office building, which is expected to
be the premier office building in the region. To be completed in 2013,
developers secured Stifel Financial Corporation, which had agreed to occupy
175,000 of the 225,000-square-feet of office space as its corporate
headquarters. 465 However, Phase I cannot begin without getting the city’s
public subsidies reapproved due to the drastic change in development plans.
The Cardinals completed the first hurdle in the approval process when the
Missouri Downtown Economic Stimulus Authority approved their plan in
January 2011. Following approval by the St. Louis Board of Aldermen, the
proposal was also approved by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment,
which includes the mayor. 466 The final approval will be in the hands of the
quasi-governmental Missouri Development Finance Board. 467 Cardinals
President Bill DeWitt III expects approval to be completed in 2011 and
construction to last for twenty months, which means that Ballpark Village is
tentatively scheduled to be open for business by 2013. 468
C. Glorypark
Similar to Ballpark Village, development of Glorypark, which is located
between Rangers Ballpark and the Dallas Cowboys newly-constructed $1.1
billion stadium, has been postponed as a result of the financial conditions
caused by the recession. However, unlike construction of Ballpark Village,
which was partially integrated with the construction of the New Busch
Stadium, the Glorypark sports.comm has struggled to escape the planning
stages of development. The project was led by former Rangers owner Tom
Hicks of Hicks Holdings, LLC and the Steiner and Associates development
firm. Plans for the development were revealed in 2004, and the first phase of

463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Tim Logan, Ballpark Village to Include Stifel HQ, ST. LOUIS POST, Jan. 15, 2011, at A1. In
August of 2011, Stifel Financial Corp. announced that it plans to buy its downtown building instead
of moving to Ballpark Village. REVENUES FROM SPORTS VENUES NEWSLETTER, Aug. 11, 2011, at
11.
466. Aldermen Approve Ballpark Village, STLTODAY.COM (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.stltoday.
com/suburban-journals/article_e0aef89f-92ff-5a51-9d3e-03c28d864f81.html.
467. Id.
468. Id.
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the proposed $600 million sports.comm was set to include 1.2 million square
feet of retail, residential, and commercial space. 469 However, after four years,
the project has only created a few road improvements and a single row of
townhouses. 470
By May 2008, attempts to finance and develop Glorypark were abandoned
for a variety of reasons. The project never got off the ground largely because
the development group lost a primary investor within a few months after the
project was formally announced in 2006. 471 The setback caused a major
postponement in the project as the developers were unable to find a suitable
replacement investor. The delay caused further financing problems because of
lenders’ refusal to offer flexible financing. Hicks blamed the delay on the
banks, saying “the nation’s economic markets today have made it impossible
to come to terms with lenders.” 472 On May 15, 2008, the developers
acknowledged that they did not exercise their option to extend a letter of
commitment to underwrite bonds for the creation of roads and parking
garages. 473 Therefore, the development process was halted due to a lack of
available financing.
Resurrection of the Glorypark project was further complicated when Tom
Hicks’ HSG Sports Group, which owned the Rangers, filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. 474 The bankruptcy was a result of multiple defaults to
creditors that occurred in March of 2009. Despite the pursuit of creditors, the
move was ultimately an attempt to force a sale of the club to an ownership
group led by Chuck Greenberg and Nolan Ryan, Rangers Baseball Express.
The team’s initial plan of reorganization included the sale of 154 acres of the
proposed Glorypark along with the sale of Rangers Ballpark. 475 Creditors

469. Jennifer Popovec, Americans Love Sports, RETAIL TRAFFIC (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://retailtrafficmag.com/development/newdevelopment/retail_football_baseball_stadiums/.
470. Jeff Mosier, So Far, Development Isn’t Cropping Up Near Cowboys’ New Stadium,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 2, 2009, at 2A.
471. Sandra Baker, Texas Rangers Owner Tom Hicks Sues Former Partner in Failed Glorypark
Development, DALLASNEWS.COM (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/communitynews/arlington/headlines/20100402-Texas-Rangers-owner-Tom-Hicks-sues-5069.ece.
472. Jim Boardman, Hicks Delays Glorypark Due to “Extreme Conditions”, ANFIELD ROAD
(May 15, 2008), http://archive.anfieldroad.com/news-archive/200805153000/hicks-delays-gloryparkdue-to-extreme-conditions.html/.
473. Id.
474. Matthew Futterman, Texas Rangers Make Bankruptcy Play, WSJ.COM (May 25, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704792104575264950799613356.html.
475. Maury Brown, Greenberg-Ryan Group Terminates Land Deal Just Before Texas Rangers
Auction, BIZ OF BASEBALL (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=4600:greenberg-ryan-group-terminates-land-deal-just-before-texasrangers-auction&catid=70:mlb-club-sales&Itemid=157.
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objected to Hicks’ reorganization plan, and the court forced the sale of the
team through public auction. Hicks attempted to create a side deal that would
have sold the land to the Greenberg-Ryan group prior to the auction of the
Texas Rangers, but the deal was cancelled in order to create a “level playing
field” at the auction. 476 Ultimately, Rangers Baseball Express submitted the
winning bid for the Rangers of $593 million. 477
However, before the sale was completed, Hicks’ former partner, Steiner +
Associates, sued, claiming a twenty-five percent ownership interest in
Glorypark and control of forty-five acres of land adjacent to Rangers
Ballpark. 478 In response, Hicks countersued, alleging fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty. 479 Hicks claimed that he “trusted and relied” on Steiner’s
promise that he would ensure the project’s success by preleasing most of the
retail spaces, which Steiner was unable to secure. 480 Ultimately, the lawsuit
was unsuccessful, and the MLB approved the sale of the Texas Rangers to
Rangers Baseball Express on August 12, 2010. 481
Despite a new ownership group and two recent trips to the World Series,
Nolan Ryan’s group has no current plans to resume development of
Glorypark. The main obstacle has been an ongoing battle between Rangers
Baseball Express, Hicks Holdings, and Steiner + Associates over who must
pay the remaining Glorypark creditors. Specifically, RTKL, the architecture
firm initially hired to design the site, and Vratsinas Construction Company
have yet to be paid. The parties filed an adversary proceeding in Hicks
Holdings’ Chapter 11 case, which has yet to be adjudicated, and the
development of the sports.comm remains on hold.
D. Victory Park
Surprisingly, Glorypark was not Tom Hicks’ only failed attempt at
creating an economically viable sports.comm. Hicks’ first attempt came as
owner of the Dallas Stars NHL franchise. In 1998, Dallas voters approved
public financing for more than half the cost of the $140 million American
476. Id.
477. Barry Shlachter, Rangers Exit Bankruptcy after Greenberg-Ryan Bid is Approved,
DALLASNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/texas-rangers/headlines/
20100805-Rangers-exit-bankruptcy-after-Greenberg-Ryan-5814.ece.
478. Former Development Partner Sues Tom Hicks Over Land Near Rangers Ballpark,
DALLASNEWS.COM (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/headlines/20100128Former-development-partner-sues-Tom-Hicks-467.ece.
479. Baker, supra note 471.
480. Id.
481. Richard Durrett, MLB Owners Approve Rangers Sale, ESPN (Aug. 12, 2010), http://sports
.espn.go.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=5457793.
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Airlines Center, the current home of the Dallas Mavericks and Dallas Stars. 482
On top of the arena financing, the Dallas City Council offered Hicks and Ross
Perot, Jr., former owner of the Dallas Mavericks, an extra $25 million to
develop the abandoned property surrounding the arena. 483 The area was
historically blighted, but rather than simply improving the land by increasing
tourism and retail foot traffic in the area, Hicks and Perot attempted to create
an ultra-sophisticated sports.comm that was to become the next Times
Square. 484
The developers attempt to create a Times Square atmosphere was
ultimately the downfall of the sports.comm because it was designed to be too
upscale for the city’s local market. The epitome of the developers
overindulgence was the creation of two enormous super screens at AT&T
Plaza, the entertainment anchor of the development. The screens were billed
as the largest outdoor digital mediums in the world, but the problem for the
developers was that no one was there to view them. 485 Their plan anticipated
massive crowds, but its retail, residential, and food and beverage options only
catered to high-end consumers. Between 2006 and 2008, the area added more
than 400 condominiums, 380 apartments, 250 hotel rooms, 500,000 square
feet of office space, and 200,000 square feet of retail. 486 Residential prices
were listed at $500 per square foot, which was more than double the going rate
in the surrounding area. 487 Residential developments included the W Dallas
Victory Hotel and Residences, a thirty-three-story hotel that was completed in
2006; the Terrace, a seven-story residential building; Vista Apartments, a
seven-story ultra-modern apartment complex; and the House by Starck and
Yoo, a luxury condominium complex. Retail options included high-end
dining, like N9ne Steakhouse, Nove Italiano, Kenichi, Cirque, and Craft by
celebrity chef Tom Colicchio; upscale retail, like Henry Beguelin, Haven, and
Lifestyle Fashion Terminal, and upscale bars, like the Ghost Bar.
Overall, the development suffered because it did not cater to its key
demographic; fans attending games at the American Airlines Center. The

482.
2009.
483.
484.
485.

Matt Pulle, Dallas’ Victory Park Struggles to Deliver a Win, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 29,

Id.
Id.
Melissa Repko, Dallas’ Victory Park Struggles to Find a Game-changer,
DALLASNEWS.COM (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/commercial-real-estate/
20101111-Dallas-Victory-Park-struggles-to-7545.ece.
486. Michael Schnurman, Why Victory Park Was a Bust, D MAGAZINE (Jan. 20, 2010), http
://www.dmagazine.com/Home/D_CEO/2010/January_February/Why_Victory_Park_Was_a_Bust.asp
x
487. Id.
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sports.comm generated most of its consumer traffic during the lunchtime
hours, and other local entertainment options were more popular among fans of
the Mavericks and Stars. 488 Beyond the abundance of unreasonably priced
retail and restaurant options, Victory Park also suffered because it was not
well-suited for foot traffic. The separation rather than integration of parking
within the sports.comm allowed fans to avoid the retail elements on their way
to the sports anchor. 489 Similarly, fans exiting the arena were unable to see
the massive video screens in AT&T Plaza; therefore, only experienced fans
knew where to find the sports.comm’s key entertainment anchor because
views of the plaza were obstructed by the W Hotel. 490 The sports.comm also
suffered because the initial development phase only included thirty shops and
restaurants upon its opening, which was insufficient to compete in the local
entertainment market. As a result, fans traveled to the nearby West Village
that included seventy different shops and restaurants that were also reasonably
priced. While Victory Park has faltered, West Village plans to construct an
additional thirty retail and restaurant options. 491
The failure of Victory Park highlights the key obstacles in the creation of a
viable sports.comm. First, while the development successfully encouraged
residential life, it failed to promote foot traffic through the sports.comm’s
retail and dining elements. Second, Hicks and Perot used their $25 million in
public financing to create a district that did not cater to the local taxpayer,
which caused a disconnect between the entertainment district and the local
community. Lastly, the sports.comm did not cater to the consumers attracted
to its sports anchor; therefore, it only generated daytime traffic, which was
insufficient to sustain its retail and dining options. Thus, massive private
investments allowed Victory Park to move past the planning stages of
development, but, like Glorypark, the Victory Park sports.comm did not have
a strong, stable plan for economic revitalization, gradually lost its retail
tenants, and, ultimately, failed.
Despite the loss of retailers, Victory Park can be saved based on the
strength of its sports, residential, and entertainment anchors. Recently,
German real estate investors US Treuhand has taken control of most of the
development from initial developer Hillwood Development, Perot’s
development firm, and plans to create a viable sport.comm at the site. 492 The

488. Repko, supra note 485.
489. Amy Prince, Victory Park, Dallas, TEXASMONTHLY (Dec. 2007), http://www.texasmonthly
.com/2007-12-01/streetsmarts.php.
490. Pulle, supra note 482.
491. Id.
492. Steve Brown, Cousins Properties will Manage Dallas’ Victory Park, DALLASNEWS.COM
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firm has hired a new developer, Cousins Properties, which has already
announced plans to move the shopping center to a more desirable location
within the district. 493 Thus, despite its previous failures, the future of Victory
Park remains bright.
E. New Meadowlands
The most illustrative example of a failed sports.comm is the development
of the Xanadu mixed-use development located near the New Meadowlands
stadium (Meadowlands) in East Rutherford, New Jersey. The Meadowlands
complex is just miles away from New York City; therefore, it enjoys the
largest market of any sports.comm from which to generate revenues and
attract tenants for large-scale retail, commercial, and recreational
developments. Despite the built-in market at the Meadowlands site, private
developers have failed on two separate attempts at creating a sports.comm, and
a third attempt is currently in the planning stages, which will likely include
public financial support in the form of a TIF district.
Virginia-based developer the Mills Corporation (Mills) began formulating
plans for the creation of a “mega-mall” outside the Meadowlands complex as
early as 1994 when they purchased a 750-acre plot of land called the “Empire
Tract” just outside of the Meadowlands property that was owned by the New
Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority (NJSEA). 494 Construction problems
due to the swamp land within the Empire Tract caused the company to
abandon their initial project, but Mills shifted its focus to purchasing
additional NJSEA-owned land. 495 In 2002, the NJSEA requested proposals
from developers for the creation of a retail and entertainment complex
adjacent to the Meadowlands. 496 Six bids were submitted: two included the
creation of a NASCAR track, one was submitted by the owner of the Mall of
America, and another proposed a convention center. 497 Based on its history
with the project, Mills’s bid to develop the land into a retail and recreational
center was successful. 498 Under the terms of the original agreement, Mills
agreed to pay the first fifteen years of rent up front in the amount of $160

(Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/DN-victory_03bus.ART.
State.Edition1.3edebbf.html.
493. Id.
494. Seamus McGraw, Whither Xanadu?, NJMONTHLY.COM (Dec. 13, 2010), http://njmonthly.
com/articles/lifestyle/whither-xanadu.html.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
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million. 499 The NJSEA’s overarching goal for the project was to avoid the use
of taxpayer funding, but the initial deal with Mills included $185 million in
public financing for a new railway to connect the project to Manhattan’s Penn
Station and for the repurchase of the Empire Tract for development of the
railway at the cost of $26 million of taxpayer money. 500
Mills’s plans of creating a 4.8 million-square-foot mall began in 2003 with
an initial price of $1.3 billion, which was scheduled to be opened two years
after breaking ground. 501 The development was immediately stalled in 2003
by a lawsuit filed against the NJSEA by a pair of developers, Hartz Mountain
and Westfield America Trust, who had submitted bids for the project. 502 The
lawsuit was unsuccessful, but was followed by another suit in 2005 by the
New York Giants who claimed that the Xandau retail project was obstructing
views of the stadium in violation of their lease. 503 That suit was also
unsuccessful, but the delays caused by litigation caused Mills to lay-off fifteen
percent of its work force by 2006. 504 Shortly thereafter, Mills shareholders
filed suit against the company and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) had begun investigating the company for questionable accounting
practices. 505 Meanwhile, another developer involved in the development, the
Simon Property Group, willfully abandoned the development after major
lender Lehman Brothers collapsed due to the financial crisis, which caused
other lenders to pull out as well. 506
After prolonged litigation and investigation doomed Mills’s initial attempt
to develop a Meadowlands sports.comm, the NJSEA agreed to turn the project
over to Colony Capital (Colony), a California-based real estate investment
firm. 507 At the time of Colony’s investment, a total of $2 billion had already
been invested and another $1.5 billion was necessary to complete the project
that was initially proposed for $1.3 billion. 508 Colony agreed to assume $485

499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Marc Scribner, New Jersey’s Not-So-Palatial Xanadu, OPENMARKET.ORG (July 22, 2010),
http://www.openmarket.org/2010/07/22/new-jerseys-not-so-palatial-xanadu/.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Laura Mansnerus, How a Mall in the Meadowlands is Bleeding a Company, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 16, 2006), at 14NJ, 1.
505. Scribner, supra note 501.
506. Terry Pristin, At $2.3 Billion, This Mall Could be Too Big to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2009, at 4.
507. Scribner, supra note 501.
508. Laura Mansnerus, Reprieve for Troubled Xanadu Entertainment Complex in Meadowlands,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006, at 5.
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million of Mills’s debt in return for 4.5 million shares in the company, and
also guaranteed up to $90 million in additional construction costs. 509 Credit
Suisse bank provided the remaining $1 billion necessary for the project. 510
Mills was eventually sold to the Simon Property Group and hedge fund
Farallon Capital Management in February 2007. 511
At the time of Colony’s investment, the project had 6 anchor tenants
committed to 500,000 square feet of retail space. 512 The initial tenants
included Cabela’s; AEG Live, a live performance and concert hall; Muvico 18,
an upscale movie theater; Forever 21; and Children’s Place, a children’s
apparel retailer. 513 The main entertainment anchors included an indoor ski
slope; the world’s tallest Ferris wheel; Wannado City, a 60,000 square foot
playroom for children that allows them to learn about different career choices;
and Sky Venture, indoor sky diving. 514 However, many of the initial design
elements were eliminated including, among others, a roller coaster, a miniature
NASCAR-style track, a new home of the Meadowlands YMCA, and a minor
league baseball stadium. 515
Unfortunately, like the first development attempt, Colony’s efforts were
stalled due to litigation. First, the Bergen County Cliff Hawks, the minor
league baseball team initially announced as a tenant for the proposed minor
league stadium, sued for breach of contract, but the case was dismissed. 516
More critically, the case against one of the project’s initial creditors that had
left the project, Xanadu Mezz Holdings, an affiliate of Lehman Brothers, was
dismissed on a technicality. 517 Xanadu Mezz had pledged $208 million for
the project, 20% of the initial costs, but was allowed to walk away from the
509. Mills Corp. Hands Over Xanadu Development to Colony Capital, SPORTS BUS. DAILY
(Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2006/08/Issue-228/FacilitiesVenues/Mills-Corp-Hands-Over-Xanadu-Development-To-Colony-Capital.aspx.
510. Colony Capital Completes Recapitalization of Meadowlands Xanadu Project, COLONY
CAPITAL, LLC (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.colonyinc.com/articles/news_xanadu.htm [hereinafter
Colony Capital Completes Recapitalization].
511. John Spence, Simon, Farallon Team Up to Buy Mall REIT, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 16,
2007),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mills-agrees-to-be-acquired-by-simon-property-hedgefund.
512. Colony Capital Completes Recapitalization, supra note 508.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Mansnerus, supra note 508.
516. Maura McDermott, NJ Sports Authority Still Expects Minor League Baseball at Xanadu,
NJ.COM (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/01/the_sports_authority_
still_exp.html.
517. Ted Sherman, Xanadu Developers Lose Legal Bid for Financing of Stalled $2B Retail
Complex, NJ.COM (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/_the_developers_
of_xanadu.html.
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project without penalty. 518 By 2009, Colony’s attempt at developing the
Meadowlands sports.comm failed when it was unable to find a replacement
creditor for such a significant investment, largely due to the credit crunch
following the financial crisis in 2008. 519
After the second failed attempt to develop the site, the State of New Jersey
and their outspoken Governor Chris Christie have become greatly involved in
the project. Christie identified the development problems succinctly.
There is no leasing plan making material on-site progress.
The physical activities of construction are at a standstill, if not
abandonment. The construction loan is out of balance. There
are no monies readily available to finish construction of public
areas or tenant improvements. Most, if not all, of announced
major tenants have an ‘escape clause’ solely dependent on
leasing—or lack thereof. 520
Beyond the $2.3 billion already invested in construction of the project by
2009, the state estimated that the project needed a minimum of $875 million
for completion. 521 To complete the project, Governor Christie began
searching for developers to complete the project by offering more state
support. In return, Christie made two demands. First, that the new developer
change the project’s current checkerboard aesthetic that Christie calls, “the
ugliest . . . building in New Jersey and maybe America,” and, second, that the
state would receive a piece of the project’s equity in return for any public
investment. 522 However, there has been outspoken opposition to adding
public funding to a project that has failed multiple times, especially
considering Christie’s movement towards austerity in all other areas of the
state government. The most influential opposition has come from George
Zoffinger, the former President of the NJSEA that accepted Mills’ initial bid,
who argued that no public money should be used for the development because
the initial goal of the project was to avoid any taxpayer involvement. 523

518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Peter Applebome, Possible Second Life for Stalled Xanadu Project? Consider Trip to
‘Jersey Shore,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at 12.
521. Charles V. Bagli, Christie Urges Rescue for Stalled Meadowlands Complex, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2010, at 24.
522. Megan DeMarco, Christie Says if N.J. Gives More Funding to Meadowlands Xanadu,
Changing Exterior is a Priority, NJ.COM (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/03
/christie_says_if_nj_gives_more.html.
523. Bagli, supra note 521.
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In May of 2011, Triple Five, owner of the Edmonton Mall and the Mall of
America, the country’s largest entertainment and retail complex and one of the
initial bidders on the project, was granted the right to develop the sports.comm
project, which they renamed American Dream Meadowlands. 524 Its initial bid
was denied, in part, because its plans included housing on the site. 525 The
new plan calls for the creation of an indoor water park, a second parking
garage, a skating rink, and other elements that have proven successful at Triple
Five’s other developments. 526 The company’s goal is to complete the project
well before the Meadowlands hosts the 2014 Super Bowl. 527 Governor
Christie has also promised, and the State Senate has approved, a plan to
include the project in the state Economic Redevelopment and Growth Grant
program, which will provide Triple Five with $200 million potential tax
breaks for the project. 528 Therefore, the Meadowlands sports.comm is likely
to proceed.
Beyond the renovation and completion of Xanadu, the Meadowlands
Regional Chamber of Commerce has submitted a proposal to redevelop the
remaining land surrounding the Meadowlands. The proposal would add 2.5
million square feet of usable land at the site and would create 15,000
temporary construction jobs and 25,000 permanent jobs. 529 The plan calls for
the creation of a 150,000 square foot casino, a 400,000 square foot convention
center, a 125,000 square foot conference center, six hotels with a total of 3200
rooms, two 3000-space parking garages, and a world-class diving and aquatics
center. 530 However, this plan would require a change to New Jersey’s current

524. Terry Pristin, Bringing the Mall of America Magic to New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2011, at 6. Triple Five is looking for $800 million in public assistance and is relying on tax-free
bonds tied at future revenues. Tax Breaks Approved for Xanadu Developer, REVENUES FROM
SPORTS VENUES NEWSLETTER, June 30, 2011 [hereinafter Tax Breaks Approved].
525. Terrence Dopp & Prashant Gopal, New Jersey’s Xanadu to be Taken Over by Mall of
America Owner Triple Five, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201012-23/new-jersey-s-meadowlands-complex-will-be-revamped-by-mall-of-america-owner.html.
526. Andrew Calvo, The Meadowland’s Xanadu Getting New Name and Developer, 4HOTELIERS
(May 3, 2011), http://www.4hoteliers.com/4hots_nshw.php?mwi=8567.
527. Dopp & Gopal, supra note 525.
528. Tax Breaks Approved, supra note 524.
529. E. Assata Wright, New Vision for Meadowlands Sports Complex, HUDSON REPORTER (Mar.
6,
2011),
http://hudsonreporter.com/view/full_stories_home/12163517/article-New-vision-forMeadowlands-Sports-Complex-Plan-includes-convention-center--hotels--casinos--athletic-center?instance=secaucus_story_left_column.
530. Michael Lamendola, Concept Plan to Transform Meadowlands Includes Casinos,
Convention Center, and Aquatics Center, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.north
jersey.com/news/117719013_Meadows_vision_includes_casinos__aquatics_and_convention_center.h
tml.
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gaming laws, which only permit gambling in Atlantic City. 531 To counter, the
state has minimized the likely opposition to a change to the gambling rules by
becoming a twenty percent equity partner in Revel Casino in Atlantic City at
the price of $261 million and by instituting legislation that eliminated a $30
million purse subsidy for the state’s horse racetracks, including the
Meadowlands Racetrack, which was paid by Atlantic City casinos. 532 Public
financing for development of the land surrounding the Meadowlands is
expected to be announced in the near future, and is likely to mirror the state’s
agreement with Revel Casino, but is dependent on Triple Five’s successful
completion of the Meadowlands sports.comm. 533
After two failed development attempts, the Meadowlands sports.comm is
a perfect example of a failed sports.comm, but also exemplifies the important
economic impact a sports.comm can have on a region. Rather than downsize
the project, the Meadowlands sports.comm has continued to increase in scope
due to the potential profits that could ultimately be realized by a successful
development. Therefore, the expansion of the project to the land directly
adjacent to the Meadowlands utilizing a public investment and its ultimate
completion will likely transform the Meadowlands sports.comm from a failed
endeavor into one of the most prosperous retail developments in the country.
F. Atlantic Yards
Similar to the problems faced by other failed or delayed sports.comms, the
New Jersey Nets’ initial attempt at creating a sports.comm in Brooklyn, New
York, was plagued by overindulgence. Proposed in 2003, the initial plan for
Atlantic Yards, the sports.comm surrounding the proposed Barclays Center,
was to create a $2.5 billion entertainment district to be designed by celebrity
architect Frank Gehry. By 2005, the completed proposal inflated the final
price to $4 billion. Since the completed plan was submitted in 2005, the
developer, Forest City Ratner, has been in a constant struggle to obtain the
necessary financing and to acquire land in order to complete the Atlantic
Yards sports.comm. However, after many delays, Barclays Center seems to be
on track for completion, despite being proposed during the worst economic
climate since the Great Depression.
The Barclays Center is scheduled to be the focal point of Atlantic Yards,
but lawsuits and financing problems have delayed construction for years. The
location of the development is the Prospect Heights neighborhood in

531. Wright, supra note 529.
532. Id.
533. DeMarco, supra note 522.
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Brooklyn, New York, which was considered a blighted area. Ratner acquired
twenty-two acres in Prospect Heights as a result of an agreement with former
Governor George Pataki and Mayor Michael Bloomberg. 534 Ratner was
awarded the land without a bid, and also acquired the eight-acre rail yard for
$100 million through a much-disputed bid process. 535 The designation of
Prospect Heights as a “blighted area” gave the city more flexibility to acquire
property through eminent domain; however, the first lawsuits against Ratner
and Atlantic Yards claimed that the city had abused its power by allowing
Ratner to choose the eminent domain condemnation zone. 536 After three
years, the case was finally decided by the New York Court of Appeals, the
state’s highest court, which ruled six to one that the city’s use of eminent
domain was appropriate. 537
By 2006, the Atlantic Yards proposal included three buildings, the
Barclays Center, an office tower, and a residential tower with fifty percent of
the occupancy dedicated to low- and middle-income families. By 2009,
Ratner attempted to save money on construction of the Barclays Center by
reconfiguring the glass and steel arena designed by Gehry. 538 Gehry criticized
the downsizing and was removed as architect on the project. 539 Ratner also
attempted to save money by delaying Phase II of the development, the
residential portion; however, local citizens criticized this move because it
eliminated much of the “public benefits” that were promised as a result of the
eminent domain taking. 540 Specifically, local residents were upset that a
2250-unit housing structure for middle and moderate income families has been
delayed, along with 8 acres of open space. 541 In response, Ratner’s new
architect, Ellerbe Becket and SHoP Architects, proposed a downsized arena in
September of 2009 and promised to begin construction of the residential phase
six months after beginning the arena. 542

534. Daniel Goldstein, What is Atlantic Yards? A Complete Failure of Democracy, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-goldstein/what-is-atlantic-yards-a_b_
497229.html.
535. Id.
536. Charles V. Bagli, Ruling Lets Atlantic Yards Seize Land, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/nyregion/25yards.html?_r=1.
537. Id.
538. Rich Calder, Game Over for Nets’ Atlantic Yards, N.Y. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, at 2.
539. Id.; Charles V. Bagli, Developer Drops Gehry’s Design for Brooklyn Arena, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/nyregion/05gehry.html.
540. Ratner’s Atlantic Yards Project Enters a Crucial Period, DEALB%K (June 25, 2009),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/ratners-atlantic-yards-project-enters-a-crucial-period/.
541. Id.
542. Bagli, supra note 539.

GREENBERG (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/21/2011 2:12 PM

SPORTS.COMM

173

Following the unsuccessful eminent domain suit, Ratner’s biggest obstacle
was to obtain financing for the project without further assistance from the
government. The city offered to extend $700 million in tax-exempt bonds, but
refused to pledge any of the taxing power of the state to back the bond
offering. 543 Therefore, in order to take advantage of this form of tax-exempt
financing, Ratner proposed to pay the $30 million annual debt service using
future revenue streams like sponsorships, suite licenses, concessions, increased
ticket prices, and ticket fees. 544 However, this financing was unnecessary
when Ratner sold an eighty percent interest in the New Jersey Nets and fortyfive percent interest in the Barclays Center to Russian billionaire Mikhail
Prokhorov, while retaining his majority ownership interest in Atlantic
Yards. 545 It has been reported that Prokhorov paid Ratner $223 million for
80% of the Nets and 45% of the arena and agreed to pay $60 million in team
losses and assume 80% of the Nets’ $200 million debt. 546 It was assumed that
Prokhorov would save the project by financing the entire $700 million bond
offering, but instead he provided a $200 million bridge loan, which gave
Ratner time to find the remaining financing. 547
To further fund the development, Ratner has been forced to sell a 49%
stake in his 15 shopping centers scattered throughout the New York City area,
which were valued at $172 million. 548 Moreover, Ratner has utilized the EB-5
foreign investment program to obtain additional financing for Atlantic
Yards. 549 Ratner claims the $249 million in EB-5 funds that he has obtained
will create 7696 new jobs. 550 However, Ratner also acknowledged that the
543. Eliot Brown, When Bruce Met Mikhail: The Backstory of the Nets-Atlantic Yards Deal,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/hed?page=all#.
544. John Brennan, Nets Naming Rights Deal is Half of What Was Publicized,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.northjersey.com/sports/pro_sports/120309_Nets_
naming_rights_deal_is_half_of_what_was_publicized.html.
545. Steve Politi, Fans Should Walk Away from ‘Crazy’ NJ Nets and Possible New Owner Now,
NJ.COM (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.nj.com/nets/index.ssf/2009/09/politi_fans_should_walk_
away_f.html.
546. Rich Calder, NBA Deal is ‘Net’ Loss for B’klyn, N.Y. POST, Apr. 4, 2011, at 5.
547. Politi, supra note 545.
548. Eliot Brown, Ratner Sells Shopping-Center Stake, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471904576231293254223456.html?mod=google
news_wsj.
549. Charles V. Bagli, With Federal Case and Modular Building Plan, New Attention for
Atlantic Yards Project, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/nyregion/
18yards.html.
550. Norman Oder, Believable? Feds Told $249M in Immigrant Investor (EB-5) Funds Would
Create 3705 Construction Jobs, 350 in Retail, 1786 in Art/Entertainment, ATL. YARDS REPORT (Mar.
29, 2011), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2011/03/believable-feds-told-249m-in-immigrant.
html.
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funds would be used for the development of a new rail yard. 551 Therefore,
since the jobs created are not necessarily tied to the proposed EB-5 financing,
the financing method will likely be subject to future legal challenges.
Though the Atlantic Yards financing plan has not yet been finalized,
developers broke ground on the project in March 2010, just in time to utilize
the city’s $700 million bond offering. 552 Construction of the Barclays Center
itself has finally begun, and as of April 2011, thirty percent of the facility’s
steel is in place. The arena is now scheduled to open sometime during the
2012–-2013 season. Despite the difficulty in developing this sports.comm,
Ratner is already declaring the facility a success by promising that the
Barclays Center will host more than two hundred events in its first year of
operation. 553 However, the sports.comm surrounding the arena continues to
be stalled, and according to a recent filing by Ratner with the SEC, the project
might be scrapped altogether. 554 Ratner warned that rising construction costs,
higher financing costs, loss of arena sponsors, and an inability to meet
government-mandated deadlines could cause the project to fail completely.
The SEC filings further indicated that Ratner and the company could
potentially lose up to $525 million on the project. However, currently the plan
is proceeding and potential tenants have not yet been discouraged as the
sports.comm has the newfound financial security of being implicitly backed by
one of the richest people in the world, Prokhorov.
VI. FUTURE SPORTS.COMM
Not surprisingly, the sports.comm development plan has practically
become a prerequisite for any professional franchise owner seeking to build a
new facility today. By adopting this strategy, teams will be able to utilize the
increased revenues generated from an entertainment district to finance the
future renovation or replacement of an anchor sports venue. Future
sports.comms that have been discussed include proposals for the San
Francisco 49ers, Minnesota Vikings, Minnesota Twins, San Diego Chargers,
and the City of Los Angeles.

551. Bagli, supra note 549.
552. Officials to Break Ground on Atlantic Yards Project, NY1.COM (Mar. 10, 2010), http://
www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/115010/officials-to-break-ground-on-atlantic-yards-project.
553. John Brenan, Nets’ New Home Moving Forward, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 28, 2011),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/Nets_new_home_moving_forward.html.
554. Calder, supra note 546.
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San Francisco 49ers

The San Francisco 49ers recently unveiled their plans to create a
sports.comm surrounding their proposed new stadium in Santa Clara,
California. Due to the state’s ongoing budget crisis, any new development in
California that requires public support would require local government
financing, and, thus far, Santa Clara has proven to be a receptive community.
Moreover, the NFL has put the onus on local governments and franchise
owners to finance their projects because the League has stopped funding its
G3 Program, which had traditionally offered low-cost construction loans to
NFL franchise owners. 555
The preliminary proposal for the 49ers Santa Clara sports.comm would
basically split the cost of construction between the team and the city. Of the
$937 million proposed construction costs, the team would provide $493
million and the city would contribute $444 million. 556 The city’s investment
would come in the form of $114 million in a direct public subsidy and $330
million in naming rights sold by the newly-created Stadium Authority. 557 The
public subsidy would be broken down into $42 million from Redevelopment
District bonding, $20 million from increased energy utilities, $35 million from
hotel taxes, and $17 million from revenues generated from a proposed parking
garage. 558 The Stadium Authority investment would primarily include money
from the sale of personal seat licenses and stadium naming rights. 559
However, the project cost has already risen $50 million prior to construction;
therefore, all financing plans are preliminary. 560
Beyond the stadium, 49ers’ legend Joe Montana and former owner Eddie
DeBartolo have proposed further private investment on seven acres north of
the proposed stadium, which was recently approved by the Santa Clara City

555. Nancy Gay, Commissioner Not in Oakland to Make Changes, SFGATE (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-12-15/sports/17130277_1_roger-goodell-g3-east-bay. The new tenyear labor pact between NFL management and players provides for a credit for stadium projects of up
to 1.5% of all league revenues in a year. With the NFL surpassing $9 billion in annual revenues, the
annual 1.5% credit would make about $150 million per year in stadium financing available annually
through the 2020 season. 49ers Hopeful of Major NFL Investment, REVENUES FROM SPORTS
VENUES NEWSLETTER, July 28, 2011, at 10.
556. City of Santa Clara, Stadium Project Term Sheet, CITY OF SANTA CLARA, 34–35 (June 2,
2009), http://santaclaraca.gov/ftp/csc/pdf/49ers-Term-Sheet-Presentation.pdf.
557. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Price Rises on 49ers Stadium, REVENUES FROM SPORTS VENUES NEWSLETTER, June 9,
2011.
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Council. 561 The area would include a luxury hotel and entertainment center,
which would complement the stadium proposal. 562 Those plans are very
preliminary and will likely be finalized after the 49ers agreement with Santa
Clara is finalized in 2011. 563 Recently, the 49ers eliminated a lawsuit, one of
the remaining obstacles for the stadium project, by purchasing a Great
America theme park adjacent to the new planned Santa Clara stadium. 564
Construction on the new stadium is tentatively scheduled to begin in 2013
after the team obtains the requisite permits and approvals from the city. 565
B.

Minnesota Vikings

The Minnesota Vikings’ lease in their current facility, the Metrodome, will
expire after the 2011 season. The Vikings’ owners have said that they will not
renew their lease after that season. 566 Thus, the issue of a new Vikings’
stadium must be resolved this year. The Vikings have submitted a proposal to
have a new $1 billion, retractable roof stadium built for the Vikings in Arden
Hills, Minnesota, at the site of a former munitions plant. 567 The site is ten
miles from downtown St. Paul and is one of the largest undeveloped areas left
in Minnesota. 568 On the site the Vikings plan to build a 1.6 million square
foot stadium with 21,000 parking spaces, with an adjacent entertainment
district, including a Vikings Hall of Fame. 569

561. Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, 49ers Legends Plan Big Score Near Proposed Stadium,
SFGATE (Dec. 12, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-12-12/bay-area/25187959_1_mayoral-pollinterim-mayor-city-voters; Santa Clara OKs Joe Montana Hotel Project at Stadium Site, CBS SAN
FRANCISCO (July 13, 2011), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2011/07/13/santa-clara-oks-joe-montana
-hotel-project-at-stadium-site/.
562. Santa Clara OKs Joe Montana Hotel Project at Stadium Site, supra note 561.
563. City of Santa Clara, San Francisco 49ers Proposal for a Football Stadium in the City of
Santa Clara, CITY OF SANTA CLARA, http://santaclaraca.gov/index.aspx?page=1197 (last visited Oct.
20, 2011).
564. 49ers Owners Investing in Purchase of Great America Theme Park, SPORTS BUS. DAILY
(Sept. 20, 2011) http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/09/20/Facilities/49ersStadium.aspx.
565. City of Santa Clara, supra note 563.
566. Don Davis, State Sets Friday Vikings Stadium Bill Deadline, W. CENT. TRIB. (Minn.), June
14, 2011, at STATE AND REGIONAL NEWS.
567. Mike Kaszuba, et al., Vikings, Ramsey Co. Strike Deal, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) (May 11, 2011),
http://www.startribune.com/sports/vikings/121580574.html.
568. Id.
569. Id.; The owner of the Vikings, Zygi Wolfs, is a real estate developer. The 2,400 acre site
offers a further mixed use development and “a daylong experience for Vikings fans, families and
friends,” said Wolfs. Vikings, Ramsey County Pitch Arden Hills Stadium Plan, CROOKSTON DAILY
TIMES (Minn.) (May 11, 2011) http://www.crookstontimes.com/state_news/x1058159425/VikingsRamsey-County-pitch-Arden-Hills-stadium-plan.
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Financing for this project has been a major obstacle. To finance the
stadium, the Vikings and the county would contribute $407 million and $350
million, respectively. 570 The state would then have to contribute the last $300
million. 571 To this point, to obtain financing the state has looked into
receiving federal grants, taking out loans, and imposing several new taxes. 572
The public bitterly opposed any plan that includes an increase in taxes. 573 The
taxes discussed include a ten percent tax on the sale of all pro-sports
memorabilia sold in Minnesota, which other Minnesota sports teams believe to
be unfair. 574 Another tax that has been hotly contested would be a surcharge
on NFL players who play in the new stadium, which may violate the
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. 575
However, the Vikings’ original proposal did not take into account the
significant road improvements that would be needed in Arden Hills to
accommodate the 21,000 or so vehicles that would be attending Vikings home
games. 576 The improvements, which would include road expansions and
reconfiguring interchanges, were estimated at $131 million. 577 Moreover,
Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton and other politicians have indicated that
they would not support the state’s financing of the project until those
additional costs are addressed—without requiring any new state funds. 578
The state had originally set a soft deadline of June 17, 2011, for drafting a
stadium bill. 579 However, this date came and went without any resolution to
the state’s problem. 580 The state still needs to resolve the $130 million gap in
funding, decide transportation needs for the new stadium, and make
arrangements for how the stadium will be managed. 581 The state wants to
ensure that the stadium will be “a people’s stadium, (with) events like high-

570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Kevin Duchschere, Teams Not Wild About 2 Tax Ideas for Stadium, STAR TRIB. (Minn.),
June 16, 2011, at 1A.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Dave Orrick, Vikings, Ramsey County Unveil Proposal to Pay for Arden Hills Road Work,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 12, 2011, at VIKINGS.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. No Stadium Deal but ‘Substantial Progress,’ Vikings Say, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June
17, 2011, at LEGISLATURE [hereinafter No Stadium Deal].
580. Id.
581. Don Davis, State Sets Friday Vikings Stadium Bill Deadline, W. CENT. TRIB. (Minn.), June
14, 2011, at STATE AND REGIONAL NEWS.
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school and amateur sports, civic and community events, (and) public access
consistent with (what’s) held at the Metrodome.” 582 Discussions on these
issues were expected to resume June 20, 2011. 583 Some proposals included
plans for a convention center and hotel; however, this concept received mixed
reviews given that the relevant metro area already has two convention
centers. 584 Once a bill is drafted, a special session of the state legislature will
need to be called to debate the bill. 585 However, Minnesota’s recent
government shutdown has further delayed the project. House Speaker Kurt
Zellers admitted, “We haven’t had any discussions about what’s in, [or] what’s
not, in that proposal. . . . We haven’t looked at [it] for weeks, you know—I
would say even months.” 586 Therefore, the development of a Vikings
sports.comm remains stalled, but proponents are confident that a deal will
eventually get done.
C.

Minnesota Twins

A second Minnesota sports.comm is also likely to be developed in the
future surrounding Target Field, home of the Minnesota Twins, which opened
in 2010. The new stadium seats 40,000 and was strategically constructed to
increase pedestrian traffic in the area, which also includes the Target Center,
home of the Minnesota Timberwolves. 587 Mike Christenson, head of the
city’s Community Planning and Economic Development department stated,
“We expect about 2.5 million fans to come down to this ballpark. . . . We want
them to come down here and stay and walk the city.” 588 The stadium was
designed with a large plaza extending toward the heart of downtown to
encourage people to stay in the area before and after games; however, to date,
there has been little development surrounding the ballpark. 589

582. No Stadium Deal, supra note 579.
583. Id.
584. Convention Hotel Proposal Comes with Vikings’ Plans, REVENUES FROM SPORTS VENUES
NEWSLETTER, Sept. 8, 2011, at 10.
585. Kevin Duchschere, Goal on Stadium Deadline Fading, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), June 17, 2011,
at 3B.
586. Mike Kaszuba & Rochelle Olson, Vikings Ready to Talk Stadium, STARTRIBUNE.COM (July
14, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/blogs/125601388.html.
587. Brandt Williams, Economic Boost Around Target Field a Spotty Story, MINN. PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/04/02/target-field-economicboost/.
588. Id.
589. Jay Weiner, Target Field: Economic Impact is Years—and Dreams—Away, MINNPOST
(Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2010/04/09/17249/target_field_economic_impact
_is_years_--_and_dreams_--_away.
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The construction of an entertainment district around Target Field is
inevitable, but political and economic realities will delay the project. Steve
Berg, author of the book “Target Field: The Minnesota Twins’ New Home,”
explained that “Target Field has opened at an absolutely terrible time for
ancillary development.” 590 Tentative proposals for the land surrounding
Target Field include a thirty-five-story “sports and entertainment
condominium” development that would feature eleven floors of hotel rooms
and twenty floors of condos connected to the stadium. 591 Other proposals for
the land include a forty-story office tower. 592 The most recent proposal
submitted by Developer Hines Interests would create a $30 million, 185-unit
apartment building called Dock Street Apartments. 593 The proposal calls for
the development of a “transit-oriented community,” which would take
advantage of the stadium’s nearby railway. 594 However, due to the recession,
the Target Field sports.comm remains stalled and no project is likely to move
forward until at least 2012.
D. San Diego Chargers
In April 2011 the City of San Diego released a report stating that the
Chargers’ stadium, Qualcomm Stadium, needs about $80 million in
maintenance and improvements—including $18 million for mechanical issues,
$17 million for site repairs, $12 million for plumbing, $9.6 million for a new
video display, and $780,000 for replacing and repairing stadium seats. 595 The
study concluded that the City of San Diego will lose more than $10 million a
year if the Chargers continue to stay at Qualcomm stadium. 596 For years the
Chargers have been asking the city for a new stadium, and given that
renovating the current stadium would be so costly, building a new stadium
would seem to be a good option. 597
However, complicating the building of a new stadium in San Diego is the
fact that competing developers in Los Angeles are planning to build a new

590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id.
593. Jennifer Bjorhus, Stalled Ballpark Village Plan Awakens, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), July 8, 2011,
at 1D.
594. Id.
595. Brent Schrotenboer & Matthew T. Hall, Fixing Stadium Would Cost $80 Million; Study
Projects Yearly Loss to City from Operating Site at more than $10 Million, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
May 21, 2011, at A1.
596. Id.
597. Id.
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stadium in hopes of attracting an NFL franchise to relocate to Los Angeles. 598
Rumors have circulated that the Chargers could be that franchise. 599
Obviously, the city of San Diego will not be as willing to spend money on
improving the old Qualcomm stadium or building a new stadium for a team
that might choose to leave at any time. 600
The most recent proposal that would give the Chargers a new stadium,
which includes an entire sports and entertainment complex in downtown San
Diego, would cost an estimated $800 million, plus $150 million in site
preparations. 601 Yet, it remains unforeseen how this project would be
financed. 602 Any money needed for downtown redevelopment projects must
be weighed against other city needs, which at this time include schools and
libraries. 603 On June 15, 2011, the California state legislature approved a
2011/2012 budget that would jeopardize redevelopment efforts in San Diego
and across the state of California. 604 The budget has not yet been approved by
the governor, but if it is, redevelopment agencies will be forced to give local
school districts their usual share of property taxes, which up until now have
been diverted to redevelopment efforts. 605 This change would not only affect
financing for downtown redevelopment projects, such as the new Chargers’
stadium, but also affordable housing projects throughout the state. 606 On the
positive side, if the governor approves the budget, the state will not have to cut
as much educational funding as originally anticipated. 607
Overall, the attitude on getting a new stadium in San Diego is not
optimistic. Jay Jeffcoat, the former chairman of the San Diego International
Sports Council, was quoted as saying “I think it’s south of 50 percent that we
can get a new stadium.” 608 Meanwhile, the prospect for getting a new
stadium in Los Angeles seems to be an ever-increasing possibility. 609 The

598. Id.
599. Id.
600. See id.
601. Tim Sullivan, Area’s Wait for New Chargers Stadium not Going Anywhere Fast, or
Anywhere at All?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 10, 2011, at D1.
602. Id.
603. Schrotenboer & Hall, supra note 595.
604. Roger Showley, Redevelopment Bill that Threatens Local Funding in Doubt; Downtown
Effort Could Lose $50M to San Diego Schools, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 17, 2011, at A3.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Sullivan, supra note 601.
609. Nate Davis, L.A. Wants NFL Team, But Which One?, USA TODAY, June 14, 2011, at 3C.
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Chargers’ owner has insisted that the Chargers are not for sale. 610 However, if
the stadium proposal in San Diego continues to go nowhere, the Chargers
could be forced to look elsewhere.
E.

Los Angeles

AEG, developer of the L.A. Live sports.comm, wants to bring the NFL
back to the city on a site where the Los Angles Convention Center West Hall
currently sits, and which is adjacent to the Staples Center. AEG proposes to
build a $350,000 million replacement West Hall and then begin construction
of a 1.7 million square foot, 72,000-seat retractable roof stadium, with
construction starting in 2012 and with completion in time to host the Super
Bowl in 2016. 611 While the football stadium would be privately financed,
AEG would need the city of Los Angeles to issue approximately $350 million
in municipal bonds to cover the cost of replacing the Convention Center’s
West Hall. 612
The project has been described as a globally influential project, or “a
world stage.” So much so that Farmers Insurance has entered into a thirtyyear agreement with AEG that would provide at least $700 million to name the
new stadium Farmers Field. 613 The Los Angeles City Council has formally
approved the outline of AEG’s $1.2 billion sports.comm proposal. 614
However, AEG is not the only developer proposing an NFL stadium in Los
Angeles.
Ed Roski and Majestic Realty Group of Los Angeles have approval for a
proposed 75,000-seat NFL stadium in Industry, California, now known as
Grand Crossing, located approximately 15 miles east of downtown Los
Angeles. 615 The stadium would be privately financed and would be the
centerpiece of a 600-acre mixed-use entertainment and retail complex, which

610. LA Sports Firm Wooing Teams; Chargers, Raiders are Among Targets, BOS. GLOBE, June
11, 2011, at 6.
611. New Los Angeles Stadium, BALLPARKS BY MUNSEY & SUPPES, http://football.ballparks.
com/NFL/LosAngeles/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
612. Scott Reid, Proposed L.A. NFL Stadium Would Require Bonds, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/aeg-284884-city-stadium.html.
613. Arash Markazi, Farmers to Sponsor L.A. NFL Stadium, ESPN LOS ANGELES (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/nfl/news/story?id=6078709.
614. Arash Markazi, LA Council Passes AEG’s Stadium Plan, ESPN LOS ANGELES (Aug. 10,
2011),
http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nfl/story/_/id/6847826/la-council-passes-aeg-plan-farmersfield.
615. Jacob Adelman, City Releases Tentative Agreement on LA Stadium, YAHOO! SPORTS (July
25, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/city-releases-tentative-agreement-la-stadium-004133229.html.
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includes 25,000 ample on-site parking spaces. 616 The proposed stadium
would seat 75,000 and the sports.comm would cost an estimated $800 million
overall, which would be privately financed; however, the city’s agreement
with Roski would require $275 million in bonds to renovate the site of the new
stadium. 617
Of course, in either case—whether it is downtown or in Grand Crossing—
nobody is moving forward without the commitment from either the NFL for
expansion or a commitment from a team in another city to move to Los
Angeles. The most likely candidates are an expansion team or teams that have
expressed their unhappiness with their current stadiums or leases, including
Jacksonville Jaguars, Minnesota Vikings, Oakland Raiders, and San Diego
Chargers. AEG President and CEO Tim Leiweke said in June of 2011 that the
NFL stadium in downtown Los Angeles could be scuttled if the city did not
sign off on the framework of the deal by July 31, 2011. 618 Significantly, in
September 2011, the California legislature approved ground-breaking
protections for AEG. Specifically, it passed a bill that would expedite judicial
review of the project, establish important environmental protections, and
prevent frivolous lawsuits that could delay the project. 619
VII. CONCLUSION
The future of happenstance development, sports.comms, delayed
sports.comms, or any other form of real estate development at, adjacent to, or
surrounding sports facilities is very much tied to the future of the local
economy in which the facility, development, or both is to be located. One
thing is for certain in this recessionary economy—it will become more and
more difficult to create new sports facilities due to the fact that it will be more
difficult to create public-private financing packages. The recession has
affected government units’ ability, appetite, or both, to fund a sports facility
and related projects. Reported governmental budget deficits at all levels of
government, changes in priorities with respect to governmental spending, cuts
and contraction in government employees and services, balanced budgets
616. Thomas Himes, Infrastructure Needed for Proposed Downtown Stadium, But So Far No
One Will Commit to Paying for It, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://www.sgvtribune.com/stadium/ci_17297487.
617. Adelman, supra note 615.
618. Leiweke Says AEG May Scrap L.A. Stadium Plan if City Doesn’t Give OK by July 31,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (June 3, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/
06/03/Facilities/LA-Stadium.aspx.
619. California Gov. Signs Bill Fast-tracking Lawsuits That Challenge AEG’s L.A. Stadium,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Sept. 28, 2011), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/
09/28/Facilities/LA-Stadium.aspx.
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through spending cuts or increases in taxes or fees, capacity of governmental
units to back bonds, political backlash against use of public funding for
stadium-related projects, and difficulties in getting either elected official
support or public referendum approval have made it most difficult for
governmental units to fund sports-related projects in the current political and
economic climate.
Unfortunately, the economy is not likely to get better anytime soon for
commercial developers. A report from the Congressional Oversight Panel in
February 2011 indicated that commercial property was less affected than
residential real estate in the recession but still faces a painful recovery. 620
According to the Federal Reserve, banks have incurred $80 billion in
commercial real estate losses, which is about only half of what they were
expected to be as a result of the recession. 621 Moreover, Elizabeth Warren,
Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel created to oversee the U.S.
banking bailout, formerly known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
warned of a “tidal wave of commercial-loan failures.” 622 However, Patrick
Parkinson, a Federal Reserve official, in the follow-up hearing on commercial
real estate held by the same Oversight Panel, said that “worst-case scenarios
are becoming increasingly unlikely.” 623
Despite the economic uncertainty, the sports.comm concept is flexible
enough to give cities a multitude of options for economic development.
Delayed sports.comms make all the sense in the world. It is proven that a
sports facility draws people and can create commerce. Owners and
government units are interested in increasing revenues through 365-day use of
facilities by creating destination draws to districts. Therefore, if the Green
Bay Packers plan of acquiring adjacent and surrounding real estate becomes a
continuing trend in the industry, it is likely to be followed by other cities. The
ability to retain 100% of the stadium revenues created by a sports.comm will
likely motivate owners to attempt different strategies in creating their own.
Another trend that has begun to emerge may be what we call “clustering.”
Livestrong Sporting Park is a soccer-specific stadium located in Kansas City,
Kansas, and the home of Sporting Kansas City. The stadium opened during
the 2011 MLS season. 624 The stadium is located near the Village West Retail
620. Rob Purnell, The Shepherd Perspective Volume IX, SHEPHERD CAPITAL PARTNERS (Feb.
15, 2011), http://shepherdcapitalpartners.com/the-shepherd-perspective-volume-ix/.
621. Id.
622. Anton Troianovski, Commercial Real Estate Coming Back, but Unevenly, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
7, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704843304576126442295848066.html.
623. Id.
624. Dave Skretta, New Stadium, New Name, New Attitude for MLS in KC, STANDARDEXAMINER (July 23, 2011), http://www.standard.net/stories/2011/07/23/new-stadium-new-name-
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Center in Kansas City, which is near the Kansas City Speedway and
Community America Ballpark. 625 The new location site permits the
developers to take advantage of foot traffic created by the already existing
sports district to further develop surrounding real estate for new facilities and
commercial purposes.
Finally, team owners unable to acquire land adjacent to their stadium,
often due to the venue’s downtown location, have begun to buy existing bars,
restaurants, and retailers rather than build a new entertainment district. Such a
strategy allows the team owner to reap the benefits of nonshared stadium
revenues without the risk of developing a new entertainment district in the
midst of a recession. The Boston Red Sox have epitomized this strategy,
beginning with Fenway Park’s renovation in 2005. 626 The Red Sox have been
aggressively buying real estate within the area including restaurants, a taxi
garage, and a radio station headquarters. 627
What follows is an outline of best practices for creating a successful
sports.comm:
a) Anchor Facilities
i)Sports Venue
(1)Professional Sports Venue
(a)Easily convertible
(2)Additional venues to compliment the stadium to promote yearround use of the sports.comm
(a)Minor League Baseball
(b)MLS
(c)Lacrosse
(d)Extreme Sports
(3)Multiple events to attract multiple people, including hockey
games,
soccer
matches,
concerts,
tournaments,
commencements, boxing matches, bowl games, revivals,
winter carnivals, monster truck rallies, motocross events, etc.
ii)Retail Store
(1)Bass Pro Shops
(a)Regional Attraction
(2)Other large retailers that are unique to the region
new-attitude-mls-kc.
625. Id.
626. Scott Van Voorhis, Sox Owners Add Another Fenway Property to Lineup, BOS. HERALD,
Aug. 11, 2005, at 45.
627. Id.
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(3)Must satisfy all price points
iii)Commercial
(1)Corporate Headquarters
(2)Regional Hospital
(3)Convention Center
iv)Hotel
(1)Preferably near or connected to the stadium
v)Residential
(1)Hotels
(2)Condominiums
(3)Must satisfy all price points
vi)Historical
(1)Museum
(a)To synergize modern development with city’s historical
character.
b) Auxiliary Developments
i)Entertainment
(1)Restaurants (all price points)
(2)Bars (all price points)
(3)Movie Theater
(4)Concert Venue
(5)Recreational
(a)Sports
(b)Interactive Video Games
(c)Other Corporate “team building” opportunities
ii)Retail
(1)Options unique within the region
(a)Fit identity of the development
(2)Outlet malls
(3)Farmer’s Market
iii)Transportation
(1)Should be located near a major transportation hub
(a)Train station
(b)Airport
(c)Highway
(d)Waterway
c) Community Benefits
i)Community Benefits Agreement
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ii)Walkable downtown
(1)Market Street Design—Shops below residential buildings for
cohesion
iii)New Infrastructure
(1)Street beautification
(2)Parks (“green space”)
(3)Roads/bridges/canals
iv)New Jobs with living wages
(1)Grocery store
(2)Reasonable retail and dining options for low income residents
and new workers
Regardless of the real estate development strategy imposed, team owners
will continually attempt to create their own sports.comm due to the obvious
economic and social benefits they have been shown to create. Sports.comms
are people attracters and can transform a city into an entertainment destination.
They can revitalize blighted areas. Most importantly, a sports.comm can
change the dynamic between a sports team and a city by providing unique
community benefits that would most likely not have been offered under a
traditional stadium financing agreement.

